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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL ANTI-




At the time of their enactment, the Clean Water Act (CWA)' and the
Clean Air Act (CAA)2 were envisioned as statutory schemes permitting fed-
eral agencies and corps of local private attorneys general to work together to
conserve and enhance the country's air and water resources through admin-
istrative actions and private citizen suits. 3 Citizen suit enforcement has not
reached its potential to compel compliance with anti-pollution laws. Many
complex factors such as financing, sophisticated technology, standing, and
discovery present formidable barriers to potential plaintiffs. The need to dis-
tribute enforcement responsibilities between the public and private sectors,
however, remains undiminished. It is essential, therefore, that citizen suits
assume a vital role in the protection of the nation's air and water resources.
As the concept of citizen suits evolved in the 1970's, private enforcement
became the principal means for inducing the Environmental Protection
Agency to take regulatory or prosecutorial action under anti-pollution laws.
4
The incidence of reported private suits brought directly against polluters was
relatively small in both number and effect; fewer than twenty-five suits were
reported between 1970 and 1978 under the CWA and CAA.5 Despite the
plan by Congress to create a broad-based enforcement scheme, 6 the private
sector never has emerged as an effective auxiliary to EPA's enforcement
efforts.
The potential for private enforcement contributions expands and con-
tracts with shifting political fortunes. For example, under the present federal
* J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 1983; Law Clerk to Chief Judge Anthony A.
Alaimo, Federal District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. The author would like to
express his gratitude to J. Gustave Speth for his inspiration and help with this article.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601-7642 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (CWA's grant of authority to bring citizen
suits). Set also 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. V 1981) (similar enforcement mechanism in the CAA).
For case law application of citizen suits under the CWA, see City of Evansville v. Kentucky
Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1014-17 (7th Cir. 1979).
4. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(suit to compel EPA promulgation of effluent limitation guidelines under the CWA).
5. Figure based on applicable statutes analyzed through LEXIS research system.
6. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 79, repnted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3668. "The Committee has established a provision in the bill that would provide citizen
participation in the enforcement of control requirements and regulations .. " Id. at 3745. See
also Senate Debate on S. 4358, Sept. 21, 1970, repnnted in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIVISION
OF CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, A Legislative Histoiy of The Clean Air Amendments of
1970, Vol. 1 (1974). "[Clitizens can be a useful instrument for detecting violations and bringing
them to the attention of the enforcement agencies and courts alike." Id. at 280 n.35.
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administration, EPA's enforcement programs have been substantially re-
structured because of agency budget reductions. Whereas the total EPA
budget for fiscal year 1981 was approximately $1.4 billion, the 1982 budget
was only $1.16 billion. 7 During debate over the 1983 fiscal year budget,
then EPA Director Anne Burford projected further reductions in agency
spending to approximately $975 million.8 It is estimated that these cuts
have reduced the actual spending power of the EPA by sixty percent in
1983, taking into account present rates of inflation.9 The effects of this
budget shrinkage are currently being felt. Agency staff has decreased from
10,381 employees to 8,340 for fiscal year 1983, and EPA staff enforcement
attorneys have been cut from 200 to just 30.10
Budgetary pressure is not the only cause of the EPA's reduced enforce-
ment of water and air quality laws; policy changes also influence enforce-
ment activity. For example, Congress has directed the EPA to focus its
attentions on the implementation of the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA)"I and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),'
2
which will demand a substantial part of the EPA's enforcement capabilities
for the next three years.1 3 The EPA has modified its enforcement policies in
other areas. The agency will no longer pursue cases solely for civil money
penalties. 14 Thus, although polluters substantially violate a federal pollu-
tion standard or emissions permit, the EPA will not bring actions against
them unless injunctive relief or cleanup steps are appropriate remedies. 5
The result of these budgetary pressures and policy modifications is a reduced
number of referral cases to the Department of Justice for enforcement pro-
ceedings. Approximately 100 cases were transferred to the Department of
Justice for prosecution in the first eighteen months of the Reagan
Administration. 16
Vigorous enforcement of anti-pollution laws in the future will depend
upon the initiative of private attorneys general. The purpose of this article is
to reexamine the concept of the citizen suit and evaluate its use as an en-
forcement tool. This process will involve three steps: 1) consideration of the
present law governing private suits against polluters; 2) discussion of the
practical difficulties facing the development of a widespread private move-
ment to enforce anti-pollution laws in the United States; and 3) examination
of one source of potential citizen enforcement litigation in CWA violations.
7. EPA Hard Hit By Budget Cuts, Sci. MAG., Oct. 16, 1981, at 306.
8. The 'Ice Queen'at EPA, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1981, at 67-68.
9. Pollution Is Our Most Important Product, NATION, Nov. 7, 1981, at 473-75.
10. EPA. Is Prodded Into Toxic Waste Rules, 68 A.B.A. J. 250, 250 (1982).
It. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
13. Interview with James Heenahan, Enforcement Attorney, EPA Region III, in Philadel-
phia (Mar. 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Heenahan Interview]; see also SCI. MAG., supra note 7,
at 306.
14. LEGAL TIMEs OF WASHINGTON, Nov. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
15. Id.
16. This figure is approximated from information derived from NEWSWEEK, supra note 8,
at 67, and Washington Post, June 23, 1982, at A25, col. 3. As those articles reported, approxi-
mately 69 cases were referred to the Department of Justice from January 1981 through March
1982; 31 cases were referred from March to June 1982.
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II. PROCEDURAL STRUCTURE OF CITIZEN SUITS
The CAA established the statutory model for citizen suit provisions in
subsequent anti-pollution and substantive environmental protection stat-
utes. 17 These clauses provide liberal access to the courts and administrative
agency resources. Generally, any person may bring a suit based on a viola-
tion of a federal pollution law, regulation, or permit issued under that law. 18
By not requiring plaintiffs to allege an injury in fact to obtain standing,
Congress hoped to recruit citizens to serve as private attorneys general to
facilitate enforcement of statutes in the face of official inaction.19 An excep-
tion to this general standing rule was created in the CWA, which defines a
citizen as a "person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected." '20 Thus, standing to sue under the CWA is available to those per-
sons who qualify as plaintiffs under the standing criteria established in Sierra
Club v. Morton.2 ' Given the broad interpretation of Sierra Club applied in
recent citizen suits decisions, 22 this stricter standard for standing probably is
not a significant impediment to private suits.
Jurisdiction over citizen suits is vested exclusively in the federal
courts.23 Parties are thereby spared the need to establish diversity of parties
or a minimum claim for damages as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 or
other jurisdictional statutes. 24 Of course, jurisdiction over citizen actions
may be acquired through other laws such as the Administrative Procedure
Act,25 but, in general, violations of anti-pollution laws fall under the juris-
diction of the federal courts without resort to other statutes.
Notice requirements form the only limitation on the jurisdiction of the
courts to entertain citizen suits. Under each statute allowing private en-
forcement actions, private plaintiffs must notify interested parties, the gov-
ernment of the state where the alleged violation occurred, and the EPA
administrator of the contemplated action sixty days in advance of the suit's
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (Toxic Substances Control Act); 16 U.S.C. § 1
5
40(g)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Endan-
gered Species Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1976) (Deep Water Port Act); 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1976)
(Noise Control Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Energy Conservation Act).
18. Set, e.g., Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511
F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (general standing requirements relaxed for citizen suits).
19. Id.
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
21. 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (plaintiff required to allege facts showing he is adversely affected).
See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 701 nn.47-8 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Loveladies Property Owners Ass'n v. Raab, 430 F. Supp. 276, 280 (D. N.J. 1975) (appli-
cation of the Sierra Club o. Morton standing rule).
22. See O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Pymatuning
Water Shed Citizens for a Hygienic Environment v. Eaton, 506 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(suit to halt sewage discharges from municipal treatment plant).
23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (CAA's liberal grant of federal
jurisdiction). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The CWA states that "dis-
trict courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizen-
ship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard of limitation." Id.
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1356(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 83
(2d Cir. 1975).
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commencement in federal district court. 26 Notice provides the agency with
an opportunity to seek abatement of the violation through administrative
means.2 7 In NRDC v. Trainh,28 Judge Leaventhal agreed that the notice sec-
tion of the CWA's citizen suit provision was designed to give the EPA an
opportunity to act on the alleged violation, and the court should therefore
"stay its hand" when the administrator might be able to act informally and
obviate the need for litigation.
29
The EPA has authority to influence the polluter in various ways. For
example, under the CAA, the EPA administrator is empowered on the basis
of information available to him, to give a violator thirty days to comply with
the applicable standard. 30 If compliance is not achieved, the EPA may insti-
tute a civil suit or issue an administrative order to bring the pollution source
into compliance.3 The threat of such administrative action or the adminis-
trative order itself may alleviate the pollution problem without further
action.
Several exceptions to the sixty-day notice requirement are found in pol-
lution legislation and case law. Where targets of enforcement are discharg-
ers of hazardous substances, citizens may commence suit immediately; no
deferral period is imposed where there is threat of public injury.32 Another
exception to the notice requirement has been noted by at least two courts.
26. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (CWA's notice requirements for
citizen suits). Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d
231, 243-44 (3d Cir. 1980) (60 day notice provisions were constructively satisfied).
27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also S. REP. No. 1196, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 35-6 (1970). The purpose of notifying the EPA of a potential suit against pollut-
ing parties was described by the Senate Committee which drafted the citizen suit clauses:
"Government initiative in seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has been restrained.
Authorizing citizens to bring suits for violations of standards should motivate governmental
agencies charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings." Id.
28. 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (a suit by private parties to compel the EPA to publish
effluent regulations as required under the law). Subsequent cases involving private actions
against polluters have upheld the notice requirement. Plaintiffs in Pymatuning Water Shed
Citizens v. Eaton, 506 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1980), were allowed to maintain an action
against the local municipal water treatment facilities which had failed to comply with their
permit, only after a showing that plaintiffs had given 60 days notice of the action to the EPA
and the Pennsylvania State Department of Environmental Resources. Id. at 907-08. Similarly,
in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) the
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of jurisdiction to fishing groups seeking damages and other
remedies from local municipalities for alleged dumping of waste materials in violation of CWA.
Id. at 22. The plaintiffs had failed to notify government agencies of the prospective suit, ignor-
ing the 60 day prior notice requirement. Id. at 14. The Court emphasized that plaintiffs invok-
ing the citizen suit provisions "first must comply with specified procedures." Id.
See also Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119, 121-22 (1st Cir.
1976) (complaint for alleged CWA violations dismissed for failure to provide actual or construc-
tive notice); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681,690 (7th Cir. 1975) (action brought
pursuant to CAA failed to satisfy 60 day notice requirement).
After plaintiffs in Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Colum-
bia, 511 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975) failed to provide 60 days notice of the suit, they filed an
identical claim 60 days after the first unnoticed complaint in order to meet the requirements of
the CAA. Id. at 814.
29. Meb-opo/lan Washington Coalitton for Clean Air, 511 F.2d at 814.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1980) (allowing imme-
diate actions for violations involving toxic materials).
FEDERAL ANTI-POLLUTION LAWS
Where administrative action would be inadequate to provide relief from the
violation alleged 33 or where the agency refuses to take any action against the
polluter,34 constructive notice of the suit will satisfy the statute. In effect,
constructive notice allows plaintiffs to commence their suit prior to the pas-
sage of the sixty-day notice period.
3 5
In addition to encouraging the EPA to take administrative action where
it would be beneficial to the public interest, notice of a citizen enforcement
suit allows the agency to intervene in the proceeding. 36 The EPA has the
statutory authority to intervene in any citizen action as a matter of right.
3 7
Agency intervention may have useful consequences for the plaintiffs' case.
Parties violating emissions standards or discharging beyond their permitted
levels are more inclined to cooperate with the EPA than with private plain-
tiffs during discovery proceedings or settlement negotiations. Another ad-
vantage of agency intervention is citizen access to EPA's extensive system of
information on all permittees and discharging entities in the region.
38
The EPA is under no obligation, however, to intervene in suits against
polluters initiated by citizens. 39 In fact, since it is the EPA's failure to obtain
compliance with the relevant pollution standard which initially creates the
need for citizen action, the agency may be reluctant to participate. Thus,
despite notification of the suit, EPA may decide to entrust the private attor-
ney general with responsibility for the enforcement action.
As stated in the amendments to the CAA, any person may commence a
civil action on his own behalf against any person "alleged to be in violation
of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this chapter or, (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or State with respect to such a standard or limi-
tation . . . ."40 Similar language is contained in other anti-pollution and
environmental protection laws.41 The courts consistently require that plain-
tiffs show a violation of a clear cut standard issued under the pertinent anti-
pollution law. For example, the defendants in O'Leag v. Moyer's Landfill,
Inc. ,42 were accused of recirculating hazardous leachate materials into their
33. See Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119, 121 (lst Cir. 1976)
(citing CWA's legislative history).
34. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1975)
(citing Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974).
35. See generally supra notes 33-34.
36. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
37. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
38. Interview with Thomas Voltaggio, Division Chief, EPA Region III Compliance Divi-
sion, in Philadelphia (Mar. 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Voltaggio Interview]. See Friends of
the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976). In this case the Second Circuit declared that
"the EPA's participation in a citizen enforcement suit is welcomed by the court, since the EPA,
as the agency vested by Congress with important overall responsibilities related to the matter
under consideration, possesses expertise which should enable it to make a major contribution."
Id. at 173.
39. Friends of the Earth v. Casey, 535 F.2d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 1976); Metropolitan Washing-
ton Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 809, 814-15 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
41. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 491 l(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Noise Control Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (RCRA).
42. 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
1983]
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privately operated landfill, allowing some 100,000 to 200,000 gallons of the
waste liquid to seep from the landfill into a nearby river every month. The
landfill's state operating permit, issued pursuant to the CWA, proscribed the
treatment of leachate near the fill, requiring instead that landfill operators
transport the material to the municipal sewage treatment facility.4 3 The
finding of a clear violation of the defendant's permit sustained an order for
the repair and cleanup of the landfill site.
44
A comparable suit against the North and South Shenango, Penn-
sylvania, municipal water treatment plant resulted in a court order to the
defendants to rectify their plumbing problems. The treatment system had
emitted sewage into the local river on numerous occasions. 45 The court
found a clear violation of the plant's permit. Defendants' assertion that the
underground sewage transport system was poorly constructed and negli-
gently installed provided no defense to the permit violation. 46 Because the
CWA required the treatment plant to utilize the "Best Practical Technol-
ogy" (BPT) to meet its permit discharge requirements, the court's order
mandated that a plan, to install the technology or repair the system, be sub-
mitted to the court within ninety days of the order.
4 7
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further clarified the types of vio-
lations that are actionable under citizen suit provisions in City ofEvansville v.
Kentucky Liquid Recychng, Inc. 48 Plaintiffs brought suit claiming that defend-
ants had discharged toxic chemicals into the sewage treatment system,
thereby contaminating the Ohio River and the local water supply. 49 In ad-
dition to problems of insufficient notice and standing, which were addressed
by the court, the Seventh Circuit found that plaintiffs had failed to raise a
proper claim under the Act. Because plaintiffs had sought compensatory
damages for past acts violating CWA guidelines,50 the court held that the
statute authorizing civil action against a party "alleged to be in violation" of
effluent standards was not applicable. 5 1 To the extent that plaintiffs alleged
only past violations, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim.
The Evansville plaintiffs failed to seek remedies satisfying the statute.
Had they sought an injunction on the grounds that the defendants' past acts
indicated a pattern of behavior that was likely to lead to future violations,
the court may have granted relief. The parties in O'Leag v. Moyer's Landfill,
Inc. ,52 on the other hand, succeeded under similar facts, by showing that
defendants' discharges in excess of the permitted levels had occurred on a
regular basis in the past, and that defendants had taken no more than stop-
gap measures to remedy the violations. 53 By showing that the violations
43. Id. at 651-53.
44. Id. at 659.
45. P)'atuning Water Shed, 506 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
46. Id. at 909.
47. Id.
48. 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979) (citizens suit brought under the CWA).
49. Id. at 1010.
50. Id. at 1014.
51. Id.
52. 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
53. Id. at 652-53.
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were likely to continue, plaintiffs provided the court with an adequate basis
to grant injunctive relief.
54
III. REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN CITIZEN SUITS
Private enforcement actions provide a number of remedial options for
pollution law violations. Injunctive relief is a common remedy awarded to
successful plaintiffs in citizen enforcement actions. Private suits may enforce
anti-pollution laws by obtaining court-ordered compliance with the applica-
ble standard or limitation. This compliance order may take the form of pro-
hibitory or mandatory injunctive relief.5 5 Secondly, where appropriate
remedies are not readily identifiable, the court may rely on its equitable au-
thority to require a polluter to submit a plan describing the steps he will take
to attain compliance with the standard violated. 56 This was the course
taken by the court in PImatumn)g Water Shed.5 7 The technological problems
involved in repairing defendant's water treatment facility plumbing were
not sufficiently understood by the court that immediate compliance could be
demanded; but the court did require, in cooperation with the state and the
EPA, preparation of a plan for compliance within a reasonable time.
58
A third remedial category is civil penalty. Requests for civil penalties
are not often granted, though they are appropriately requested under the
CWA.59 In many cases, courts consider that the penalty money would be
more wisely invested in the effort to attain compliance rather than in puni-
tive sanctions.6° The judiciary may be reluctant to allow private citizens to
bring cases seeking quasi-criminal sanctions in the form of civil fines for pol-
lution violations. Although Congress sought to create private attorneys gen-
eral under anti-pollution laws, the spirit of citizen enforcement actions casts
plaintiffs in the role of protectors of their immediate environment, rather
than in the role of society's corporate watchdogs. 6 1 Pursuit of penalties
against violators is more appropriate as an agency function.
62
Another reason for judicial unwillingness to award civil penalties is the
statutory reservation to plaintiffs of private common law causes of action.
63
54. Id. at 659.
55. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also National Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (establishing timetable for defend-
ants to comply with CAA).
56. Pmatuning Water Shed, 506 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1980); see supra text accompanying
notes 45-47.
57. 506 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
58. Id. at 909.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
60. See O'Leary, 523 F. Supp. at 659.
61. Volhaggio Interview, supra note 38.
62. Id.
63. Citizen suit provisions in CWA and CAA create no implied private cause of action as
has been held to exist in other federal statutes. See generaly Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
Implied actions were discussed by the Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clamrnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1982). The structure of the CWR and its "legislative history
both lead us to conclude that Congress intended that private remedies in addition to those
expressly provided should not be implied. Where, as here, Congress has made clear that im-
plied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are not authorized to ignore this legisla-
tive judgment." Id. at 18. Citizen suit clauses, however, do specifically reserve for plaintiffs any
19831
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Thus, citizens may pursue damages emanating from the violation in a sepa-
rate action. The availability to plaintiffs of these civil remedies may affect
the inclination of courts to impose penalties on polluters.
IV. ATTORNEYS FEES
Although plaintiffs rarely recover damages under citizen suit enabling
clauses, private attorneys general are eligible for attorneys fees. All citizen
suit clauses in anti-pollution laws provide for the award of attorneys fees to
"any party, whenever the court determines that such an award is appropri-
ate." 64 Recent judicial discussion of attorneys fees clauses has affirmed the
viability of fee awards before the courts.
In Sierra Club v. Gorsuch ,65 the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia awarded attorneys fees to the Sierra Club and co-plaintiff Environ-
mental Defense Fund (EDF), despite the fact that plaintiffs did not
substantially prevail in their suit challenging regulations controlling sulfur
dioxide and particulate emissions, promulgated by the EPA under the
CAA.
6 6 In its two-pronged analysis the court first considered whether the
questions raised by plaintiffs in the course of the suit were significant. Sec-
ond, the court evaluated whether the plaintiffs substantially assisted the
court in its consideration of the important questions raised. 67 The contro-
versy before the court also presented the first major judicial review of the
rulemaking procedures adopted in the 1977 amendments to the CAA.
6 8
At trial, plaintiffs had alerted the court to several crucial issues regard-
ing EPA's rulemaking procedure for the challenged rule.69 In addition,
counsel for the EDF and the Sierra Club compiled extensive legislative his-
tory and factual background for the specific amendments under review, not
only enriching the court's understanding of the issues but also saving the
court time in its deliberations. 70 The award of fees was justified by the court
on the grounds that the plaintiffs did substantially contribute to the goals of
the Act:
the issues they addressed were important, complex and novel; their
assistance in the resolution of the issues was substantial and not
duplicative of the efforts of other parties; and the caliber of their
written and oral presentations was exemplary. While the occasions
upon which non-prevailing parties will meet such criteria may be
exceptional [cite omitted], Sierra Club is such an occasion. 7
Contrary to the general rule that parties bear their own litigation ex-
other common law actions they might have. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
64. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
65. 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 254 (1982).
66. 672 F.2d at 34.
67. Id. at 39-42.
68. Id. at 40.
69. Id. at 40-41.
70. Id. at 41.
71. Id. at 39.
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penses regardless of the suit's outcome,72 the decision in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch
is the latest in a line of cases that have established the principles of fee
awards to parties who seek to enforce federal anti-pollution laws through
private suits.73 Because courts have recognized that awards of attorneys fees
provide a major incentive for parties to undertake public interest litigation,
it is not surprising that Congress voted to codify this socially utilitarian prac-
tice into environmental statutes.
The rationale for attorneys fees awards in citizen suits is not the reim-
bursement of the party "wronged" in the litigation. 74 Theoretically,
whether a party prevails in a suit brought to enforce anti-pollution laws is
inconsequential in determining the award of fees:
[T]he purposes of the authority to award fees are not only to
discourage frivolous litigation, but also to encourage litigation
which will assure proper implementation and admtm'stration of the act or
otherwise serve the public interest. The committee did not intend
that the court's discretion to award fees under this provision should
be restricted to cases in which the party seeking fees was the "pre-
vailing party." In fact, such amendment was expressly rejected by
the committee, largely on the grounds set forth in NRDCv. EPA .75
The phrase "proper implementation and administration of the act"
' 7 6
has been interpreted narrowly by the courts. 7 7 Only cases brought under the
jurisdiction of the citizen suit clause itself may qualify for fee awards; suits
brought to remedy actions illegal under the act, but nonetheless not included
in those violations of effluent or emission standards or limitations, are subject
to the historical prohibition against fee awards. 78 Thus, where suits are
properly commenced to enforce emission standards or similar anti-pollution
limitations under the laws which provide for citizen action, prevailing plain-
tiffs are entitled to receive fee awards from defendant polluters. Courts
award fees or request parties to negotiate a proper fee settlement consistent
with the terms of the act and subject to the approval of the court.
79
In Alabama Power Co. v. Corsuch ,80 a companion case to Sierra Club, the
court addressed, among other issues, whether environmental groups, which
had intervened on behalf of the EPA, were entitled to an award of attorneys
fees under the CAA. 8' EPA opposed the award of attorneys fees, asserting
72. Seegenerally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
73. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir.
1973); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Natural Resources, 512 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Haw. 1981); Save
Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136 (D. R.I. 1977); Citizens Ass'n v.
Washington, 383 F. Supp. 136 (D. D.C. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 535 F.2d 1318 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
74. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 79, repnhtedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3668, 3747.
75. H. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 337, reprted tn 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1077, 1416 (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136 (D. R.I. 1977).
78. Id. at 1141.
79. See, e.g., Pymatunrng Water Shed, 506 F. Supp. at 909; Sierra Club, 672 F.2d at 42.
80. 672 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 4.
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that the intervenors had duplicated the EPA's efforts. The court held that
the Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund in their role as inter-
venors had "not demonstrated with any sort of particularity that their inter-
vention added in any essential way to EPA's stance on the issues involved, '82
and therefore, the court denied that portion of the award for attorneys fees
associated with the environmental groups' intervention.
The calculation of attorneys fees has been standardized under most fed-
eral attorney fee shifting schemes. 83 To encourage competent attorneys to
undertake public interest representation, the court must compensate attor-
neys sufficiently for the work they perform.84 The measurement for compu-
tation of fees is a "reasonable hourly rate" multiplied by the number of
hours expended on the law suit. 85 On its face this formula appears simple,
but complications have surfaced in its application by the courts. Many
courts have been unwilling to accept the actual number of hours spent on a
case as the basis for calculating reasonable fees. The court in Copeland v.
Marshall,8 6 asserted that "no compensation is due for nonproductive
time." 8 7 Thus, where multiple attorneys are assigned to duties that the court
finds could have been handled by a single attorney, under Copeland the court
would deny fees for those hours billed by the extra lawyers. Only the hours
necessary for the task, in the court's estimation, would be compensable.
The hourly rate should be the prevailing rate in the community for
similar work performed.8 8 That rate is a product of the level of skill required
by the suit, the importance or risk posed by the litigation, and the attorney's
reputation and ability.89 Although the hourly rate emerging from this
calculus has consistently approached fair market value for the services of the
attorneys in the case, 9° some courts tend to discount fee rates to public inter-
est attorneys. 9' These courts opine that attorneys who litigate public interest
claims should not expect remuneration, but rather servepro bono under their
82. Id. The court did, however, grant these environmental groups' attorneys fees in their
role as petitioners and in the situation where the court specifically requested one of the interven-
ors to address an issue. Id.
83. Seegenerally Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lindy
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiation and Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.
1973). These cases measure attorneys' fees by market value. Cf Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp.
403 (C.D. Cal. 1980). The court calculated fees to prevailing plaintiffs based on market value,
but added a 3.5 multiplier to compensate counsel for their meritorious services in a complex
environmental case. Id. at 574-77.
84. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (award of attorneys' fees in a
Title VII action). In Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the
Court of Appeals adopted the Copeland fee calculus in the environmental context.
85. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 891.
86. 641 F.2d 880.
87. Id. at 891.
88. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d at 50-61 (extensive discussion of fee
awards calculation).
89. Id. at 52 (citing Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiation and Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973)).
90. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d at 58 n. 11; Keith v. Volpe, 501 F.
Supp. at 412-13.
91. See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees: What is Reasonable?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 281,
310-11 (1977).
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professional obligation to perform community service.9 2 Nevertheless, many
courts utilize the formula set out in Copeland, instructing parties to develop a
fee settlement based on those criteria.
93
Fee awards are also available to the alleged violators in environmental
citizen suits where frivolous or bad faith claims are shown. Although actual
awards of such fees have not been reported in any case, potential plaintiffs
should be aware that fee awards are available to defendants under the stan-
dard "American Rule," which allows a court to make an award of fees to
parties victimized by bad faith or frivolous claims.
94
It is noteworthy that while the prevailing standards for attorney fee
awards are fairly liberal toward plaintiffs, the Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in Sierra Club o. Gorsuch .9- The Court's pending scrutiny of
Sierra Club's "award where appropriate" analysis has raised speculation that
attorneys fees may not be as broadly accepted by the Court on review.
96
The development of the law governing citizen suits to enforce anti-pol-
lution laws has resulted in a favorable climate for litigation. Jurisdiction
and standing limitations present no major restrictions on citizen suits, 9 7 pro-
viding plaintiffs meet rudimentary notice requirements. The major proce-
dural impediment has been plaintiffs' strategic error in seeking personal
damages instead of remedies to abate defendants' prohibited activity. 98 It is
clear that causes of action created by environmental laws are for the public
benefit; therefore, the selection of remedies should be tailored to that end in
order to state a proper cause of action.
Recent court decisions regarding awards of attorneys fees encourage
plaintiffs in citizen enforcement suits. The District of Columbia Circuit's
adoption of the "substantial contribution" theory of awarding fees to public
interest litigants,99 would seem to indicate that prevailing plaintiffs, in par-
ticular, have a strong claim to fees because their suits generally will advance
the purposes of the statute at issue. In addition, the language of Sierra Club o.
Gorsuch suggests that in cases focusing on national policy issues, non-prevail-
ing plaintiffs stand a better chance of obtaining some fees from successful
defendants than do those plaintiffs in smaller, locally oriented cases. to0
92. Id. at 311. See, e.g., Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp.
1233, 1253 (D. Kan. 1974).
93. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d at 50-61.
94. For an overview of the development of attorney fee awards in American law and the
introduction of statutorily authorized awards, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
95. 672 F.2d at 33.
96. The Department of Justice argued in its petition for certiorari in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch
that awards of attorneys fees to losing plaintiffs in suits against the government impose a major
burden on government efforts, by encouraging "unproductive, expensive and time consuming
litigation." Note, Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 677, 687 n.56 (1983) (quoting Petition for Certiorari at 8, Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672
F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 254 (1982).
97. The CWA contains a stricter standing requirement. See supra text accompanying notes
20-25.
98. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 64-80.
100. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 39-40.
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Because the basic legal landscape appears amenable to private enforce-
ment of federal anti-pollution laws, the paucity of such actions must result
from non-procedural factors.
V. THE SCARCITY OF CITIZEN SUITS
Examination of available case law suggests a number of reasons why
citizen suits to enforce anti-pollution laws have been relatively scarce. Many
violations are not readily apparent to the inhabitant of an area affected by
illegal air and water pollution; violations do not often announce themselves
in easily perceived forms. While some cases arise where citizens observe a
visible change in the color or odor of a river, see a shift in the color or quality
of industrial smokestack exhaust, or experience personal injury from contam-
inated drinking water or failing crops, most violations are not so evident.
Nevertheless, inconspicuous deviations from emissions and discharge stan-
dards may have significant impacts on water and air quality.
A second reason for the rare use of private enforcement is the highly
complex, scientific nature of many environmental regulations.' 0 1 Average
citizens may not have the ability or willingness to engage in the educational
process required to understand and effectively enforce environmental quality
standards.
Even where lack of knowledge is no barrier to a citizen suit, economic
disincentives may stifle the prospective plaintiffs' initiative. Actual costs of a
suit vary with the facts of the case; however, in the simplest case, filing of
charges and motions with the court, discovery efforts, and the assembly of
expert witnesses requires some financial resources "up front." The expecta-
tion that plaintiffs may be reimbursed by the court through an award of fees
does not remove the immediate burden of such expenses.
10 2
Other financial disincentives discourage citizen suits. Several citizens'
suits to date have been brought in pursuit of compensation for personal inju-
ries received allegedly from the illegal pollution caused by the defendant;
10 3
but, since private enforcement precludes recovery of damages, plaintiffs are
deprived of a powerful, personal motive to sue. In addition, citizens must
consider the economic risk of liability for defendants' attorneys fees. Though
these awards are rare, the fear of having to pay one's adversary's legal costs
may dissuade citizens from bringing suit.
Situations conducive to private enforcement action usually involve ob-
vious regulatory violations resulting in public harm, such as a river foaming
due to toxic discharges of a tanning company or the silting of a local creek
by a coal mining operation. But such patent violations are also likely to be
the subject of EPA or state enforcement actions. It is, therefore, arguable
that a portion of citizen enforcement activity in the last decade has been
preempted by some form of agency action.
101. Se. 40 C.F.R. §§ 129-36 (1982) (examples of the complex nature of chemical
regulations).
102. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13.
103. See generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th
Cir. 1979); Yates v. Coal Creek Co., 485 F. Supp. 995 (D. W.Va. 1980).
[Vol. 60:4
FEDERAL ANTI-POLL UTION LAWS
Agency action taken in the sixty-day notice period may also limit the
number of citizen suits that actually reach the litigation stage. Because an
agency letter or conference with the polluter often achieves corrective ac-
tion,' 0 4 citizen suits perform their intended role: to awaken government en-
forcement machinery.' 0 5 Nevertheless, at the point where a citizen gives
notice to the EPA of his intended suit, he may have expended considerable
energy and resources. EPA action during the deferral stage renders those
efforts non-compensable because fees are available only to litigants. Thus,
citizens may be discouraged from bringing suits if they anticipate being pre-
empted by agency action.
No one of these problems facing citizen plaintiffs may be cited as the
primary cause for the scarcity of private enforcement actions. In combina-
tion, however, they present major barriers to the participation of private par-
ties in the implementation of water and air quality statutes.
The remaining section of this paper proposes a model for citizen en-
forcement suits, focusing on the CWA as a potential arena for increased citi-
zen suit participation.
VI. A MODEL FOR PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACTIONS
One of the major impediments to citizen participation in the enforce-
ment of anti-pollution standards has been the difficulty, both perceived and
real, of collecting sufficient factual evidence on which to base citizen enforce-
ment suits. 10 6 Several factors contribute to this problem including the com-
plexity of pollution standards, the specialized technology often required to
discover violations of regulations, and the cost of acquiring data. During the
initial years of anti-pollution legislation, citizens were on their own to collect
necessary information; but as state and federal administration of those laws
developed, a number of agencies have created substantial resource systems
from which private citizens can draw information to support their enforce-
ment efforts. 1
0 7
The machinery created for the administration of anti-pollution laws is
illustrative of the government resources presently available to citizens. The
EPA is divided into geographic regions, each administered by an office con-
taining an enforcement division and a compliance division.' 08 These re-
gional offices are responsible for: 1) the collection of compliance data from
all parties governed by federal pollution laws and regulations; 2) the coordi-
nation of the enforcement efforts of the state environmental programs with
the region; and 3) the screening and development of desirable enforcement
actions, which are forwarded to the EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C.
for approval and reference to the Department of Justice.' 0 9




108. Interview with Anne Pyzick, Report Manager, EPA Region III NPDES Compliance
Division, in Philadelphia (Mar. 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Pyzick Interview].
109. Voltaggio Interview, supra note 38.
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Each region has developed its own reporting and compliance evaluation
system," 1 0 tailored to the needs of the federal jurisdiction in the area and the
memoranda of agreement signed with the delegated states in the region.
Delegated states have elected to accept primary responsibility for enforce-
ment of water quality standards subject to EPA review."'I These states issue
permits to parties who are subject to emission and discharge regulations, col-
lect monthly discharge reports from permittees, and seek compliance with
limitations or standards through administrative or civil actions. 112 Dele-
gated states must report to the EPA regional administration any compliance
information as specified in the memorandum of agreement for that state. By
contrast, in non-delegated states the EPA compiles all compliance informa-
tion and carries out enforcement actions.' 13
EPA Region III offers a good example of a reporting system under the
CWA. The principal reporting document is the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, which describes the specific
limitations under which the permittee must operate."t 4 In order to ascertain
whether those limitations are being complied with, the NPDES permit typi-
cally requires the permittee to file a monthly discharge monitoring report
(DMR).1 5 The DMR requires three categories of information.
1) Permitted Discharge Levels. Each permittee is permitted to dis-
charge amounts of various effluent matter, measured both by total volume of
discharge and by the concentration of effluent in the water receiving the
discharge. The limitations circumscribe safe levels of discharge of chemical
compounds, total suspended solid materials, and other water quality meas-
ures such as water acid content, biochemical oxygen, and water color. The
DMR also locates the permittee and the specific body of water receiving
discharges.
2) Method of Discharge Analysis. As specified in the NPDES permit,
effluent discharges are measured by the permittee utilizing various testing
methods. Sampling is done one of two ways: "composite sample," a combi-
nation of individual samples taken at regular intervals proportional to the
discharge flow rate, or in volumes proportional to the total flow; or a "grab
sample," an individual sample taken to spot check the water quality and
content. By multiplying the proportional content of the sample by the total
flow, which is also a regulated quantity, a permittee computes total output
levels of the effluents. Most effluent discharges are regulated by average as
well as by minimum/maximum output level.
3) Actual Discharge Levels. These are the actual figures which de-
scribe the permittee's discharge activity for the reported month, the results of
the permittee's mandatory sampling under the NPDES permit."
16
110. Pyzick Interview, supra note 108.
111. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316-19 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
112. Pyzick Interview, supra note 108.
113. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
114. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18 (1982) established reporting requirements under the CWA.
115. 40 C.F.R. § 122.7() (1982).
116. All information regarding DMRs was gathered through Freedom of Information Act
requests. See also Pyzick Interview, supra note 108; interview with John Hundertmark, Engineer,
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Immediately available to the public once filed with the regional office,
DMRs are not difficult to interpret. Substantial violations by the permittee
may be identified by comparing the discharge level reported with the per-
mitted level of effluent output. The gravity of a violation, however, may be
burdensome to estimate because a number of considerations qualify the im-
portance of effluent discharges. For example, in some parts of the country it
is more difficult for permittees to meet permit standards during the winter
months than from June to October, owing to decreased water levels in most
inland tributaries; effluent concentrations necessarily increase during such
times, although the actual amounts discharged remain static." 7 Many
NPDES permits take these seasonal changes into account, dictating relaxed
effluent limits during periods of low water flow.' 18
The Code of Federal Regulations requires that each regional office pro-
duce a quarterly noncompliance report (QNCR) which catalogues all in-
stances of NPDES violations by major effluent sources in the region. 1 9
Among the violations recorded in the QNCR are failures to submit DMRs,
submission of inadequate DMRs, failures of municipal entities to meet sec-
ondary treatment construction schedules, and deviations beyond effluent dis-
charge limitations. 120  The regulations, however, do not require the
publication of all discharge violations, only those violations that the permit-
tee has not remedied within forty five days from the DMR reporting date.'
2'
Under most NPDES permits, the reporting date is twenty eight days after
the end of each month. 122 Permittees, therefore, have approximately ten
weeks to correct discharge violations before risking publication. Some per-
mittees try to avoid publication of violations in the QNCR by a series of
excess discharges followed by corrective action within the forty-five day pe-
riod. To prevent these cyclical violations, the regulations also require the
publication of those violations which establish a pattern of noncompliance
over the most recent four-month reporting period.'
23
The availability of NPDES reports to private citizens is key to the effi-
Region III NPDES Permit Division in Philadelphia (Mar. 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Hundertmark Interview].
117. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13. For an example of seasonal effects on effluent con-
centrations in tributaries receiving discharges, see Discharge Monitoring Reports of the Hershey
Chocolate Co., NPDES Permit No. Pa. 0008087 (Mar. 1982) (on file at the Denver Law Jour-
nal) (low seasonal flow creating temperature differentials of 10 degrees in excess of permitted
levels).
118. See, e.g., NPDES Permit of the City of St. Albans, NPDES Permit No. WV. 0023175,
EPA, Region III, Philadelphia, Pa. (variance of organic nitrogen and ammonia nitrogen levels
from June to October and November to May).
119. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18 (1982). EPA compiles a similar report on violations by non-major
permittees which is published annually. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18(c) (1982).
120. See, e.g., EPA Region III Quarterly Non-Compliance Report for Period Ending Sep-
tember 1981, EPA Region III, Philadelphia, Pa. (Dec. 1981) (on file at the Denver Law
Journal).
121. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18(a)(2)(A) (1982). In addition to using DMRs and QNCRS to deter-
mine NPDES permit violators, citizens can retrieve discharge information from the EPA by
filing a Freedom of Information Act request.
122. Pyzick Interview, supra note 108. See also NPDES Permit of Met Fin Co., NPDES
Permit No. WV 0004596, EPA, Region III, Philadelphia, Pa. (on file at the Denver Law
Journal).
123. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18(a)(2)(B) (1982).
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cient use of citizen suits to enforce water pollution laws. First, the reports
readily identify the sources of pollution, their locations, and the public wa-
ters affected by the effluent discharges.124 Second, the DMRs filed by per-
mittees clearly describe specific discharge activities.' 25 If a permittee is
exceeding his effluent limitations, one need only look to the results of the
permittee's monitoring tests to verify the violations. The DMRs provide the
EPA and private attorneys general with a primafacie case of illegal water
pollution activity against the NPDES violator.' 2 6 In addition, the quarterly
and annual noncompliance reports indicate which violations have been
targeted for compliance by informal or judicial administrative efforts.
Although the average QNCR in Region III contains more than 1500
discharge and reporting violations, 12 7 not all of the listed CWA violations are
appropriate for citizen enforcement suits. Where agency enforcement action
has commenced, private efforts would be duplicative. Moreover, many vio-
lations identified in the QNCR may not warrant the investment of litigation
resources; citizen suits for small, inconsistent violations lack cost effective-
ness. Thus, the dilemmas facing potential plaintiffs are numerous. If citi-
zens are to accept increased responsibility for the enforcement of the CWA
and other anti-pollution statutes in response to flagging EPA activities, a
coherent litigation strategy must be developed.
Because relatively few citizen enforcement suits have been brought di-
rectly against polluters, successful litigation strategies have not been devel-
oped. One alternative is to examine the EPA's exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in its case selection process. At a minimum, regional staff attor-
neys consider four factors to decide whether a violator should be prosecuted:
degree of excursion from stipulated discharge limits, time over which the
violations occurred, corrective action taken to bring the effluent source into
compliance with the permit, and future corrective measures planned.128
When evaluating degree of excursion from stipulated discharges, it is
difficult to determine when effluent discharges constitute a significant
enough excursion to support enforcement. Obviously, the limitations of the
permit delineate acceptable emission levels within the regulation. Small de-
viations from the limitations may or may not have a major impact on the
affected tributary. In addition, testing methods may provide ambivalent
data on discharges, such as a permittee who reports being within his permit-
ted maximum daily discharge, but far exceeds the allowable monthly dis-
charge standard. In such cases the agency often has been unwilling to
institute an administrative action;' 29 however, the violation could support a
private enforcement proceeding notwithstanding EPA's exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
The duration of a violative practice may raise the significance of an
excursion to an actionable level. For example, a poultry processing plant
124. Set supra text accompanying note 116.
125. Id.
126. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13; Voltaggio Interview, supra note 38.
127. Hundertmark Interview, supra note 116.
128. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13.
129. 1d.
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exceeding its Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) 130 daily maximum .limita-
tion for eighteen consecutive months indicates disregard for the statutory
requirements imposed by the CWA. The permittee may claim that his ex-
cursions are relatively small; but, if he fails to comply over a period of
months, the permittee is a good candidate for enforcement proceedings. In
contrast, many instances of noncompliance found in the QNCR are short
term excursions 31 caused by temporary equipment failures or seasonal vari-
ations, after which the permittee returns to compliant discharge levels.'
32
Because the statute does not provide citizens with a cause of action for past
violations, one-time or infrequent violators technically would not be valid
subjects for citizen actions. 133 Where it appears, however, that structural or
technical infirmities of a permittee's pollution control system create the ex-
pectation of future violations, equitable remedies allow suit for injunctive
relief, Expectations of continued excessive discharges must be measured by a
consistent pattern of past violations, over a minimum period of three or four
months.1 34 Examination of violators' DMRs would supply data to deter-
mine the duration of violations.
1 35
Citizens should avoid bringing suits against polluters who are in the
process of correcting problems in their discharge treatment equipment. This
suggestion does not indicate that violators are able to avoid enforcement by
promising corrective action when threatened with a suit, but rather that
those permittees making good faith efforts to comply with their permits are
not cost-effective subjects for citizen actions.
Since 1977, permittees under the CWA have been required to use the
Best Practical Technology (BPT) in their efforts to reduce effluent discharges
to acceptable levels. 136 Insuring that such technology is continually effective
presents a problem in a number of industries; constant repair and modifica-
tion is necessary to meet permitted discharge levels. During these repair pe-
riods, permittees report violations over which they exercise little control.
1 37
Some violations exceed permit limitations but, neverthelessare difficult
to enforce for policy or economic considerations. For example, a small com-
pany, which has conscientiously attempted to meet its NPDES discharge
standards, spends perhaps $2-3 million installing the Best Practical Technol-
ogy but discovers that the technology fails to perform as needed. The com-
pany remains in violation of its permit. Because of its substantial
expenditure on treatment equipment, the company rejects plans for correc-
tive action in the immediate future. This situation, considered in light of
130. The BOD level is a quantification of the amount of oxygen necessary to maintain the
ecological balance of the subject tributary. Se O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp.
at 653 n.22.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22.
132. Dates on which a permittee returns to compliance prior to publication also appear in
the QNCR. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18(a)(1)(iv) (1982).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
134. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
136. See, e.g., Pynsatuning Water Shed, 506 F. Supp. at 909.
137. See NPDES Permit for the City of St. Albans and Pursuant Correspondence, supra note
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EPA's case selection criteria, 138 presents a potential cause of action. The
likelihood that a court would grant any significant relief to claimants, how-
ever, is negligible. The company has, in fact, met its statutory burden of
fitting BPT equipment. Although the system failed to achieve acceptable
performance levels, the courts may deem equipment failure more a misfor-
tune of the marketplace than a situation of the company's inattention to
NPDES standards. 139 Consequently, private enforcement resources would
not be wisely spent bringing suit against the company unless the alleged
discharges had an environmental impact that overshadowed the benefits of
continued plant operation. In enacting the CWA, Congress theoretically
balanced these factors and decided that environmental protection was the
predominant consideration; however, practical aspects of the laws' applica-
tion will probably lead courts to deny any major form of relief where no
immediate threat to public health exists.
Generally, municipal treatment facilities are good subjects for citizen
enforcement actions. The crunch in local public funds of the mid-1970's
caused many jurisdictions to become lax in the operation and maintenance
of their treatment facilities. Many localities have been unable to construct
water treatment facilities without the assistance of federal grant monies
available through the CWA. 14° Because of these difficulties the EPA has
been reluctant to initiate enforcement proceedings against jurisdictions that
have not acquired federal grants. Although fiscal incapacity to attain com-
pliance with NPDES standards is not a defense to a charge of failing to
install BPT treatment facilities, the factor effectively reduces the court's op-
tions to construct an appropriate remedy. For this reason, EPA suits have
focused on municipal violators that have the fiscal capacity to properly com-
ply with effluent guidelines, or have rejected available funds.1
4 1
A private enforcement group created with the intent to implement a
plan of action could be organized efficiently on a regional basis. First, re-
gional enforcement groups could confront environmental problems where
they frequently occur: at the interstate level. Local enforcement efforts
aimed at large local pollution sources may be sufficient to halt various imme-
diate point sources from further violations of the law, but fail to cleanup the
entire stream where discharges were attributable to out-of-state points of
emission. A regional structure also would effectively coordinate with EPA
regional reporting and administrative systems. Where federal or state au-
thorities in a region are active in cleaning up a particular water body, pri-
vate resources could be channeled to complement enforcement efforts.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
To predict the success of large-scale efforts to enforce anti-pollution laws
through a scheme of citizen suits would be highly speculative. The history of
citizen suits brought directly against polluters provides little indication of
138. Set supra text accompanying note 129.
139. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13.
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
141. Hundertmark Interview, supra note 116.
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how a continuous, organized program of litigation would fare as a public
interest enterprise. The stage is set for a systematic attempt to privately en-
force environmental statutes. The evolution of federal administrative ma-
chinery in support of those laws has created a store of discovery materials on
which citizens may draw to identify and assemble cases. This is the corner-
stone of any future private enforcement venture. The EPA reporting ma-
chinery facilitates selection of violations and significantly reduces the costs of
discovery. The judiciary seems favorably disposed to the award of attorneys
fees to plaintiffs bringing effective or useful citizen suits. Though it is impos-
sible to state with any certainty that courts will allow all plaintiffs the full
value of the fees and costs incurred in litigation, it is clear that courts are
currently more willing to make such awards than at any time in the past. As
a result, the financial deterrents are less threatening than in previous years.
These favorable mechanical factors create the opportunity for an effec-
tively organized and conducted private enforcement group to operate. As
federal enforcement efforts are directed away from the CAA and CWA, and
the degradation of the environment becomes an expanding threat, the use of








In 1976, legislation was enacted that substantially restricted the Inter-
nal Revenue Service's (IRS) power to issue John Doe summonses to investi-
gate unidentified persons.' Congress action reflected its concern about the
use of these summonses to conduct "fishing expeditions" through the records
of banks and other third parties in the hope of uncovering useful information
about someone. 2 The new law seeks to protect the privacy of such records by
permitting a John Doe summons to issue only after the IRS has satisfied a
district court, in an ex parte hearing, that there is a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that ascertainable persons may have violated the tax laws.
The new legislation and IRS interpretation of the statute have raised a
number of questions concerning the scope of the IRS authority to conduct
investigations or research projects not focused upon any particular taxpayer
or tax liability. One issue involves IRS attempts to circumvent the John Doe
summons requirements by requesting information about unidentified per-
sons while auditing an identified taxpayer. An administrative summons is
issued for documents relevant to the audited person's tax liability. 3 The IRS
does not follow the John Doe summons requirements even though the
records concern unidentified persons. The courts have disagreed about
whether administrative summonses with a dual purpose of investigating
both the audited person and an unidentified person are enforceable. Several
courts have ruled administrative summonses with a dual purpose are en-
forceable4 while one court has required the IRS to follow the John Doe sum-
mons requirements any time information is requested about unascertained
persons.
5
The IRS has also sought to avoid the John Doe summons procedures by
* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. B.A., M.A., New York Uni-
versity; J.D., Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., Georgetown University.
1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1205, 90 Stat. 1520, 1701 (codified at
I.R.C. § 7609(0 (1976)).
2. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 311 (1975) reprintedtn 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2897, 3207 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 658]; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 373 reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3439, 3802 [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. 938].
3. The general administrative summons is issued pursuant to I.R.C. § 7602 (1976). See
infra note 14 and accompanying text.
4. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 635 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Flagg,
634 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1980); United States v. Barter Sys., Inc., 82-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9698 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Constantinides, 80-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) $ 9830 (D.C. Md. 1980). See infta notes 64-66 and 73-86 and accompanying text.
5. United States v. Gottlieb, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9257 (M.D. Fla. 1982). See infra
notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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relying upon a statutory right to inspect records that taxpayers and other
third parties are required to maintain.6 The IRS has asserted that the in-
spection authority is implicit in the statutes that mandate recordkeeping.7
Such warrantless inspections, however, may raise serious constitutional issues
in light of Supreme Court decisions involving administrative searches. 8
Another controversy focuses on the reasonable basis standard for issuing
and enforcing a John Doe summons. The courts have disagreed as to what
the IRS must show to establish a reasonable basis for its belief that the tax-
payer has not complied with the tax laws. Some courts have concluded this
belief may be based upon IRS audit experience and statistical analyses, 9
while one court has required evidence about the specific unidentified person
or transaction.10 Courts have also disagreed about whether the expare judi-
cial determination authorizing issuance of a John Doe summons may be
challenged in a subsequent adversarial enforcement proceeding.'1
A final area of concern is the possible "chilling effect" an IRS summ-
mons may have upon the exercise of first amendment freedoms. It has been
asserted that a summons for documents identifying members of controversial
groups has an impermissible impact upon the members' freedom of associa-
tion.1 2  Similarly, summonses for records of religious organizations have
been challenged as infringing upon the members' right to exercise their reli-
gious beliefs.' 3 The courts in each of these cases have attempted to create
standards that will protect the interests of both the IRS and the taxpayers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Administrative Summonses in General
The basic investigatory tool of the IRS is the administrative summons
authorized by I.R.C. Section 7602.14 The statute grants the IRS broad pow-
6. This claim is based upon I.R.C. § 6001 (Supp. V 1981) and the regulations promul-
gated thereunder.
7. United States v. Mobil Corp., 543 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Tex. 1981); United States v.
Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 475 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Ohio 1978). See infra notes 87-108 and accompany-
ing text.
8. Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). Se also United States v. Mobil Corp., 543 F. Supp.
507, 517-19 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
9. United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Island Trade Exch., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). See ina notes 120-28 and
accompanying text.
10. United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982). See infra notes
129-44 and accompanying text.
11. United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 713 (1983); United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir.
1981); In re John Does, Dairy Cattle Prog., 541 F. Supp. 213 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v.
Island Trade Exch., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). See infra notes 146-69 and accom-
panying text.
12. United States v. Citizens State Bank, 612 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1980). See infia notes 170-
78.
13. United States v. Grayson County State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dented,
455 U.S. 1920 (1982); United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980). See infra notes 179-
86.
14. I.R.C. § 7602 (1976) provides:
Examination ofbooks and witness
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ers to require persons to produce information relevant to the determination
or collection of federal taxes. In United Slates v. Powell15 the Supreme Court
analogized the IRS summons to a grand jury subpoena,16 and held that the
government need make no showing of probable cause to obtain enforcement
of a summons.' 7 A subpoena may be issued, therefore, based on suspicion
that the laws have been violated, or merely to ascertain that the law is being
obeyed. 18
Although issued by an IRS agent, an administrative summons is en-
forced only through an order of a federal district court.19 This enforcement
proceeding provides for an impartial judicial officer to determine whether
the summons meets all statutory and constitutional requirements. In Powell,
the Supreme Court held that a summons will be enforced if: 1) the investi-
gation has a legitimate purpose, 2) the information sought is relevant to the
purpose, 3) the IRS does not already possess the information, and 4) the
summons procedural requirements have been followed.
20
The Powell decision maintained that a taxpayer may challenge a sum-
mons on "any appropriate ground."'2' Prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1976,22 however, taxpayers had little opportunity to challenge a summons
served on a third party seeking information about their affairs. In many
instances, the third parties (such as banks and credit-card issuers) voluntarily
complied with the summons, thereby eliminating the judicial enforcement
proceeding. 23 The IRS was not required to notify taxpayers that informa-
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where
none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in
respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is
authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or
any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody,
or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the per-
son liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary
may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in
the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to
give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.
15. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
16. Id. at 57.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 57-58.
19. I.R.C. § 7402(b) (1976) provides:
To Enforce Summons-
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to
produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the
district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction by appro-
priate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers,
or other data.
20. 379 U.S. at 57-58.
21. Id. at 58 (citing Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964)).
22. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1699 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
23. See generally Kenderdine, The Internal Revenue Service Summons to Produce Documents.- Powers,
Procedures, and Taxpayer Defenses, 64 MINN. L. REv. 73 (1977); Note, Taxation.- IRS Use ofJohn Doe
Adminitrative Summonses, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 465 (1977); Comment, Government Access to Bank
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tion concerning their affairs was being requested from a third party. Even if
the taxpayer was aware of the summons, he could not be assured that the
third party would assert any defenses in his absence. Moreover, if the sum-
moned third party refused to comply, the taxpayer had no absolute right to
intervene in the enforcement proceeding to present his case.
2 4
Congress provided a partial remedy in 1976 by creating special proce-
dures for the issuance of third-party summonses. Section 7609(a)(1) requires
the IRS to notify a taxpayer whenever a summons concerning his affairs is
served upon a statutorily defined third-party recordkeeper. 25 If the taxpayer
challenges the summons, the IRS must seek an enforcement order in the
district court. 26 The taxpayer now has an absolute right to intervene in the
enforcement proceeding and he may raise any appropriate defense.
27
B. The John Doe Summons
Obviously, if the taxpayer's identity is not known, the rights to notice of
the summons and to intervene in the enforcement proceeding provide no
practical protection. In these situations I.R.C. section 7609(f) provides judi-
cial supervision for IRS use of the John Doe summons by requiring a district
court proceeding before the summons is issued.2 8 In that proceeding, the IRS
must establish that: 1) the summons relates to an investigation of particular
Records in the Aftermath of United States v. Miller and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 14 Hous. L.
REV. 636 (1977).
24. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 527-30 (1971) (taxpayer may not intervene
in third-party summons enforcement proceeding merely because his tax liability is the subject of
the summons).
25. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3) (West Supp. 1983).
Third-parry recordkeeper defined.
For purposes of this subsection, the term "third-party recordkeeper" means-
(A) any mutual savings bank, cooperative bank, domestic building and
loan association, or other savings institution chartered and supervised as a savings
and loan or similar association under Federal or State law, any bank (as defined
in section 581), or any credit union (within the meaning of section 501(c)(14)(A));
(B) any consumer reporting agency (as defined under section 603(d) of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a(f));
(C) any person extending credit through the use of credit cards or similar
devices;
(D) any broker (as defined in section 3(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(4)));
(E) any attorney;
(F) any accountant; and
(G) any barter exchange (as defined in section 6045(c)(3)).
26. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (Act), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), made some changes in this area. Prior to
this Act, a taxpayer could stay compliance of the summons by notifying the third party. The
new statute requires the taxpayer to file a petition to quash the summons in the appropriate
district court within 20 days after receiving notice of the summons. Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, § 33 1(a), (b) (codified at I.R.C. § 7609(b)(2), (d) (West Supp. 1983).
27. I.R.C. § 7609(b)(1) (West.Supp. 1983).
28. I.R.C. § 7609(0 (West Supp. 1983).
Additional requirement in the case of aJohn Doe summons.-
Any summons described in subsection (c) which does not identify the person with
respect to whose liability the summons is issued may be served only after a court pro-
ceeding in which the Secretary establishes that-
(1) the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascer-
tainable group or class of persons,
(2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or
IRS INVESTIGATIONS
persons; 2) there is a reasonable basis for believing the person being investi-
gated has not complied with the tax laws; and 3) the information sought is
not readily available from other sources.
2 9
The John Doe summons requirements provide greater taxpayer protec-
tion than the general administrative summons requirements. One major dif-
ference is the John Doe summons requirement that the IRS must establish a
reasonable basis for believing that the unidentified taxpayer has not com-
plied with the tax laws. 30 This limitation on the traditionally broad investi-
gatory power of the IRS questions the validity of the Supreme Court's
analogy in Powell between an IRS summons and a grand jury subpoena.
3 '
A second important difference is that the restrictions of section 7609(0 apply
to the issuance of all John Doe summonses, whereas the notice requirements
of section 7609(a) are only applicable when a summons is served on a third-
party recordkeeper.
32
The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 197633 suggests section
7609(0 was enacted in response to a congressional belief that the IRS might
abuse the summons power in the case of unidentified taxpayers.3 4 The legis-
lation appears to have been prompted by the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Biscegha .35 Several commentators suggested Biscegla allowed
the IRS to use a John Doe summons as a "license to fish" through third-
party records. 36 Although the committee reports do not indicate an intent
to overrule any particular decision, it is clear Congress was not satisfied that
the privacy interests of taxpayers were properly safeguarded.
37
In Biscegha, the IRS was attempting to learn the identity of a person
who had deposited $20,000 in "paper thin, severely disintegrated" $100 bills
class of persons may fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of any
internal revenue law, and
(3) the information sought to be obtained from the examination of the
records (and the identity of the person or persons with respect to whose liability
the summons is issued) is not readily available from other sources.
29. Id.
30. I.R.C. § 7609(l)(2).
31. 379 U.S. at 57. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1699 (1976).
34. The House Ways and Means Committee explained its rationale for changing the law
relating to administrative summonses as follows:
The Service has instituted an administrative policy designed to establish certain safe-
guards in this area. Under this policy, IRS representatives are instructed to obtain
information from taxpayers and third parties on a voluntary basis where possible.
Where a third party summons is served, advanced supervisory approval is required.
In the case of a John Doe summons, the advance supervisory approval must be ob-
tained on a high level basis. The committee believes, however, that these administra-
tive changes, while commendable, do not fully provide all of the safeguards which
might be desirable in terms of protecting the right of privacy.
H.R. REP. 658, supra note 2, at 307; S. REP. 938, supra note 2, at 368.
35. 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
36. See Note, The IRS Gets Its Fishing License-United States v. Bisceglia, 11 GONZ. L. REV.
251 (1976) [hereinafter cited as IRS Gets Fishing License]; Note, Federal Tax Procedure-An Extension
of the Summons Authority ofthe Internal Revenue Service, 21 Loy. L. REV. 1026 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Extension of Summons]; Note, IRS Subpoena Power to Investigate Unknown Taxpayers, 50
N.Y.U. L. REV. 177 (1976) [hereinafter cited as IRS Subpoena Power].
37. H.R. REP. 658, supra note 2, at 307; S. REP. 938, supra note 2, at 373.
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at a bank. 38 An IRS agent, suspecting unpaid taxes, issued a John Doe sum-
mons to the bank requesting all its records for the time period during which
the deposits were made. The bank refused to comply and the IRS obtained
an enforcement order from the district court. 39 The Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that the section 7602 summons power requires the IRS to identify
the person it wishes to investigate.
40
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, disagreed with this con-
clusion, emphasizing the practical necessities of the tax collection business.
"[I]t would be naive," the Chief Justice maintained, "to ignore the reality
that some persons attempt to outwit the system, and tax evaders are not
readily identifiable."''4 The opinion suggests that the IRS summons power
must be viewed against such a realistic background.
The Court stressed that sections 7601 and 7602 authorize the IRS to
investigate all persons who may be liable for any tax and to summon any
persons with respect to any tax liability.42 To read these statutes in a restric-
tive fashion would ignore the fact the IRS "has a legitimate interest in large
or unusual financial transactions, especially those involving cash." ' 4 3 It
would be impractical to investigate such transactions if the IRS was required
to ascertain the identities of the persons involved. Such a requirement
would frustrate the broad power of inquiry authorized by Congress in sec-
tion 7601.44
Chief Justice Burger's opinion rejected the contention that the Court
was permitting the IRS to carry on "fishing expeditions into the private af-
fairs of bank depositors."'4 5 Because the IRS must enforce a summons
through the courts, 46 taxpayers will be protected from improper searches.
The Court did not, however, address the practical question of who would
challenge a John Doe summons, given that the summoned third party has
little at stake.
A second decision, UnziedStates v. Humble Oil &RefMng Co. ,47 apparently
convinced Congress that the IRS might. engage in "fishing expeditions."
The issue in Humble Oil was the enforceability of a John Doe summons issued
in connection with an IRS research project concerning the extent of tax
avoidance among mineral property lessors. The summons requested the
names of all mineral lessors who held leases that were surrendered by Hum-
ble Oil without production. 48 The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the sum-
mons and held the section 7602 summons authority extended only to
investigations of specific individuals. The summons power could not be used
38. 420 U.S. at 142-43.
39. United States v. Bisceglia, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9474 (D.C. Ky. 1972).
40. Bisceglia v. United States,.486 F.2d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 1973).
41. 420 U.S. at 145.
42. Id. at 149.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 150.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 151.
47. 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974),acated and remanded, 421 U.S. 943, afdper curtam, 518 F.2d
747 (5th Cir. 1975).
48. 488 F.2d at 954.
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to conduct general research projects.
49
The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of the holding in Biscegha.
5° On re-
mand, the Fifth Circuit again concluded the summons was unenforceable. 5'
The court distinguished Biscegl'a as involving an ongoing particularized in-
vestigation which presented facts indicating tax evasion. 52 In contrast, Hum-
ble Oil involved a research project that might reveal liability for unpaid
taxes only as a result of an IRS fishing expedition.
53
Justices Blackmun and Powell in their concurring opinion in Biscegla
observed that a John Doe summons may be used to learn the identity of a
particular person whose transactions "strongly suggest liability for unpaid
taxes." 54 The Fifth Circuit's holding in Humble Oil is in agreement with this
interpretation.5 5 If this more limited view of the summons power had been
generally accepted, it is doubtful Congress would have enacted section
7609(o. The legislative history of section 7609 indicated, however, that Con-
gress feared Bisceglia allowed the IRS to roam at will through third-party
records in order to discover liability for unpaid taxes.
56
III. WHEN MUST THE JOHN DOE SUMMONS BE USED
A. The Dual Purpose Summons
Many of the questions about John Doe summonses have arisen in con-
nection with the burgeoning phenomenon of barter exchanges. These enti-
ties operate as clearinghouses for exchanges of goods and services between
exchange members. Each member is credited with units in proportion to the
dollar value of the goods and services he provides. These units are then
traded for goods and services contributed by other exchange members.
57
With few exceptions, 58 an exchange of property is a taxable event which
is to be reported as income by each party to the exchange. The amount of
reportable income equals the difference between the value of the property
received and the adjusted basis of the property contributed. In the barter
exchange context, the IRS views the taxable event as occurring when the
member's account is credited with units having an ascertainable market
value.59 IRS experience indicated exchange members frequently failed to
report income from barter exchange transactions.
6 °
49. 488 F.2d at 962-63.
50. 421 U.S. 943 (1975).
51. 518 F.2d at 748-49.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 420 U.S. at 151 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
55. 518 F.2d at 748-49.
56. H.R. REP. 658, supra note 2, at 307; S. REP. 938, supra note 2, at 373. See generally IRS
Gets Fishing License, supra note 36; Extension of Swnmons, supra note 36; IRS Subpoena Power, supra
note 36.
57. United States v. Barter Sys., Inc., 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9127 (D. Neb. 1981).
58. Nonrecognition or deferral of gain realized from a property exchange is provided for
certain exchanges of "like-kind" property by I.R.C. § 1031 (1976).
59. Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100.
60. Congress responded to the increasing use of barter exchanges as tax avoidance devices
in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
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The IRS sought to discourage the use of barter exchanges as a tax
avoidance device by selecting a high proportion of exchange members for
audit.6 1 To identify exchange members, the IRS summoned membership
lists in the course of exchange audits. These summonses have been resisted
on the grounds that the IRS is seeking information about unidentified tax-
payers without following the John Doe summons requirements 62 or that the
information is for a general research project and therefore contrary to the
Humble Ol ban on general research summonses.
63
In United States v. Constantinides,64 a district court enforced a summons
for a barter exchange's membership list even though the IRS clearly in-
tended to use the information in connection with a research project. The
summons was enforced because the information requested was relevant to a
determination of the exchange's tax liability. 65 The summons was not inva-
lid merely because it might also be useful for an IRS research project. 66
Not all courts agree with the Constantimides rationale. In United States v.
Gotthieb ,67 the court held the IRS must follow John Doe summons procedures
whenever they request information about unidentified taxpayers from a
third party.68 The court reasoned that if the IRS could obtain information
about unidentified taxpayers while auditing a third party, they would never
have to use the John Doe summons procedures.
69
A Nebraska district court, in United States v. Barter Systems, Inc. ,70 fol-
lowed a rationale similar to Gottlieb in concluding that section 7609(0 was
intended to make a firm distinction between investigations of identified and
unidentified persons. The opinion indicates section 7609(0 was intended by
Congress to be a limitation on the broad investigative powers of the IRS. 7 1
Therefore, a summons issued in the course of an audit must comply with the
special John Doe provisions if the IRS intends to use the information for the
primary purpose of investigating unknown persons.7
2
The Eighth Circuit reversed, maintaining that the lower court had con-
strued the scope of the IRS summons power too narrowly. 73 The court indi-
cated the IRS summons authority should be upheld unless it was expressly
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). This Act amended I.R.C. § 6045 (West Supp.
1983), making barter exchanges subject to transaction reporting requirements. The Act also
amended I.R.C. § 7609(a) (West Supp. 1983) to classify a barter exchange as a third-party
recordkeeper.
61. United States v. Constantinides, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9830 at 85,733 (D. Md.
1980).
62. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
64. 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9830 (D. Md. 1980).
65. Id. at 85,734.
66. Id. at 85,735.
67. 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)" ,9257 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
68. Id. at 83,561.
69. Id. Contra United States v. Bart~r Sys., Inc., 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9707 (E.D.
Mich. 1982).
70. 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9127 (D.C. Neb. 1981), rev'd, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9698 (8th Cir. 1982).
71. 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 83,094.
72. d.




prohibited by statute or was contrary to substantial policy interests. The
court concluded that section 7609(o is not a limit on IRS use of a general
summons during an investigation of a named taxpayer even though the sum-
mons requires disclosure of information relating to unidentified taxpayers
whom the IRS might also wish to audit.
74
The IRS experience in enforcing summonses issued in connection with
its Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) also sheds light
on the dual purpose summons issue.75 The TCMP is a research project
designed to evaluate overall compliance with tax reporting requirements.
76
Several thousand taxpayers are selected randomly by computer for intensive
audits. The ultimate purpose of the TCMP is to increase the IRS efficiency
by concentrating enforcement efforts on specific problem areas.
77
In United States v. Flagg,78 the IRS sought enforcement of a summons
served on a taxpayer selected under the TCMP. Although the district court
refused to enforce the summons,7 9 the Eighth Circuit reversed, maintaining
the IRS summons power must be construed broadly to effectuate congres-
sional intent that the IRS insure compliance with the tax laws.80 The court
concluded that Humble Oil did not establish that tax records might never be
examined for research purposes; Humble Oil only held that a summons must
be issued pursuant to a "particularized investigat'n:i of an individual tax-
payer."' The TCMP satisfies this requirement because the summonses are
issued to determine a particular individual's tax liability.
Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit concurred in this interpretation of Hum-
ble Oil in United States o. First National Bank of Dallas , 8 2 which involved the
enforcement of a third-party summons issued to a bank, requesting records
pertaining to a taxpayer undergoing a TCMP audit.8 3 Relying on Humble
Oil, the district court refused to enforce the summons.8 4  On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit reversed and explained that Humble Oil did not hold that a
summons could not be enforced if issued primarily for research purposes. A
summons may be used to obtain information for research purposes if the
summons is issued to determine the tax liability of a specific taxpayer.
85
Thus, the Fifth Circuit stated that the rationale of Humble Oil is limited to
cases where a summons is issued solely to obtain research data.86
74. Id. at 85,519.
75. See generally Note, Enforcing Internal Revenue Service Summonses Under the Taxpayer Aleasure-
ment Compliance Program: The Needfor Statutory Reform, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 861 (1982).
76. [3 Audit] INTERNAL REV. MAN. (CCH) § 4861.1(2) (Aug. 27, 1980).
77. United States v. Flagg, 634 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1980).
78. Id.
79. 45 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 80-618, 80-621 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
80. 634 F.2d at 1091.
81. Id. at 1092. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
82. 635 F.2d 391 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981).
83. 635 F.2d at 392.
84. 468 F. Supp. 415 (N. D. Tex. 1979). See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
85. 635 F.2d at 395.
86. It should be noted that these TCMP cases are not controlling on the issue of whether a
dual purpose summons may be used to obtain information about unidentified persons. The
TCMP cases are concerned solely with whether the summons was issued for a proper purpose.
Issuance of a John Doe summons also requires a determination of whether § 7609(l) restrictions
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B. The Right to "Inspect" Records
The IRS has attempted to avoid statutory and judicial restrictions on its
use of administrative summonses to conduct general research by asserting a
statutory right to inspect documents that taxpayers and third parties are
required to maintain.8 7 The IRS claims such records may be inspected
without issuing a summons. Two courts disagree as to whether there is an
absolute inspection right. One court, in United States v. Mobil Corp. ,88 held
that section 6001 did not imply authority to inspect. 8 9 Another court, in
United States v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. ,9 ruled that statutory authority to require
records implies an authority to inspect the records. 9 1
1. United States v. Mobil Corp. 92
In United States v. Mobil Corp. ,93 the IRS requested a permanent injunc-
tion to compel production of records which Mobil kept pursuant to section
6001. The information sought concerned the number of personal exemp-
tions claimed by Mobil's employees on their tax withholding forms and re-
flected the government's concern over the increasing use of unwarranted
exemption claims to reduce the amount of tax withheld from wages. The
IRS claimed that its right to inspect these records was implied from both the
language of section 6001,9' and its implementing regulations. 95
Mobil refused the request, contending that the section 6001 recordkeep-
ing provisions should not be utilized to compel a production of records that
could not be obtained by a summons.96 Mobil suspected that the IRS was
requesting the information in connection with a general research project, in
which case Humble Oil indicated that a summons would not be enforceable.
apply. See United States v. Barter Sys., Inc., 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9698 at 85,518 n.10
(E.D. Mich. 1982).
87. The basis for the claim of a statutory right to inspect is found in I.R.C. § 6001 (Supp.
V 1981) which provides:
Notice or regulations requz'ing records, statements and special returns
Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collection thereof,
shall keep such records, render such statements, make such returns, and comply with
such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe. When-
ever in the judgment of the Secretary it is necessary, he may require any person, by
notice served upon such person or by regulations, to make such returns, render such
statements, or keep such records, as the Secretary deems sufficient to show whether or
not such person is liable for tax under this title. The only records which an employer
shall be required to keep under this section in connection with charged tips shall be
charge receipts, records necessary to comply with section 6053(c), and copies of state-
ments furnished by employees under section 6053(a).
88. 543 F. Supp. 507 (D.C. Tex. 1981).
89. Id.
90. 475 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
91. Id. at 700.
92. 543 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
93. Id. An earlier reported decision in this case by the same court considered Mobil's mo-
tion for discovery. 499 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
94. The IRS asserted its right to inspect was inherent in the language of section 6001 that
requires "maintenance" of records for tax liability.
95. 543 F. Supp. at 509. In Treas. Reg. § 31.6001-1(e)(1) (1960) the Secretary declared
"[aill records required by the regulations in this part shall be kept, by the person required to
keep them, at one or more convenient and safe locations accessible to internal revenue officers,
and shall at all times be available for inspection by such officers."
96. 543 F. Supp. at 508.
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Also, if no specific employees were under investigation, the IRS would have
to comply with the John Doe summons procedures.
9 7
Mobil sought to discover the purpose for the IRS inspection by serving
a subpoena duces tecum and requesting documents that would reveal the iden-
tities of any employees under investigation by the IRS. On an IRS motion
to quash the subpoena, Mobil argued that any inspection right conferred by
section 6001 is analogous to the summons power granted by section 7602.
Thus, it should enjoy all the statutory and procedural rights that would be
available in a summons enforcement proceeding.
The district court quashed the subpoena, holding that whatever result
would obtain in a summons enforcement proceeding is not dispositive with
respect to the scope of discovery under section 6001.98 A preliminary in-
quiry into the IRS purpose for an inspection is unnecessary with respect to
section 6001 because the inspection causes only a limited disruption and in-
trusion into the privacy of the inspected party. Conversely, section 7602 pro-
vides a far greater reach with respect to the parties, subject matter, and type
of testimony that may be summoned. It is this "sweeping and intrusive"
nature of the summons power that necessitates the judicial restrictions set
forth in Powell as well as the requirement that the summons be issued only
with respect to specific and well-defined investigations. The court concluded
in the discovery order that the government may demand an inspection of
records even though its purpose is to avoid statutory and judicial restrictions
on the issuance of a summons.
Judge Higginbotham. clearly had second thoughts about this discovery
order. In granting Mobil's motion for summary judgment, the court held
that the IRS derives no inspection authority from section 6001. In order to
compel an inspection, the IRS must issue a summons pursuant to section
7602. 99 The court did not find an implied right to inspect because to con-
strue section 6001 otherwise would raise serious constitutional questions.10 °
To avoid these constitutional difficulties, the court indicated the IRS was
obligated to construe section 6001 narrowly.1o
2. United States v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. 102
In contrast to the Mobil case, United States v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. pro-
vides judicial support for the IRS interpretation of its inspection authority.
Ohio Bell concerned an IRS investigation into the validity of excise tax ex-
emptions claimed by Ohio Bell customers. 103 Although the tax is paid by
the customer, it is collected and paid to the IRS by the telephone company.
97. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
98. 499 F. Supp. at 484.
99. 543 F. Supp. at 519. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
100. Id. at 511-16.
101. This construction process begins with an exhaustive analysis of the relevant legislative
history, which, the court concludes, presents no clear picture of congressional intent. Without
such guidance, the rules of construction mandate that the statute be construed in a manner that
avoids constitutional difficulties.
102. 475 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
103. Id. at 699.
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Certain organizations 10 4 could obtain exemptions from the tax by submit-
ting an exemption certificate and supporting documents to the telephone
company.' 0 5 The regulations require these certificates to be made available
for inspection. 106
In the course of its investigation of Ohio Bell subscribers, the IRS re-
quested access to the exemption certificates and documents. Ohio Bell re-
fused to comply with the request. In an action instituted by the IRS to
compel production of the documents, Ohio Bell maintained that the IRS
must first issue a summons and comply with the John Doe notice provi-
sions. 10 7 The court rejected this contention and found that section 6001 au-
thority to require recordkeeping implied a grant of authority to inspect the
records without issuing a summons. 108
3. The Fourth Amendment Issue
The constitutional problem perceived by the Mobil court stems from the
Supreme Court's decision in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 109 In. Barlow's the
Court declared the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)"10
unconstitutional to the extent it authorized the Secretary of Labor to con-
duct nonconsensual, warrantless, administrative inspections of business work
areas. As in Mobil, the inspection in Barlow's was not initiated in response to
a specific complaint, but was the result of OSHA's routine compliance selec-
tion process.
The Court held that a warrant, or its equivalent, must be obtained
before nonconsensual searches are conducted. This procedure insures that
"the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by stat-
ute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral
criteria.""' The warrant requirement also serves to advise the owner of the
104. I.R.C. § 4253 (1976).
105. 26 C.F.R. § 49.4253-11 (1982).
106. 26 C.F.R. § 148.1-4(g) (1982).
107. 475 F. Supp. at 699. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 700. The Mobil court rejected this rationale because it found no language in
§ 6001 to support the conclusion that the statute grants "implicit authority" to inspect records.
The requirement that records be available for inspection does not necessarily allow them to be
inspected without the protections provided by summons enforcement procedures. Thus, the
IRS regulations go beyond the authority granted by the statute. See 543 F. Supp. at 511.
109. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). The constitutional questions raised by warrantless administrative
searches of business and residential areas have been discussed in a number of excellent articles.
See generally McManis & McManis, Structuring Admiistrative Inspections: Is There Any Warrant For A
Search Warrant?, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 942 (1977); Note, Administrative Searches and the Implied Consent
Doctrine: Beyond the Fourth Amendment, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 91 (1976); Note, Camara, See and
Their Progeny: Another Look at Administrative Inspections Under the Fourth Amendment, 15 COLUM. J. L.
& Soc. PROBs. 61 (1979); Note, Rationalzing Administrative Searches, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1291
(1979); Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MINN. L. REv. 155 (1967).
110. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 and Supp. V
1981). The statute provides that an employer must "make, keep and preserve, and make avail-
able" to the Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare such records
as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe by regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(1) (1976).
The regulations issued pursuant to this authority authorize inspectors to "review records
required by the Act . ..and other records which are directly related to the purpose of the
inspection." 29 C.F.R. § 1903.3 (1982).
111. 436 U.S. at 323. In discussing the Secretary's contention that requiring warrants seri-
ously burdens the enforcement process, the Court noted that warrants for administrative
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premises of the "scope andobjects of the search, beyond which limits the




In Mobil, the court indicated that the undefined scope of the warrantless
inspection authority claimed by the IRS created constitutional problems
similar to those presented in Barlow's. 113 The court noted that the IRS inter-
pretation of section 6001 would allow it to "unilaterally determine the scope
of its inspection rights." ' 1 4 The court interpreted Barlow's as rejecting such
broad administrative latitude and requiring judicial supervision over agency
record inspections. 1 15
The court's conclusion in Mobil that this judicial supervision necessitates
the issuance of a summons is, however, questionable. The Barlow's require-
ment of review by a neutral officer is satisfied by a "warrant or its
equivalent." ' 6 The Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Mississippi
Power & Light Co. 117 suggests the IRS procedures for enforcing record in-
spections may provide a warrant equivalent. The court in Mssi'ssippi" Power
ruled that Department of Labor procedures providing resort to a federal
court prior to the inspection are the type of warrant equivalent contem-
plated by the Court in Barlow's.I"'
The court interpreted the Barlow's warrant equivalent standard as man-
dating judicial review of an inspection request before an inspection.11 9 Under
this view, requiring the IRS to obtain an injunction to enforce its inspection
right provides adequate constitutional protection because a court will deter-
mine the reasonableness of the search before it is conducted. 120
searches do not require probable cause in the criminal law sense, but instead require only that
reasonable legislative and administrative standards be followed in selecting an establishment for
inspection. This category of "administrative" probable cause was created by the Court in the
companion cases of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) and See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967). The less demanding standard recognized that effective regulatory pro-
grams often require the deterrent effect of unannounced, random inspections. An administra-
tive warrant only requires a showing that "a valid public interest justifies the intrusion."
Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
In later cases, the Court held that a warrant need not be obtained in all circumstances. In
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) and United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972), the Court concluded that valid warrantless searches could be conducted
with respect to industries that historically have been pervasively regulated and which require
frequent, unannounced inspections for effective law enforcement. Thus, persons in industries
such as those involving firearms or liquor are deemed to have impliedly consented to the inspec-
tions. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316; Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 74-77. The Barlow's decision indicates this
"implied consent" doctrine will not be extended to permit warrantless inspections merely be-
cause an industry engages in interstate commerce or is subject to governmental regulation.
112. 436 U.S. at 323.
113. 543 F. Supp. at 518-19.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 436 U.S. at 325.
117. 638 F.2d 899 (5th Cir.), cer. dened, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
118. 638 F.2d at 907.
119. Id.
120. The inquiry into the reasonableness of a particular search is held to require considera-
tion of three elements. Id. at 907. The first is whether there is statutory authority for the pro-
posed search. The second is whether the scope of the search is properly limited. The third
element requires an examination of whether the standards used by the agency in choosing to
initiate a particular search satisfy the fourth amendment standards of reasonableness. The deci-
sion must be based upon evidence of an existing violation, upon reasonable legislative or admin-
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IV. ISSUING AND ENFORCING JOHN DOE SUMMONSES
A. Reasonable Basis
IRS reluctance to use section 7609(f) procedures reflects its uncertainty
about its ability to demonstrate a reasonable basis for believing someone has
not complied with the tax laws. 12 1 In most instances where John Doe sum-
monses have been sought, the IRS has asserted two bases for meeting this
statutory requirement. The first is that the transaction involved is inherently
suspicious as susceptible to tax cheating.122 The second is that examinations
of taxpayers in similar situations indicate a high degree of improper
reporting. 1
23
Most courts have agreed that either of these circumstances alone can
provide the reasonable basis required for issuing a John Doe summons. For
example, in United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exchange, Inc. ,124 the Third Circuit
upheld a summons demanding production of a barter exchange's member-
ship list and bartering transaction records. 125 The holding was supported
principally by a revenue agent's testimony that barter transactions "are in-
herently susceptible to tax error."' 126 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that
the fact members of barter exchanges "historically, exhibited numerous er-
rors in the reporting of non-cash transactions" constituted a reasonable basis
for investigating members of a particular exchange. 127 In United States v.
Island Trade Exchange, Inc. ,128 the court allowed issuance of a John Doe sum-
mons because the IRS met the rational basis standard by establishing that
the "unique and nontraditional features of bartering transactions cause tax-
payers to omit or improperly report income."'
29
Evaluation of whether the IRS belief in a particular case is reasonable is
quite subjective as was illustrated in United States v. Brigham Young Univer-
sity.' 30 In that case, the IRS asserted a reasonable basis derived from its
audit experience with 162 returns of property donors to the university.'
3 1
Every one of the returns revealed substantial overvaluations of the contrib-
uted property. Because the vast majority of these overvaluations involved
contributions of art objects or silver mining claims arranged by particular
dealers or appraisers, Brigham Young University (BYU) offered to identify
the donors of such property. The IRS refused this offer and obtained an ex
istrative standards, or, the search must be made "pursuant to an administrative plan containing
specific neutral criteria." Id. at 907 (quoting Bar/ow's, 436 U.S. at 323).
121. I.R.C. § 7609(0(2) (West Supp. 1983). See supra note 13.
122. United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Island Trade Exch., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
123. United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982), cert granted, 103
S. Ct. 713 (1983); United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Maxwell, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9378 (D. Nev. 1981).
124. 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981).
125. Id. at 308.
126. Id. at 306.
127. In re John Does, 671 F.2d 977, 980 (6th Cir. 1982).
128. 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
129. Id. at 997.
130. 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982), revkg, 485 F. Supp. 534 (D. Utah 1980),cert. granted, 103
S. Ct. 713 (1983).
131. 485 F. Supp. at 536.
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pare order allowing it to serve a John Doe summons for the names of all
persons who donated property.
132
In the subsequent enforcement proceeding, the court refused to enforce
the summons. The fact that many BYU donors overvalued their gifts did
not provide a reasonable basis for believing other donors had overvalued
their gifts. 133 The court was not persuaded by the IRS statistical argument
that the large number of improper deductions discovered made it likely that
other donors had also overstated the value of their contributions. 1
34
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's interpretation
of the reasonable basis standard.' 3 5 The court compared this case to the
cases of Columbus Trade Exchange 136 and Pittsburgh Trade Exchange,' 37 where
the IRS statistical experience had been with members of other barter ex-
changes. Supported by these cases in two other circuits, the court concluded
that the fact each of the 162 donors examined had overvalued their gifts
made it reasonable to believe at least some of the remaining 150 donors had
overvalued their gifts.
138
One issue not explored in Brigham Young Unwterst'y is the validity of the
statistical evidence upon which the IRS established its reasonable basis. It
must be noted that all the determinations about the overvalued contribu-
tions were made by the IRS. 139 It is possible that a number of the findings
were incorrect and certainly all were subject to challenge in the administra-
tive appeals process or in the courts.
This statistical question was raised in United States v. Maxwell,'4° where
the IRS sought enforcement of a John Doe summons demanding the mem-
bership list of a Nevada barter exchange. To establish a reasonable basis for
the summons, the IRS presented the results of two annual surveys of the
audits of members of a large Los Angeles barter exchange.'41 The 1976 sur-
vey indicated fifty-nine percent of the active members failed to report any
income from their barter transactions, while the 1977 survey showed sev-
enty-two percent failed to report. The IRS also asserted that statements
made by the exchange's proprietor, to the effect that he knew members were
not reporting income, established a second reasonable basis for the
summons. 142
The court straddled the issue, somewhat, in holding that the IRS
surveys "may not . . . standing alone" be sufficient to establish a reasonable
basis. 143 The court noted "[tihe survey was not an independent study by
unbiased researchers," and observed that "the results of any study are only
132. Id. at 535.
133. Id. at 538.
134. Id.
135. 679 F.2d at 1349.
136. 671 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1982).
137. 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981).
138. 679 F.2d at 1350.
139. 485 F. Supp. at 536.
140. 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9378 (D. Nev. 1981).
141. Id. at 87,026-27.
142. Id. at 87,025-26.
143. Id. at 87,029.
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as reliable as the methodology employed. ' 144 The summons was, however,
enforceable because the survey results together with the proprietor's state-
ments established the requisite reasonable basis..'
45
B. Challenging the John Doe Summons
A fundamental question about section 7609()146 is whether it created
new substantive limitations on the IRS summons power or whether it merely
provided additional procedural requirements. Congress directed the district
courts to authorize the service of a John Doe summons in an exparte proceed-
ing based "solely upon the [IRS] petition and supporting affidavits.'
1 47
This language has been interpreted to allow the summoned party to chal-
lenge the enforcement of a summons by attacking the sufficiency of the IRS
showing with respect to issuance of the summons. ' 48 The effect of this inter-
pretation is to make a sharp distinction between the enforcement standards
for John Doe and other administrative summonses. Some courts, however,
have maintained that Congress did not intend to create such a distinction,
precluding later challenges to the ex parte findings. 1
49
The disagreement on this issue results from different analyses of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Powell. 150 If Powell is interpreted as being pri-
marily concerned about IRS abuse of its summons powers, then the grounds
for challenging enforcement of a summons should be quite broad. In con-
trast, if Powell is viewed as rejecting any probable cause requirement for
enforcement of an IRS summons, a taxpayer may not challenge the ex pare
reasonable basis findings in a subsequent proceeding to enforce the sum-
mons. Using this more restrictive interpretation, section 7609() only pro-
vides a new procedure to restrain IRS use of John Doe summonses; under this
approach no new substantive ground for challenging a summons has been
created.
The practical effect of allowing a summoned party to challenge the issu-
ance of a John Doe summons at an enforcement proceeding is to convert the
ex parte inquiry into an adversarial contest. In Brigham Young Unvers'y,'
1 5 1
the Tenth Circuit indicated the Supreme Court mandated such a contest.1
52
The court quoted Reisman v. Caplin ' 53 as authority for its contention that a
summons enforcement proceeding is an adversarial determination of the is-
sues wherein a "witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate
144. Id. at 87,028.
145. Id. at 87,029.
146. See supra note 25.
147. I.R.C. § 7609(h)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
148. United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 713 (1983); United States v. Island Trade Exch., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y.
1982).
149. Agricultural Asset Management Co. v. United States, 688 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981); In re John Does, 541
F. Supp. 213 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
150. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
151. 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982).
152. Id. at 1348.
153. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
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ground."' 154 Powell is cited as authorizing the courts to "inquire into the
underlying reasons" for an IRS investigation.1 55 A similar rationale was
adopted by one New York district court in United States v. Island Trade Ex-
change, Inc. 156 The court in Island Trade Exchange viewed section 7609(0 as
encompassed by the requirements in Powell that a summons meet all the
administrative provisions of the Code.
157
In reJohn Does 158 heard by a second New York district court, rejected
the view that the ex parte findings could be challenged in the summons en-
forcement proceedings.' 59 The court noted that permitting a redetermina-
tion of the ex parte hearing issues would render the ex parte proceeding
unnecessary and would interfere with IRS investigatory powers. 
60
The Second Circuit resolved this difference of opinion by holding that
the section 7609(o criteria are not appropriate grounds for challenging en-
forcement of a summons.1 61 An analysis of the statute's legislative history
persuaded the court that Congress did not intend for questions about the
issuance of summonses to become entangled in adversarial proceedings.'
62
To hold otherwise "would make the ex parte proceeding superfluous," a re-
sult Congress can hardly have intended.'
63
In Pittsburgh Trade Exchange, 164 the Third Circuit also stated that the
section 7609(0 criteria cannot serve as an additional substantive basis for
challenging summons enforcement.' 65 The court's opinion, however, was
based on a different and more questionable analysis of the statute's legisla-
tive history. This opinion noted that a major portion of section 7609 is con-
cerned with providing notice to taxpayers when summonses regarding their
affairs are served upon third parties. From this, the court concluded the
thrust of section 7609(f) is to provide procedural safeguards for unidentified
taxpayers who cannot be notified.' 66 Because the ex parte proceeding is es-
sentially a substitute for notice, the criteria used in the ex parte proceeding
were not intended to create substantive defenses to summons
enforcement.'
6 7
While the court's conclusion may be valid, the legislative history does
not support the view that section 7609(f is primarily concerned with the
problem of notice.168 The placement of this subsection among the general
154. 679 F.2d at 1348 (quoting Reuman, 375 U.S. at 449).
155. 679 F.2d at 1348 (quoting Powell, 379 U.S. at 58).
156. 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
157. Id. at 996.
158. 541 F. Supp. 213 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
159. Id. at 218.
160. Id. at 218-19. This reasoning echos that of Powell. The Court rejected the probable
cause requirement for IRS summonses "because it might seriously hamper the Commissioner in
carrying out investigations he thinks warranted, forcing him to litigate and prosecute appeals on
the very subject which he desires to investigate .. " 379 U.S. at 54.
161. Agricultural Asset Management Co. v. United States, 688 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1982).
162. Id. at 149.
163. Id.
164. 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981).
165. Id. at 306.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. H.R. REP. 658, supra note 2, at 307; S. REP. 938, supra note 2, at 368.
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third-party recordkeeping provisions appears to be more a matter of conven-
ience than affinity. The Committee Reports clearly indicate that section
7609(f) is directed at curbing potential IRS abuse of John Doe
summonses. 
169
It is equally clear Congress did not intend to establish a new basis for
resisting enforcement of summonses. Congress understood the importance of
the John Doe summons as an investigatory tool and did not intend John Doe
summons provisions to impose an excessive burden on the IRS.' 70 By man-
dating an ex parte proceeding, Congress apparently recognized that permit-
ting an adversarial contest on the reasonable basis question would inhibit
the use of John Doe summonses.
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
The possibility that the government may learn the names of members of
controversial political, religious, or similar organizations inhibits participa-
tion by some people who might otherwise join or support these groups. In
light of this reality, the courts have recognized that the constitutional right
to freedom of association depends in great measure upon an ancillary right
to privacy in one's associations.' 7 t Thus, an investigation that would in-
fringe upon associational privacy is permissible only where the government
can demonstrate a substantial relationship between the information re-
quested and a compelling state interest.1
7 2
An illustration of how this constitutional protection may limit the IRS
summons power is presented in United States v. Citizens State Bank ,173 where an
organization of tax protestors, the United States Taxpayers Union (USTU),
sought to prevent the IRS from summoning bank records that could reveal
the identities of its members and contributors.' 7 4 The summons was issued
to a bank during an investigation of a USTU officer who had not filed an
income tax return for ten years. The IRS requested all bank records for the
officer's personal account and for a USTU account controlled by the officer.
The bank did not comply with the summons. In an IRS action to enforce
the summons, the officer and the USTU intervened alleging that release of
the records would identify members and contributors of the organization.
The intervenors claimed that giving the IRS access to USTU records would
discourage persons from joining or contributing to the organization out of
169. Id.
170. H.R. REP. 658, supra note 2, at 306; S. REP. 938, supra note 2, at 373.
171. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (committee
request for NAACP membership lists in connection with investigation of Communist Party de-
nied because state did not demonstrate a substantial relation between the information sought
and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (state request for NAACP membership lists denied because state could not justify the
infringement on right of freedom of association); Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D.
Ark.), affdper curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968) (no compelling government interest shown for sub-
poena requiring production of records identifying contributors to Republican Party). But see
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (Army Intelligence system for surveillance of lawful political
activity did not, by itself, have a chilling effect upon constitutional freedoms).
172. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
173. 612 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1980).
174. Id. at 1093.
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fear of IRS retaliation.' 75 To support this contention, the USTU sought to
introduce evidence on the adverse effects such an IRS summons would have
on its activities. The district court, however, deemed this evidence irrelevant
and enforced the summons. '
76
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that aprimafacie
showing of a first amendment infringement required the IRS to establish an
appropriate need for the material.177 The IRS must demonstrate that there
is a rational connection between disclosure of the information and a legiti-
mate and compelling government interest."18 On remand the district court
was ordered to determine whether disclosure of the bank records would ad-
versely affect USTU's freedom of association and, if so, whether the govern-
ment had a compelling need for the information. The court emphasized,
however, that its decision would "only rarely serve to limit the reach of an
IRS summons."" 79
Just how rare is illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States
v. Holmes,' 80 involving a summons issued during an investigation into the
exempt status of a church. Although the court found the summons too
broad to meet the restrictive statutory standard of I.R.C. section 7605(c),
which permitted examination of church records only to the extent neces-
sary,' 8 ' the likelihood of a subsequent narrower summons impelled the court
to consider the constitutional issue.' 8 2 The church asserted that any sum-
mons for documents relating to its internal affairs would infringe upon its
members' free exercise of religion.' 8 3  The court held, however, that al-
though the summons might create an incidental burden upon religious activ-
ities, this burden was balanced by the government's substantial interest in its
fiscal integrity. '
8 4
In the later case of United States v. Grayson County State Bank,'8 5 the same
court indicated that religious free exercise cases are distinguishable from the
essentially political situation presented in Citizens State Bank. The court con-
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1094.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. at 248).
179. Id.
180. 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curim).
181. I.R.C. § 7605(c) (1976) Restriction on Examination of Churches-
No examination of the books of account of a church or convention or association of
churches shall be made to determine whether such organization may be engaged in
the carrying on of an unrelated trade or business or may be otherwise engaged in
activities which may be subject to tax under part III of subchapter F of chapter 1 of
this title (sec. 511 and following, relating to taxation of business income of exempt
organizations) unless the Secretary (such officer being no lower than a principal inter-
nal revenue officer for an internal revenue region) believes that such organization may
be so engaged and so notifies the organization in advance of the examination. No
examination of the religious activities of such an organization shall be made except to
the extent necessary to determine whether such organization is a church or a conven-
tion or association of churches, and no examination of the books of account of such an
organization shall be made other than to the extent necessary to determine the
amount of tax imposed by this title.
182. 614 F.2d at 88-89.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 990.
185. 656 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982).
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cluded that allowing the IRS access to church records did not restrict reli-
gious freedom. 186 The court did not, however, discuss the potential chilling




The controversies surrounding the John Doe summons legislation indi-
cate that the statute has not protected taxpayer privacy interests, but rather
has created a tactic for delaying and hindering IRS investigations. This is
the result of a congressional failure to recognize the wisdom of the Supreme
Court's longstanding view that the IRS power to summon documents cannot
be narrowly construed if the tax laws are to be effectively administered.18 8
Section 7609(f) was enacted because Congress believed that the Bsceg-
ha'8 9 decision authorized IRS fishing expeditions and because it approved
of the holding in Humble Oi/.'9° Yet the rationale in Biscegh'a, is the better
reasoned view. The IRS can protect government revenues only by having
access to records of financial transactions. In most cases, access to records
will not violate legitimate privacy expectations because the records have
been voluntarily thrust into the stream of commerce.
For similar reasons, the IRS should be permitted to collect information
concerning potential tax evasion. This does not suggest the IRS should be
free to roam through records without purpose, but the IRS should be al-
lowed to accumulate information about specific types of transactions. Lim-
ited access to records required to be maintained would protect the IRS
interest in tax compliance. Given the judicial role in the injunction process,
the recordkeeper's fourth amendment rights would also be protected.
The issue of IRS summons infringements on first amendment rights has
not been fully developed. As the courts hear more of these cases, the scope of
IRS authority to summon records of churches and political organizations
will be defined.
186. 656 F.2d at 1074. In quoting from Holmes, the court noted that even if there is an
incidental burden on the free exercise of religion, the burden is justified if a compelling govern-
ment interest outweighs the degree of impairment. d.
187. The position of the Eighth Circuit on the issue of IRS summonses and religious free
exercise is not clear. In United States v. Life Science Church, 636 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1980) (per
curkim) the court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether a sum-
mons for church records was too broad under § 7605(c). The court also ordered a determination
of the constitutional issues raised by Citizens State Bank and Holmes. The court did note, how-
ever, that the IRS summons probably was an infringement on the first amendment rights of the
Life Science Church. 636 F.2d at 224.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Trader's State Bank, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9131 (9th Cir. 1983) (ber cunam), refused to enforce an IRS summons for a church's bank
records. Citing Citizens State Bank, the court found the IRS had shown no rational connection
between the documents sought and a legitimate governmental end.
188. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
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ANTITRUST'S PER SE RULE: REPORTS OF ITS
DEATH ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED
SETH E. LIPNER*
In the five years between 1975 and 1980, the Supreme Court, led by
"the new antitrust majority,"' appeared to undo thirty years of antitrust
precedent. A series of cases under section 1 of the Sherman Act 2 discarded
the much criticized per se rule in favor of the rule of reason. Due in large
part to a change in membership on the Court,3 the transition has had re-
sounding effects.
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Sociey ,4 however, the Supreme
Court may have reversed this trend. In a four-three opinion, the Court de-
clared that competing physicians who had agreed to use a maximum fee
schedule had violated the Sherman Act per se. 5 Less than ten years ago the
decision would not have been considered controversial or even noteworthy;
today it is both.
This article will examine the current state of the law under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. Part I traces, in detail, the series of events which brought
about increased reliance on the rule of reason, reviewing in particular the
Burger Court's price-fixing cases. Part II reports the Maricopa County deci-
sion. Finally, Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Marcopa
County and attempts to assess the status of antitrust law under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
I. THE BURGER COURT AND THE PER SE RULE
Success or failure in an antitrust case frequently depends upon whether
the court applies theper se rule of illegality. This rule states that if a practice
falls into a forbidden category, 6 it will be condemned without inquiry into
* B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1978; J.D., Albany Law School of Union Uni-
versity, 1980; LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1981; Assistant Professor of Law,
Bernard M. Baruch College of City University of New York. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Robert and Roslyn Griffin for their editorial assistance and fine attention to
detail.
1. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 643 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting).
2. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1976)).
3. The resignation of Justices Douglas and Black during the 1970's had a major impact
upon antitrust law. For many years, these two jurists greatly influenced the development of
antitrust law. A perusal of a standard law school antitrust casebook reveals a total of 20 cases in
which one of them authored the majority opinion. See M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY
& H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION (1975).
4. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
5. 1d. at 344-45.
6. Over the years the forbidden categories have been expanded to include: price fixing,
division of markets by competitors, group boycotts, tie-ins, and certain exchanges of price infor-
mation. Vertical division of markets by manufacturers, placed into theper se category in United
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its justifications or procompetitive benefits. 7 Since the inception of our anti-
trust laws, price fixing has been held to be one of the forbidden practices.8
Thus, characterization of a practice as price fixing inevitably leads toper se
treatment. During the Warren Court era, the per se rule was used with re-
markable frequency; 9 its complement, the rule of reason, 10 which calls for a
full-scale economic analysis of the impact of the restraint,' 1 was never in-
voked by the Warren Court to decide a price-fixing case.
1 2
In a series of cases beginning in 1975, the Supreme Court, under the
influence of its new members, resurrected the rule of reason. The Burger
Court quickly expanded the breadth of the rule of reason and brought its
previously undefined contours into sharper focus. Increased reliance on the
rule of reason was necessarily accompanied by a decreased role for the per se
States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), was withdrawn from that category in
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See infa text accompanying
notes 31-42. See also L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 63-77 (1977);
Redlich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1979).
7. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); Northern Pac. R.R. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
8. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.
271 (6th Cir. 1898), modtfled, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211,213 (1951); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392 (1927); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at § 167; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept.- Price Ftxng and
Market Dirnsitns, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); Redlich, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (per se rule applied to
division of markets by competitors); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum
price fixing); United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (division of markets
by manufacturers); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (refusal to deal
by manufacturer induced by competitor); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (price
fixing by manufacturer); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (con-
certed refusal to deal induced by competitors). But see United States v. Container Corp., 393
U.S. 333, 338 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring) (stating that aper se rule was not being applied; the
majority opinion, authored by Justice Douglas, is unclear as to the standard utilized.).
10. The rule of reason dates back to Chief Justice Edward White's opinion in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The application of the rule was expounded upon by
Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The rule of
reason has lain largely dormant since that time, although it has made occasional appearances.
See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
11. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), where Justice Brandeis
stated:
The . . . test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.
Id. at 238. See also National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-99 (1978)
(Justice Stevens, for the majority, stating that inquiry under the rule is directed at forming a
judgment about the impact of a restraint upon competition); cf. id. at 700 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (questioning the narrowness of the majority's approach to the rule, at least as applied
to professional organizations).
12. But see United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 338 (1969) (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
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rule. While some of this decrease has been substantive and substantial, other
aspects of it have been more symbolic. For instance, in the first case, Goldfarb
v. Vrgini'a State Bar,"3 the Court held that dissemination and enforcement of
a minimum fee schedule for attorneys constituted "a classic illustration of
price-fixing."' 4 But despite this finding, the Court never expressly declared
the practice "per se" unlawful. '
5
The State and County Bar Associations in Virginia had distributed a
"suggested" minimum fee schedule to all the state's attorneys.' 6 When Mr.
and Mrs. Goldfarb sought an attorney for a title search, they could not find
one who would charge less than the suggested fee. 17 Compliance with the
schedule had been secured by the State Bar Association's publication of ethi-
cal opinions indicating that failure to adhere to the fee schedule was
"misconduct."'
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court, distinguished
several cases which had not involved the per se rule,' 9 demonstrating, for
instance, that the schedule was more than merely advisory.2 ° The opinion
thus suggests that an advisory schedule, 2 1 or perhaps one involving past
transactions, 22 might have been lawful.23 Since the Bar Association en-
13. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
14. Id. at 783.
15. The words '"per se" are never used. Instead, Chief Justice Burger noted that the prac-
tice was unusually damaging, an irrelevancy under the per se rule. id. at 782. See supra text
accompanying note 7. See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 564
(9th Cir. 1980) (Larson, J., dissenting), rev'd 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (stating that nevertheless aper
se rule was applied in Goldfarb).
16. 421 U.S. at 776-78.
17. Id. at 775-76. The Goldfarbs contacted over 36 attorneys; of those who replied, none
would charge less than the suggested minimum fee, and several stated that they knew of none
who would. Id. at 776.
18. Id. at 776-78, 783. The Court stated: "[The associations created] a pricing system that
consumers could not realistically escape." Id. at 783. Membership in the State Bar Association
was required in order to practice law in Virginia. Id. at 776. The ethical opinions stated, inter
alia, that "evidence that an attorney habitually charges less than the suggested minimum fee
schedule adopted by his local Bar Association, raises a presumption that such lawyer is guilty of
misconduct .. " Id. at 777-78.
19. Id. at 781. For example, the Court cited American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), which had involved a purely advisory fee schedule.
20. 421 U.S. at 781-83.
21. Advisory schedules have historically been treated as information exchanges, rather
than outright price fixing. An exchange might facilitate price fixing, as in American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), or it may be a legitimate effort by business-
men to improve market information. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422
(1978). The crucial distinction between price fixing (per se) and information exchanges (rule of
reason) is that the former includes an agreement lacking in the latter, to adhere to a price or
follow a particular policy. See also United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 6 at § 73; Redlich, supra note 6 at 24-26.
22. See Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); Maple Floor-
ing Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
23. Thus, for example, the American Society of Anesthesiologists was able to escape con-
demnation when their members agreed to adopt, publish and disseminate a relative value guide
for professional service. See United States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, 473 F. Supp.
147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The schedule in that case, however, was also insulated because it con-
tained no suggestion of any monetary values, just suggested formulas for the computation of
professional time for various medical procedures. Id. at 153. Cf. Plymouth Dealers Ass'n v.
United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960) (agreement among competitors to begin negotia-
tions from agreed list prices held unlawful per se as price fixing).
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forced the schedule through the prospect of professional discipline, the effect
was to produce adherence to the fee schedule, and thus the Bar Associations
were guilty of price fixing.
24
The opinion also rejected any notion that a learned profession was ex-
empt from Sherman Act proscriptions. 2 5 The practice of law, stated the
Court, is "trade or commerce" which falls within the ambit of the Sherman
Act. 26 The Court did indicate, however, that the public service aspects of a
profession might, in some cases, warrant treatment different from that gov-
erning other businesses. 2 7 It was left unclear exactly what that different
treatment might be.
In retrospect, it is significant that early per se price-fixing cases, such as
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association2 8 and United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co. ,29 were not cited to support the Court's decision. In addition,
the Chief Justice cited no Warren Court majority opinion on the price-fixing
question. 30 The Goldfarb opinion foreshadowed the coming change in court
philosophy.
Two years later, in Continental TV , Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. ,31 the Bur-
ger Court made what is to date its greatest assault on the per se rule. Sylva-
nia, a subsidiary of the giant, General Telephone and Electronics, was
accused of a per se violation of section 1 by enforcing franchise agreements
which limited its distributors to the sale of Sylvania products from specified
locations only. 32 A similar nonprice restraint, allocation of exclusive territo-
24. 421 U.S. at 781-83.
25. Id. at 786-88. The County Association advanced several reasons for its contention,
including the existence of state licensing regulations and that the goal of professional services is
not profit but provision of necessary services. The defendant thus argued it was totally exempt
from the Sherman Act. Id. at 787.
26. Id. As the Court stated: "[T]o read into [the Act] so wide an exemption as that urged
on us would be at odds with [congressional] purpose." Id. The Court also rejected the argu-
ment that since the Bar Association was established by act of the Virginia legislature, the Asso-
ciation's practice was immunized as state action under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). It
could not be argued, said the Court, that the price schedule was mandated by the legislature
and thus immunized. 421 U.S. at 790-92.
27. Id. at 788 n. 17. The Court stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a busi-
ness is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the profes-
sions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect,
and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be
treated differently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the one with
which we are confronted today.
Id
28. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
29. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
30. The opinion does cite the concurring opinion in United States v. Container Corp., 393
U.S. 333, 337-39 (1969), in which Justice Fortas states that his understanding of Justice Doug-
las' majority opinion is that the case was to be analyzed under the rule of reason. See 421 U.S.
at 782. Justice Douglas' opinion in Container, silent on that question, is notably terse and indi-
cates, at least to some, aper se analysis. For an in depth analysis of the question see Kefauver,
The Legah'ty of Dissemnzation of Market Data by Trade Associations. What Does Container Hold-, 57
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (1972).
31. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
32. Id. at 40. Sylvania had extracted from dealers "location clauses" requiring the distrib-
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ries to distributors, was held by the Warren Court to beper se unlawful only
ten years earlier in the case of United States v. Schwinn. 33 In Sylvania, the Bur-
ger Court overruled Schwinn ,34 refused to apply the per se rule, and instead
applied the rule of reason. 35 Justice Powell, writing for a divided Court,
reasoned that the restraint was not necessarily pernicious and without re-
deeming effect. Therefore, he stated, a per se rule could not be applied.
Rather, a full-scale inquiry into the effect of the restraint was required.
36
Over a dissent by Justice Brennan,37 Justice Powell thus cast into chaos
utors to resell only at designated locations. Continental TV., a San Francisco distributor who
had so agreed, opened a new outlet in Sacramento. Under pressure from its Sacramento distrib-
utor, Sylvania reduced Continental's line of credit. In response Continental withheld payments
owed to Sylvania's finance company. When the finance company sued Continental for these
payments, Continental cross-claimed against Sylvania, asserting the § 1 violation. The trial
court, Justice Clark (retired) sitting by designation, held the practice to be aper se violation. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,072 (9th Cir. 1974), but
on rehearing en banc, the court reversed, 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976), over two vigorous dissents,
id. at 1004, 1018.
33. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). The Schwinn case came to the Supreme Court only four years
after the Court had decided White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). In White
Motor the Court held that the judiciary's unfamiliarity with vertical territorial restraints re-
quired remand for the study of their effects. Id. at 263-64. In Schwinn, the Court changed its
approach and held that Schwinn's allocation of exclusive territories to its independent distribu-
tors was aperse violation of§ 1. 388 U.S. at 379. The Schwnn decision was subjected to severe
criticism from some scholars. See, e.g., McClaren, Marketing Limitations on Independent Distributors
and Dealers-Pies, Territories, Customers and Handling of Compettwe Products, 13 ANTITRUST BULL.
161 (1968); Orrick, Marketing Restrictions Imposed to Protect the Integrity of Franchise Distribution Sys-
tems, 36 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 63 (1967); Posner, Antitmst Polihy and the Supreme Court. An Analy-
sis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282 (1975). But see Redlich, supra note 6.
34. 433 U.S. at 58. The Court could not find a "principled basis for distinguishing" the
Schwinn restraints from those present in Sylvania. Id. at 46.
35. Id. at 57-59.
36. Id. at 49, 54-59. Relying primarily on the writings of antitrust scholars and economists,
the Court noted that competition among different brands, interbrand competition, is enhanced
by vertical restraints such as the location restrictions in Sylvanta or the exclusive territories in
Schwinn. Each "exclusive" dealer has the incentive to furnish local advertising and other point-
of-sale services, such as showrooms and repair and maintenance shops. Without the restraint,
firms which also sell the manufacturer's product in the territory would take a "free ride" on the
other distributor's advertising or services, thereby discouraging the provision of these services.
Elimination of the free rider effect through allocation of territories thus improves a manufac-
turer's ability to compete with other brands. The Court therefore would not condemn the prac-
ticeper se. Id.
As the Court recognized, vertical restraints, while protecting interbrand competition, also
reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the number of sellers of a particular product in any
given market. Id. at 54. A court's job is to balance the procompetitive interbrand effects of the
vertical restraint against the concomitant reduction in intrabrand competition. The Court inti-
mated no view on how this balancing would be done. The Court's willingness to so balance,
however, is significant in light of its refusal to engage in a similar balancing in United States v.
Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). In that case, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,
stated that the Court's "inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition
in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another sector is one impor-
tant reason we have formulatedperse rules." Id. at 609-10. In Topco, the Court, over the dissent
of Chief Justice Burger, id. at 613, held an agreement among competitors to divide territories
was illegal per se.
37. 433 U.S. at 71. Joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan would have applied theper
se rule of Schwinn. Justice White, in a separate concurrence, would have distinguished Schwznn
from Sylvania and applied the rule of reason in Sylvania. He argued there was no need to over-
rule Schwinn since, in his view, the restrictions in Sylvania had "less potential for restraint of
intrabrand competition and more potential for stimulating interbrand competition" than the
exclusive territories restrictions in Schwinn. Id. at 59 (White, J., concurring).
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the entire body of law under section 1.38 The little used 39 and poorly under-
stood rule of reason 40 was brought to the forefront of antitrust analysis. But
perhaps more significant was the suggestion that per se treatment was always
inappropriate if the restraint had any "redeeming virtue. ' 41 Courts and
commentators began to wonder what the effect of this new test ofper se ille-
gality was on other classes of trade restraints.
4 2
Only a year later, the Court, by expounding on the factors that define
the rule of reason, set out to remedy some of the problems it had created. In
National Sociey of Professional Engineers v. United States,43 the Court considered
the legality of a professional society's ethical canon prohibiting competitive
bidding on engineering projects. 44 The defendant in the case was a nation-
wide association of engineers, organized to deal with the nontechnical, busi-
ness aspects of engineering. 45 The Society's code of ethics provided that
members could not submit competitive bids. The question of fees was not
even to be discussed until the prospective client had selected an engineer for
his project. 46 In 1972, the government charged that this ethical canon had
the effect of suppressing price competition, and was therefore unlawful per
se. 4 7 The Society argued that the canon promoted the interests of safety and
quality by ensuring against inferior engineering work, which might flow
from the desire and ability to cut prices.48 In essence, the Society asserted
that the Canon was reasonable and thus insulated from section 1 condemna-
tion, because competition among engineers was contrary to the public
interest.
4 9
38. See Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approaches.- Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1977); Redlich, supra note 6.
39. See supra text accompanying note 12.
40. Professor Posner, upon whose writings the Court partially relied, see 433 U.S. at 55-56,
has written:
The content of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in practice, it is little more
than a euphemism for nonliability. Before Shwinn, restrictions on distribution were
tested under the Rule of Reason, meaning: they were lawful. The Court in Sylvania
may not have intended by its invocation of the Rule of Reason to bless all restrictions
in distribution, but it was deceived if it thought it was subjecting those restrictions to
scrutiny under a well-understood legal standard.
Posner, supra note 38, at 14.
41. 433 U.S. at 58 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
42. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 38, at 6-12; Redlich, supra note 6, at 56 n.397; see also
Bohling, A Simplied Rule ofReasonfor Vertical Restraints. Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis
and Sylvania, 64 IowA L. REv. 461, 519-24 (1979); Robinson, Antitrust Development, 80 COLUM.
L.J. 1, 14 (1980); Note, Sylvania and Beyond An Expanding Rule of Reason for Distributional Re-
straints, 4 J. CORP. LAw 169, 185-89 (1978).
43. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
44. Id. at 683-84.
45. Id. at 682. The Society's membership of 69,000 represents less than one quarter of the
nation's licensed professional engineers. See id. at 681-82.
46. The Society's Code of Ethics prohibited members from soliciting or submitting com-
petitive bids for engineering projects. A member was not permitted to give any estimate on fees,
either verbal or written, prior to selection of a project's engineer. In fact, a prospective engineer
was required to withdraw his name from consideration if a prospective client persisted in re-
questing a fee proposal. The Society thus sought to preserve the traditional method of selection,
based upon quality and reputation rather than price. Id. at 683-84.
47. Id. at 684. The complaint prayed for an injunction against the practice.
48. Id. at 684-85.
49. Id.
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Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,50 rejected the Society's asser-
tions5' and in'so doing set forth his understanding of the rule of reason.
Reviewing its history,52 he stated that inquiry under the rule is limited to
balancing anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. 53 Justice Stevens
then compared the "two complementary categories of antitrust analysis," 54
the rule of reason and the per se rule. He stated that under both categories
the judicial inquiry is directed at forming "a judgment about the competi-
tive significance of the restraint."'55 But, the Court is not to judge the wis-
dom of the congressional policy in favor of economic competition. 56 The
legislative mandate in favor of free and unfettered competition cannot be
questioned by the courts.
In order to demonstrate that the Society's "public interest" argument
was fatally flawed, Justice Stevens concentrated not on the price-fixing char-
acterization, 57 which had dominated Warren Court antitrust analysis, 58 but
rather on the restraint's impact upon competition. In fact, he hedges when
he states that the engineers' restraint is "not price fixing as such," 59 even
though the Society's practice clearly had an effect upon price.60 The War-
ren Court would have condemned it on that basis alone.
In a detailed discussion, which would only have been necessary under
the rule of reason, Justice Stevens concluded that the restraint had an an-
ticompetitive character, requiring no elaborate industry analysis.6 ' The
Court's language, however, indicates reliance on the per se rule. The Court
asserted, for example, that allegations of better quality, 62 or even improved
health and safety 63 are not "reason[s], cognizable under the Sherman Act,
for doing away with competition. '64 But, by leaving unclear which rule he
was actually applying, Justice Stevens came close to obliterating the differ-
50. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concurred separately in the Court's
opinion. Id. at 699. Chief Justice Burger dissented in part, asserting tersely that the first
amendment guaranteed the right of the Society to state in its canon that competitive bidding is
unethical. Id. at 701.
51. Id. at 692-96.
52. Id. at 687-92.
53. Id. at 691-92. But see supra note 11.
54. Id. at 692. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at § 72.
55. 435 U.S. at 692.
56. Id.
57. See cases cited supra note 8.
58. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at § 74; cases cited supra note 9.
59. 435 U.S. at 692.
60. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940).
61. 435 U.S. at 692.
62. Id. at 693-96.
63. Id. at 696 n.22.
64. Id. at 696. See also Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628 (D.
D.C. 1979) where the court held a similar restraint among architects unlawful under the rule of
reason. The court facially distinguished the engineers case by pointing out that the architects
had not banned all price discussions between potential client and potential architect. Rather,
in Mardirosian one architect could discuss price with a client, but a second architect could not
seek to match or underbid the first. Id. at 645-48. If one notes that the practices of both the
engineers and the architects affected price, the distinction offered by the court highlights no real
difference. Although the engineers' restraint is probably more injurious, both are now clearly
illegal.
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ence between the per se rule and the rule of reason.
65
In its next term, the Supreme Court was faced with a different and
difficult price-fixing case. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) televi-
sion network attacked the blanket licensure practices of two copyright per-
forming rights societies, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP).66  These societies are
granted nonexclusive 67 performance rights by individual copyright owners;
the societies, in turn, sell a "blanket license," permitting licensees to use any
composition in the licensor's repertoire. 68 The price charged for this license
is based not upon frequency or amount of use, but rather upon the licensee's
gross revenues. 69 The societies then distribute the royalties to copyright
owners. A necessary result of this scheme is that the society must choose a
price for its license, and CBS challenged that practice of price setting as
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.
70
The blanket license has been in use for several decades and, although it
has often been challenged 7 1 under the antitrust laws, it has never been pro-
scribed.7 2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in BMIv. CBS 73 was faced with
a,court of appeals opinion which, for the first time in the license's history,
decreed the practice illegal per se.4
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.7 5 Justice White,
writing for a unanimous Court,7 6 refused to apply the per se rule.7 7  He
65. See supra text accompanying note 55.
66. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). BMI is a
nonprofit corporation owned by members of the broadcasting industry and represents approxi-
mately 30,000 authors, composers, and publishers. ASCAP was organized in 1914 and repre-
sents some 22,000 composers and publishers. Id. at 4-5.
67. The nonexclusivity of the license is an important aspect of its legality. Id. at 28-30
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Prior to 1950, members granted ASCAP exclusive rights to license
their works. In 1950, the government challenged a 1941 consent decree, resulting in, inter alia,
the nonexclusivity of the license granted by ASCAP. See United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). BMI is in a similar situation. 441 U.S. at 12 n.20.
68. The societies also sell a per-program license. According to the most recent challenge to
the blanket license, the per-program license was, at least regarding television stations, an unat-
tractive alternative to the blanket license because 1) its base percentage rate is several times
higher than the blanket license, and 2) its reporting provisions are unusually onerous. See Buf-
falo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,898, at 72,533 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
69. 441 U.S. at 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This fee, based upon a user's ability to pay, is,
as Justice Stevens points out in a dissenting opinion, nothing more than an effective price dis-
crimination. The blanket license requires a user to purchase a license which is far broader than
his actual needs. The price he pays is unrelated to either the quantity or the quality of the
music used. Id. at 30-31. For a detailed economic analysis, see Cirace, CBS v. ASCAP. An
Economic Analysis of A Political Problem, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 277 (1978).
70. 441 U.S. at 6, 8-9.
71. The license continues to be the subject of antitrust litigation. Subsequent to CBS v.
BMI-the-license was challenged and found to violate the rule of reason in Buffalo Broadcasting
Co. v. ASCAP, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
72. See Cirace, supra note 69. The CBS case, and the history of ASCAP and BMI in the
courts, is the subject of two excellent notes: Note, CBS v. ASCAP Blanket Licensing and the
Unresolved Conflict Between Copright and Antitrust Law, 13 CONN. L. REV. 465 (1981); Note, Blanket
Licensing- The Clash Between Copyright Protection and the Sherman Act, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 729
(1980).
73. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
74. CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
75. 441 U.S. at 7.
76. Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, stated that while the practice should be evalu-
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would not characterize the practice in question as price-fixing,7 8 stating that
the Court had some doubt whether the practice was a threat to free market
pricing. 79 "The blanket license cannot be wholly equated with a simple hor-
izontal arrangement among competitors."8 0 Factors such as lowered trans-
action costs through reduction of the number of individual sales, and easier
monitoring and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use made the
blanket license a necessary and useful part of commerce.
8 '
The license was viewed as being unlike anything the individual copy-
right owners could sell.8 2 The setting of a price was a necessary consequence
of creation of this new product.8 3 Analogous to a joint venture, the legality
of the blanket license must be judged under the rule of reason rather than
under the per se rule.8 4 The Court thus remanded the case8 5 for evaluation
of its legality under that rule.86 Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion,8 7
would have avoided the remand; he found sufficient evidence in the record
to declare that the practice violates the rule of reason.88
With its decision in BMI, the Court concluded four years of restructur-
ing antitrust law under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The new members of
the Court had had the opportunity to set forth their views of antitrust law.
Lower courts and commentators were predictably split on the effect and wis-
dom of the Court's decisions.8 9 Yet, even as BMI was being decided, the
ated under the rule of reason, there was sufficient evidence then before the Court to ban the
blanket license. Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 24-25.
78. Id. at 23.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 23.
81. Id. at 20-21. But see Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
82. 441 U.S. at 21-23.
83. Id. at 21.
84. Id. at 23. See also infra text accompanying notes 170-71.
85. 441 U.S. at 25.
86. On remand to the Second Circuit, Judge Newman held that the blanket license, at
least as regards CBS, is not an antitrust violation. See CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.
1980).
87. 441 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 34-38. In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam),
the Supreme Court ruled that an agreement among competitors fixing credit terms affected
price and thus was a per se violation of § 1. Credit terms, held the Court, are an inseparable
part of price, and any attempt to tamper with price has always been unlawfulper se. Id. at 648.
"The fact that a practice may turn out to be harmless in a particular set of circumstances will
not prevent its being declared unlawfulper se." Id. at 649. The Court's decision was not surpris-
ing. In United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977), the Court, including
the dissenters, agreed that in the normal case, credit terms are intimately associated with price.
For an extended discussion, see Favretto, The Per Se Rule. A/ive and Welland Lving in Catalano,
6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 11 (1981).
89. Compare Bohling, A Stmplified Rule ofReason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals,
Economic Analysts and Sylvania, 64 IOWA L. REV. 461 (1979); Posner, supra note 38 with Redlich,
supra note 7; Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Dtrciplines: What Are The Sources of Wisdom for
Antitrust? 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977). See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643
F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (discussed infta note 100); Mardirosian v.
American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628, 636-40 (D. D.C. 1979) (discussed supra note 64);
see also, e.g., Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118, 126-27
(2d Cir. 1980); Paralegal Inst., Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D.N.Y. 1979);
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District Court of Arizona had issued an opinion9' which was clearly influ-
enced by the Burger Court's trend. Two years later, the Supreme Court
would be confronted with that very case, and would be presented with the
opportunity to extend its four previous opinions to a logical conclusion.
II. ARIZONA V MARICOPA Couvrry MEDICAL SoCETY
In 1978, the State of Arizona charged that a nonprofit county medical
society, composed of competing doctors, had violated the Sherman Act by
establishing maximum fee schedules for use by its members. 9 1 Insurance
companies gained Society approval by agreeing to pay member doctors the
scheduled amount, and doctors in turn agreed to accept this payment in full
satisfaction for their services. 9 2 The doctors were permitted to charge in-
sured patients less than but no more than the scheduled amount; they could
charge uninsured patients more than the scheduled amount.93 Insured pa-
tients were also free to visit nonmember doctors, but then they were not
guaranteed full insurance coverage.
94
The state charged that the fee schedules had the effect of enhancing
prices, 95 primarily through periodic upward revisions of the fees. 96 The So-
ciety, on the other hand, argued that the schedules were an effective cost
containment device and assured patients full coverage. 97 The state moved
for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, alleging that the
agreement was aper se violation of section 1.98 The district court, influenced
by the Supreme Court's recent decisions, denied the motion99 and ordered a
Veizaga v. National Bd. of Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,274 (N.D. Ill.
1977).
90. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,694 (D.
Ariz. 1979), afl'd, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
91. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 337 (1982). Actually two
such societies were charged; one in Maricopa County, the other in Pima County. The com-
plaint also charged a violation of the state antitrust law, a law which is read in conformity with
the federal statute. Id. at 336 n.l.
92. Id. at 341.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Unlike the advisory relative value guide involved in United States v. American Soc'y of
Anesthesiologists, 473 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the doctors in the Maricopa County Soci-
ety: 1) agreed to abide by the plan, and 2) established a monetary conversion factor in addition
to the relative value guide. 457 U.S. at 340-41. For a discussion of how antitrust has been
applied to the health care field, see Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health Industry, 12 AKRON
L. REV. 417 (1979); Grad, The Antitrust Laws and Professional Disczpline in Medicine, 1978 DUKE
LJ. 443; Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J.
303; Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors." Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act,
1978 DUKE LJ. 645; Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health Professions: Developing a
Framework for Assessing Private Restraints, 34 VAND. L. REv. 927 (1981); Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and
the Health Care Inusty." New Wamors into an Old Battle, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 446 (1979); Com-
ment, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes." Applicability of Per Se Rules Under the Sherman Act,
11 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 387 (1978).
96. 457 U.S. at 341-42. But the questions of upward revision are irrelevant to the question
under § 1: whether the Sherman Act prohibits establishment of a maximum fee schedule in this
case. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
97. 457 U.S. at 342, 351.
98. Id. at 336-37.
99. 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,694, at 77,897 (D. Ariz. 1979). The district judge of-
fered three justifications for his result: 1) the Court's trend as embodied in Engineers and Sylva-
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trial under the rule of reason. On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals
issued three separate opinions,'0° each judge expressing a different view.
Nevertheless the court upheld the denial of the motion, applying the rule of
reason. i01
Before the Supreme Court, the Society conceded the established princi-
ple that price-fixing agreements are illegalperse, but argued that the rule did
not apply to them because the agreements at issue: 1) fixed maximum, not
minimum prices; 2) were among members of a profession; 3) were in an in-
dustry with which the judiciary had little antitrust experience; and 4) had
redeeming competitive effects.i
02
Justice Stevens took pains to review the Court's price-fixing cases, em-
phasizing that both minimum and maximum price-fixing arrangements
have always been per se unlawful. ' 0 3 Justice Stevens then quickly dismissed
the doctors' contention that the professional character of their business justi-
fied different treatment. The agreements involved, said the Court, "are not
premised on public service or ethical norms. . . . [T]he claim that the price
restraint will make it easier for customers to pay does not distinguish the
medical profession from any other provider of goods or services." °10 4 The
Court similarly rejected the argument that the per se rule should not apply
because the judiciary has little antitrust experience with the health care in-
dustry.' 0 5 The Sherman Act, said the Court, "establishes one uniform rule
applicable to all industries alike."' 
0 6
ma, 2) that the professional character of the restraint dictated rule of reason treatment; and,
3) that the Supreme Court cases involving maximum price fixing did not expressly call forper se
treatment. Id. at 77,895-97.
100. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457
U.S. 332 (1982). The majority opinion was authored by Circuit Judge Sneed. It expressed
uncertainty regarding the state of antitrust law as applied to the health care field. 643 F.2d at
556. Admitting that even doctors can be motivated by economic considerations, the court re-
fused to characterize the restraint as price fixing, since the doctors apparently lacked monopoly
power and thus could not effectively raise prices. Id. at 557. The court also concluded that
Socony-Vaaum was inapposite in light of the Supreme Court's decision in BMI. Id. at 557-58.
Judge Kennedy filed a separate concurring opinion, asking for additional evidence before mak-
ing the price-fixing determination. Id. at 560 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In dissent, Judge Lar-
son stated that in spite of the uncertainty created by Go/dfarb and Engineers, "the Supreme Court
would be willing to applyperse rules to professional price tampering .. ." d. at 564 (Larson,
J., dissenting). He also admonished the other members of his bench that if a cautious approach
was proper as the majority asserted, then caution counseled application of the long established
per se rule rather than embarkation upon a theory based on "erroneous legal premises and
abused . . . discretion." Id. at 569.
101. Id. at 560.
102. 457 U.S. at 342.
103. Justice Stevens traced the history of the per se rule and rule of reason, beginning with
the Court's decisions in United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) and Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). He then turned to the strict rule against price
fixing, noting Justice Stone's words to that effect in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392, 398 (1927), and the harsh treatment of the defendants applied by Justice Douglas in
the seminal case, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Justice Ste-
vens then quoted at length from two prior maximum price-fixing cases in the Supreme Court,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) and Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 457 U.S. at 342-48. Thus, with sweeping language, Justice Stevens
foreclosed the notion that a price restraint can be anything other than per se unlawful.
104. 457 U.S. at 349.
105. Id. at 349-5 1.
106. d. (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940)).
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The defendant's principal argument was that perse treatment was inap-
propriate because of the presence of significant procompetitive effects. These
effects included full insurance coverage, a choice of doctors, and lower pre-
miums.10 7 The Court rejected the argument as demonstrating "a misunder-
standing of the per se concept."' 10 8 The rule that price fixing is illegalper se
precludes any argument that an individual price-fixing scheme might have a
beneficial effect.' 0 9 Such a claim, the Court stated, is so unlikely to prove
significant in a particular case that the general rule warrants application in
all price-fixing cases. " 0
Justice Stevens then noted that the goal of lower fees, allegedly flowing
from transaction cost savings,"' could be achieved without price fixing
among doctors." 2 The opinion alludes to state regulation or doctor-insurer
agreements as alternative means of accomplishing this end. 1 3 There was
thus no factual basis in the record for defendant's contention that doctors
alone must set the price schedule.
114
The dissenters argued that the doctors' agreements should be judged
under what was a rule of reason approach, citing the BMI case. 115 The
majority distinguished the BMI decision, as involving price fixing in the "lit-
eral sense" only. 1 6 The salient feature of the blanket license in BMI was
that it had characteristics quite different from anything the individual copy-
right owners could sell. The establishment of performance rights societies
permitted the free flow of performance rights licensure; without them, effi-
cient selling and monitoring would be impossible. The "price fixing" in-
volved in that case was nothing more than a producer's decision as to what
price he would charge for this new product, the blanket license." 
7
Justice Stevens contrasted the doctors' maximum fee schedule with
price setting in partnerships and other joint arrangements where collective
pricing decisions are necessary." 8 He found the doctors' fee schedule analo-
gous neither to a partnership's price setting nor to the blanket license in
BMI.1'9 No new and distinct product was offered. Rather, the only effect
was to permit the sale of medical services at predetermined prices, avoiding
107. 457 U.S. at 351.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. As Justice Black said in Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which
are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned,
but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related indus-
tries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unrea-
sonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
111. 457 U.S. at 352.
112. Id. at 352-54.
113. Id. (citing, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979)).
See also Kartell v. Blue Shield, Inc., 592 F.2d 1191 (1st Cir. 1979); Medical Arts Pharmacy, Inc.
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Conn. 1981).
114. 457 U.S. at 352-53 n.26.
115. Id. at 357-67. (Powell, J., dissenting).
116. 457 U.S. at 355-56.
117. Id. at 355-56 & nn. 31-32.
118. Id. at 356-57.
119. Id.
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the interplay of free market forces. 120 Such arrangements among independ-
ent competing entrepreneurs, declared the Court, remain illegal per se.'
2 1
Joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell dis-
sented on the question of whether to apply the per se rule.122 The dissenters
would have avoided the price-fixing characterization in two ways. They
found no showing in the record that the plan was plainly anticompetitive,
12 3
and they would have held that the facts of Mancopa County fell within
BMI.124 Regarding the first, Justice Powell did not expressly find that com-
petitive efficiencies were present, but instead he bemoaned the lack of a de-
tailed record.' 2 5 He noted that the plan "seems to be in the public
interest,"' 26 although he could point to no specific procompetitive bene-
fit. 127 According to the dissent, if significant procompetitive effects could be
found, per se treatment would be inappropriate.
28
Turning to their second argument, the dissenters would hold that the
agreement in Maricopa County had enough in common with the blanket li-
cense in BMI to justify rule of reason treatment.' 29 Justice Powell asserted
that the plan has characteristics different from the usual horizontal arrange-
ment,' 30 similar to the combination in BMI. Several similarities between
BMI and Marcopa County were said to be of significance: each involved com-
petitors in cooperative pricing, each addressed the need for better service to
consumers, and each created a new product through otherwise unattainable
efficiencies. 131
The plaintiff State of Arizona, wrote Justice Powell, had not yet dis-
charged its burden of proving the plainly anticompetitive character of the
restraint. 132 In basing its per se condemnation of this novel plan upon a
limited record, the majority had lost sight of the central "consumer welfare"
purpose of the Sherman Act.' 33 Unlike Justice Stevens, Justice Powell
120. Id. at 356.
121. Id. at 356-57.
122. 457 U.S. at 357 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor took no part
in the consideration of the case.
123. Id. at 359-64.
124. Id. at 364-66.
125. Id. at 358, 361, 367.
126. Id. at 357.
127. Justice Powell noted that the Society's plan "forecloses no competition," id. at 360,
since consumers and doctors are free to participate or withdraw. Even if that is so, the fact that
no injury results from the restraint cannot be equated with aprocompetlhde benefit. Second, the
dissent asserts that the insurers adequately represent consumer interests, quality service at lower
prices. Id. at 360-61. But, as the majority properly notes, the plan allegedly reduces transaction
costs, not medical costs. Id. at 352 n.25. Thus, the plan does not promote that which consumers
desire: lower medical cost and quality of care. See infa text accompanying note 156.
128. 457 U.S. at 352 (Powell, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 151-62, 175-
78.
129. 457 U.S. at 361-64 (Powell, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 360.
131. Id. at 364-65. Justice Powell argued that the Societies had created a different product
in that they "set up an innovative means to deliver a basic service-insured medical care from a
wide range of physicians of one's choice-in a more economical manner." Id. at 365 n. 12. See
infta text accompanying notes 167-74.
132. Id. at 366.
133. Id. at 367.
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would have remanded the case for trial under the rule of reason.
III. THE REVITALIZATION OF THE PER SE RULE
The Court's decision in Maricopa County is a stunning reaffirmation of
the per se rule against price fixing. After several years of movement away
from the use of per se rules, the Court has for the present halted this trend.'
34
While Maricopa County is certain to engender some confusion, it must never-
theless be lauded as a significant step toward reestablishment of a predict-
able and functional rule of law.
Marcopa County, though, is not particularly noteworthy in its assertion
that professions must not be treated differently from other businesses in the
legality of their pricing practices. The Court thus continues to clarify its
statement in Goldfarb, left open in Engineers,135 that the public service aspects
of professions might require varied rules. Goldfarb had made clear that pro-
fessions are not exempt from the Sherman Act's proscriptions;1 36 Marcopa
County confirms the thrust of Engineers: professions will be treated no differ-
ently from other providers of goods and services, at least regarding agree-
ments affecting price.
In fact, Engineers had decreed that even if a professional agreement im-
proves the quality of service, it remains unlawful if there is an affect upon
price.' 37 The doctors in Maricopa County did not even assert that their agree-
ment improved the quality of medical service offered. They alleged, rather,
that the agreement made payment easier for customers.' 38 The latter, said
Justice Stevens, is a concern endemic to all industries, and it alone will not
distinguish the doctors' restraint from agreements among
nonprofessionals. 1
39
Justice Stevens also reaffirmed the long-standing principle that the per
se rule applies to all industries alike. The doctors had argued that per se
treatment was inappropriate because the judiciary had little antitrust experi-
ence in the health care field. 140 The Court has, in the past, spoken of not
applying a per se rule in areas in which it was unfamiliar.' 4 ' These state-
ments, however, referred to unfamiliar restraints rather than industries.
142
Price fixing, the restraint involved in Maricopa County, has always been ille-
gal.' 43 Agreements establishing price ceilings have twice been condemned
by the Supreme Court. 44 The fact that courts might lack experience in the
134. The existence of such a trend cannot be doubted. See, e.g., supra notes 99-100.
135. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
136. 421 U.S. at 787-88. See supra text accompanying notes 13-27.
137. 435 U.S. at 696 n.22.
138. 457 U.S. at 348-49.
139. Id. at 349.
140. Id. at 350-51.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-63 (1963).
142. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). Justice Stevens refers to
the distinction in Mancopa County, 457 U.S. at 349 n.19.
143. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
144. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). These cases arguably involved "vertical" restraints, agree-
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health care field does not warrant a different rule of law. In fact, the uni-
formity of the per se rule is one of its primary virtues. 145
The two most important aspects of the Court's opinion are: 1) the role
of the price-fixing characterization in section 1 analysis 14 6 and 2) the nar-
rowing of BMI. Regarding the first, Justice Stevens' opinion is founded
upon his description of the agreement as one fixing prices.' 47 Once this
characterization is made, per se treatment necessarily follows; questions of
procompetitive benefits become wholly irrelevant.
In its first four cases, the Burger Court apparently retreated from the
characterization approach. Engneers bypassed the characterization issue,
and BMI questioned its utility148 in the copyright field. Marcopa County
reverses this trend. While the dissent calls for more detailed rules, 149 the
majority applies the traditional rule that an agreement which affects price is
to be placed in the forbidden category. 150 Characterization's role has, with
the Marcopa County decision, been restored after a short hiatus.
The dissenters would have avoided the price-fixing label.151 Relying on
occasional Court language to the effect that agreements in theper se category
had no purpose except stifling competition, 152 Justice Powell would have
allowed the alleged procompetitive virtue to remove the practice from theper
se category. 153 Once removed, trial under the rule of reason must follow.
The dissent, however, seems to have taken that language out of context; lan-
guage referring to "no purpose except stifling of competition," or "lack of
any redeeming virtue" was not intended as a talisman.' 54 It is noteworthy
ments between firms at different levels of the distribution system. The agreement in Marcopa
County was among entrepreneurs at the same level of competition, and is known as a "horizon-
tal" arrangement. But Justice Stevens wrote that: 1) the earlier cases did have horizontal as-
pects as well as vertical, and 2) in general, horizontal restraints are less defensible than vertical
restraints. 457 U.S. at 348 n.18. But see Blair and Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule and Consumer
Welfare: An Econonuc Analysis, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 461 (1981); Easterbrook, Maxmum Frce Fixing,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981).
145. 457 U.S. at 349-51, 353-54. Even Professor Bork, whose writings have greatly influ-
enced the Burger Court, wrote: "The benefits of a broad per se category in ease of enforcement
and predictability are so great that its legitimate availability constitutes one of the main tradi-
tion's chief assets." Bork, supra note 8, at 837. See also Redlich, supra note 6, at 54-58. Sullivan,
supra note 89. But see Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979).
146. See supra note 8. The characterization approach is well developed and explained in L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at § 74.
147. See 457 U.S. at 348-54.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
149. 457 U.S. at 366 (Powell, J., dissenting). But the characterization approach to price
fixing is not as unclear as the dissent believes. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at §§ 74-78, 81, 86-
92; Redlich, supra note 6, at 14 n.91.
150. See supra text accompanying note 103.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 122-28.
152. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (quoting White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)). See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 49, 50 (1977); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, quoted in Sylvania,
433 U.S. at 50.
153. 457 U.S. at 361-64.
154. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). To confirm that
language such as this is not to be taken literally, one need only look to the remainder of the
paragraph in which it is contained. Justice Black therein states that regarding restraints in the
per se categories, a general reasonableness inquiry is "so often fruitless" as to be judicially un-
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that Justice Stevens avoided reference to this "standard".
Assuming arguendo the dissent's view of the significance of a benefit, Jus-
tice Stevens demonstrated that the procompetitive benefit was not even pres-
ent.' 55 He noted that in Maricopa County, Arizona about seventy percent
of the doctors offered the benefits of the Society's plan, and that a patient
therefore had a seven in ten chance of choosing a doctor who offered full
insurance coverage. In other markets that do not have the plan, however,
presumably at least seventy percent of the doctors also offer "usual, custom-
ary, and reasonable" rates, that typical insurers will reimburse. A prospec-
tive patient in those counties, therefore, also has a seven in ten chance of full
coverage. 156 A patient is no better off in Maricopa County than is a patient
elsewhere. The alleged benefit to the patient, guaranteed coverage with free-
dom of choice of doctor, simply is not effected as a result of the doctors'
agreement.
Further, the allegation of lower insurance cost, perhaps the most signifi-
cant potential procompetitive benefit, was rejected as a valid defense.'
5 7
Such "lower cost" defenses historically have been invalid in price-fixing
cases.' 58 There is, however, an important distinction between the defend-
ant's argument and previous "lower cost" defenses. The doctors did not al-
lege that the agreement reduced medical costs, but rather that a
prearrangement on fees makes medical insurance less expensive by improv-
ing the accuracy of the insurer's risk calculation. 59 But, says the Court,
even if some prearrangement is desirable, it is not necessary for the doctors to
set the maximum price.' 6 State regulation or insurer-doctor arrangements
are possible alternatives. 161 "[In any event," wrote Justice Stevens, "there is
no reason to believe that any savings that might accrue from this arrange-
ment would be sufficiently great to affect the competitiveness of these kinds
of insurance plans."'
' 62
The dissenters take a different view of the significance of potentially
lower insurance rates. Justice Powell analogized the case to BMI, noting
that the agreements in both BMI and Maricopa County were intended to pro-
economical. Id. By inference then, a reasonableness inquiry in aper st case would often, but not
always, result in condemnation. If the "no purpose except stifling of competition" language is
read outside its context, the per se rule and its attributes would be forever lost. Indeed as the
Court stated in United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972): "Whether or not we
would decide this [per se] case the same way under the rule of reason . . .is irrelevant to the
issue before us." Ste also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 332, 343-44
(1982); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
155. 457 U.S. at 351-52.
156. Id. Justice Stevens indicated this presumption was in accord with the Society's figures.
Id. at 352 n.24. Discussions between this author and members of the medical and insurance
fields confirm the validity of those figures.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 107-13.
158. Se, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 663, 647 (1980); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392, 397-98 (1927); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290, 340-41 (1897).
159. 457 U.S. at 352 n.25.
160. Id. 352-53.
161. Id. The fact that the doctors can best compute medical fees does not insulate them
fromperse treatment. Se 457 U.S. at 353.
162. Id. at 353-54.
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vide "better service" to the consumer through the creation of a new and
more efficient product.16 3 Justice Powell's approach is clearly not as refined
as that of Justice Stevens, who distinguished between improved care and a
patient's ability to pay, 164 finding that an allegation of the former was not
present. 165 Justice Powell simply refers to "better service."
166
Cheaper full insurance coverage is the "new product" created by the
doctors, according to Justice Powell.' 67 He would thus hold that, as in BMI,
the doctors' agreements are price fixing only in the "literal sense."' 68 Yet
the crucial distinction, according to the majority, lay in the fact that the
doctors had created no new product; 169 they sold only medical services. It
was the price for these services that the doctors tried to affect through agree-
ment. In BMI, by contrast, the societies were created to sell what was, in
fact, a new product, the blanket license.
Justice Stevens also analogized the BMI blanket license to a joint ven-
ture or partnership which involved the creation of a new entity.' 70 This new
entity would naturally have to price its product. For instance, doctors with
different specialties might combine to form a new business entity which of-
fered a wider range of health care services. In such an arrangement, each
doctor would give up his identity as an independent competitor in order to
become a member of the group, much as a composer delegates his price set-
ting power to the performing rights societies. 17 Price setting by such an
entity is a necessary part of our economic system.
The agreement in Maricopa County, however, was "fundamentally differ-
ent."' 172 It involved no new product and no new entity.' 73 Each doctor
maintained his individual identity as a competitor. The Court has declared
repeatedly that any agreement among individual competitors that estab-
lishes a fee schedule of any kind is unlawful per se.174 At least four Justices
are unwilling to change this rule.
Having found that the doctors' agreements were illegal per se, the Court
saw no need to analyze in depth the restraint's anticompetitive nature. The
entire history of the Sherman Act is replete with judicial statements that, in
price-fixing cases, no such inquiry is required.175 The maximum price wrin-
kle is not unfamiliar to the courts, and it is easily seen how the doctors'
conspiratorial price ceiling tends to become a uniform price. 176 Each doctor,
163. Id. at 364-65 (Powell, J., dissenting).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 138-39.
165. 457 U.S. at 349.
166. Id. 364-65 (Powell, J., dissenting).
167. Id. 365 n.12.
168. Id. at 361-64.
169. 457 U.S. at 356-57.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2480.
172. Id. at 2479.
173. "Neither the foundations nor the doctors sell insurance, and they derive no profits from
the sale of health insurance policies. The members of the foundations [the doctors] sell medical
services." Id.
174. See cases cited supra note 8.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 340 U.S. 150 (1940).
176. 457 U.S. at 348. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
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confident of the prospect of full payment from an insurer, has little or no
incentive to lower prices to insured patients. The patient makes the choice
of doctor without considering the price; he need only be concerned with
whether the doctor is a Society member. Price competition among Society
members is thus eliminated; the pricing decision is removed from the mar-
ketplace and placed in the Society's smokefilled rooms.1 7 7 The Sherman
Act, from its inception, has proscribed any such removal. Justice Stevens
thus stated that the doctors' agreements "fit squarely into the horizontal
price fixing mold."'
178
The dissent, on the other hand, would not condemn the doctors' plan
on the limited record before the Court. The case reached the Court on mo-
tion for partial summary judgment, the State of Arizona demanding per se
treatment. Justice Powell indicated that he would not characterize the
agreement as a per se violation without additional information.1 79 But such
an approach in every case would undermine the utility of the per st rule
whose purpose, at least in part,180 is to enhance judicial economy. 
83
In conclusion, Justice Stevens praises in general terms the benefits of the
dissenting); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951). See also
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at § 78.
177. Antiseptic-smelling corridors? In addition, the restraint reduces the incentive to inno-
vate. 457 U.S. at 348.
178. 457 U.S. at 357 (Powell, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. There are those who believe that the antitrust laws in general, and the per se rule in
particular, have social as well as economic goals. Foremost among these social goals is the
protection of small businesses and independent decisionmaking. See, e.g., United States v. Alu-
minum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) where Judge Hand stated:
It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small
producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in
which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few. These
considerations, which we have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we think
the decisions prove to have been in fact its purposes.
Id. at 427. Judge Hand added that "[t]hroughout the history of these statutes it has been con-
stantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and
in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete
with each other." Id. at 429.
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), Justice Douglas stated:
But beyond all that there is the effect on the community when independents are swal-
lowed up by the trusts and entrepreneurs become employees of absentee owners. Then
there is a serious loss in citizenship. Local leadership is diluted. . . .These are the
prices which the nation pays for the almost ceaseless growth in bigness on the part of
industry.
Id. at 318-19 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Black, adding strength to this view, used it as the basis of his decision in Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), stating:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an agreement among competitors to fix
maximum resale prices of their products does not violate the Sherman Act. For such
agreements, no less than those to fi" minimum prices, cri/ple the freedom of traders and thereby
restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own jldgrnent.
Id. at 213 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-78
(1966); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1957).
Commentators have also expressed this view. Blake and Jones have stated:
Another political objective of antitrust is the enlargement of individual liberty ...
[lit was the purpose of the antitrust laws to expand the range of consumer choice and
entrepreneurial opportunity by encouraging the formation of markets of numerous
buyers and sellers, assuring ease of entry to such markets, and protecting partici-
pants--particularly small businessmen-against exclusionary practices.
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per se rule,' 82 concluding with the almost proverbial suggestion that the doc-
tors take their case to Congress. 183 The Court's commendation of the per se
rule in Maricopa County is particularly interesting; mention of the virtues of
theper se rule is notably absent from Goldfarb 184 and Engineers,' 5 and is con-
tained in a mere footnote in Sldania t 86 At least four members of the Court
now clearly approve of a broad per se rule against price fixing.
The apparent difference of opinion which has arisen between Justices
Stevens and Powell is worthy of continued observation. The battle will un-
doubtedly continue for the last word in shaping the nature and policy of the
Sherman Act. But the Supreme Court, which in recent years has concen-
trated on the rule of reason, has once again demonstrated its preference for
the per se rule. While the future remains uncertain, the per se rule has re-
turned to improve predictability and reaffirm the roles of Congress and the
judiciary in formulating antitrust law.
CONCLUSION
With the Court's decision in Marcopa County, the per se rule, at least for
now, retains its vitality in antitrust analysis. The four-three decision, how-
ever, leaves open the possibility that the Court will again shift its ap-
proach.' 8 7  Justice Stevens, joining the remaining Warren Court
members,' 8 8 has reaffirmed a wise rule and its traditions. If a restraint is
characterized as price fixing, it will be condemned per se; there is no need for
elaborate inquiry into alleged procompetitive benefits or redeeming virtues.
Blake & Jones, In Defense ofAntitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 383-84 (1965). See also Redlich,
supra note 6; Sullivan, supra note 89.
Similar concerns motivated other antitrust legislation. See the statements by Representa-
tive Celler, 95 CONG. REC. 11,486 (1949), and Senator Kefauver, 96 CONG. REC. 16,450 (1950),
regarding the need for stronger measures against economic concentration.
181. 457 U.S. at 343-44 & n.14.
182. Id. at 355-57.
183. Id. See also Borsody, supra note 95; Kallstrom, supra note 95; Rosoff, supra note 95.
184. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
185. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
186. Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 50 n.16 (1977).
187. Justice Blackmun took no part in the Marcopa County decision. It is not clear which
side of the argument he would favor. In United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972),
Justice Blackmun concurred separately in Justice Marshall's majority opinion, stating that the
per se rule "appears to be so firmly established by the Court that, at this late date, I could not
oppose it." Id. at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But in Syl ania, Justice Blackmun agreed
with the majority, and thus supported the Court when it overruled Schwinn's per se approach in
favor of the rule of reason. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. Justice Stewart, the "per-
ennial antitrust dissenter," has been replaced by Justice O'Connor, whose views in the area of
antitrust are, as yet, unknown. Redlich, supra note 6, at 46.
188. Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan made up the remainder of the four-judge ma-
jority in Martopa County, It is noteworthy that it was justice Stevens, in Engineers, 435 U.S. 679,
681 (1978), who first elevated the phrase "rule of reason" to "Rule of Reason." In Marcopa
County, Justice Stevens has reduced the phrase to lower case designation. 457 U.S. at 342.
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THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION




In September 1977, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC or Commission) proposed customer protection rules, one of which
would have required commodity futures brokers to determine whether com-
modity futures trading was suitable for customers.' When the Commission
adopted the proposed customer protection rules, however, it did not adopt
the suitability rule.2 The CFTC announced its action as being for the pro-
tection of customers. 3 Yet, despite what the CFTC announced, the thesis of
* L.L.B. University of Colorado, 1959; Member Bar Associations of California and
Colorado.
1. (a) [No broker may], directly or indirectly make any recommendation to any cus-
tomer concerning the purchase, sale or continued holding of any commodity interest,
or may effect, directly or indirectly, any transaction in a commodity interest for a
customer pursuant to discretionary power . . . unless [the broker]:
(1) Within a reasonable period of time before the recommendation or transac-
tion,
(i) Obtained from the customer the essential facts about the customer's financial
condition and trading objectives, and
(ii) Verified with the customer the accuracy of that information if previously
obtained and
(2) At the time of the recommendation or transaction, had reason to believe
that the recommendation or transaction was suitable for the customer in light of
(i) The information obtained from the customer and otherwise known about the
customer . . . and
(ii) The risk of loss involved therein.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "recommendation" means any advice,
suggestion or other statement that is intended, or can reasonably be expected, to influ-
ence a customer to purchase, sell or hold a commodity interest, but does not include
any statement that merely describes in an objective fashion the commodity interest,
the manner in which it is traded or the services of [the broker].
(c) This section does not apply to recommendations furnished solely through-
(I) Uniform publications distributed to subscribers thereto,
(2) Books,
(3) Television or radio communications, or
(4) Seminar or lecture presentations.
Protection of Commodity Customers: Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading Profes-
sionals, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,750 reprinted in [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,474, at 21,940 (Sept. 6, 1977).
2. Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, reprinted tn [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,642, at 22,623 (July 24, 1978) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 1.33) [hereinafter cited as Customer Protection Rules].
3. On October 1, 1978, William T. Bagley, Chairman of the CFTC, announced the com-
mission's action.
Starting as a brand new regulatory Commission three and one-half years ago, we have
now virtually completed a new book of rules for commodity traders and the public.
These much-needed customer protections are another step toward assuring a smooth-
working marketplace that has greater safeguards for the participants.
The phenomenal growth of futures trading in recent years, with new contracts in
both the traditional commodities and the attractive new financial instrument futures,
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this article is that the Commission declined to adopt a suitability rule so that
brokers would not have a duty to determine whether commodity futures
trading is suitable rather than to protect customers. This article reviews the
history of the suitability concept, discusses the ways suitability duty can be
enforced by the common law, and concludes that the efforts of the CFTC to
obstruct the development of a suitability duty will ultimately fail.
II. THE CONCEPT OF SUITABILITY
A. General Principles
In investing, one person's meat is another person's poison. A suitable
investment for a young widow with children who has recently received
$150,000 in life insurance proceeds on which she must rely for support differs
from what is suitable for a doctor who makes $150,000 a year. "Suitability"
is the label given to the concept to express the appropriateness of an invest-
ment or speculation in the light of the finances and objectives of customers.
4
The concept of suitability was endemic to the brokerage community
long before it was adopted as a legal concept. The essence of the brokerage
suitability concept is investments that conform to the needs and goals of the
particular investor. 5 A well-known writer on investing, Roger Babson,
stated, "[t]he proper investment procedure for an individual depends largely
on his personal circumstances. He must reckon not only the amount of his
capital and his financial position but his family responsibilities, his tempera-
has brought thousands of new investors into the market and swelled the ranks of the
professionals who serve them, he said.
Because of this, the Commission has answered the need for shoring up the frame-
work in which the industry operates.
These customer protection rules come as a follow-up to steps taken earlier to effect
improvements in the in-house operations of exchanges, brokerage houses and other
commodity firms, through such things as strengthened registration, reporting and
minimum financial requirements, and through exchange rule enforcement reviews.
Under the rules that go into effect October 1 [1978], customers are going to get
from futures commission merchants risk disclosure statements prepared by the CFTC,
which the customer must acknowledge before opening an account.
CFTC Release No. 432-78 (Oct. 1, 1978).
4. See generally Roach, The Suitability Obltgations of Brokers.- Present Law and the Proposed Fed-
eralSecurithes Code, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1067 (1978) (survey of the development of suitability for all
forms of investment).
5. See INVESTMENT AND INVESTORs 49 (P. Rossi ed., 21st ed. 1936). This book sets forth
an elaborate scheme for classifying individuals with respect to their suitability for different kinds
of investments:
GROUP I.-Investors who rely entirely for their maintenance upon the income pro-
duced by their investments.
(a) Rich people who have more than sufficient income.
(b) Well-to-do people who need not strain their investments.
(c) People moderately well off who must make a large income.
(d) People who are compelled to make their investments produce the largest
possible income.
GROUP II.-Investors who live partly on their present efforts and partly on the in-
come produced by their investments.
(a) People with ample means.
(b) People with insufficient income from earnings but ample income from in-
vestments.
(c) People with insufficient income from earnings and a small capital.
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ment, and the goal for which he is striving."'6
Professor Paul Fenlon, of the University of Texas Business School, ana-
lyzed the profiles of various investors to determine the suitability of invest-
GROUP III.-Investors who live entirely on the results of their present efforts.
(a) People with surplus earnings, which they apply towards increasing their cap-
ital, the income from which is already sufficient to provide for their wants.
(b) People with surplus earnings, which they apply towards the building up of a
capital, the income from their present capital being still insufficient to keep them.
(c) People with a moderate surplus and a very moderate capital, or no capital at
all.
Differences in investment policy for these classes are set forth:
CLASS 1.-The provision of a definite capital sum for educational or other purposes
within a short term of years.
CLASS 2.-A policy suitable for investors who are not dependent on the income from
their capital, and who, for various reasons, anticipate the necessity of realizing sub-
stantial sums from time to time at very short notice.
CLASS 3.-A policy suitable for investors who have sufficient income for their present
needs but who wish to accumulate as much capital as possible against the time when
they retire.
CLASS 4.-A policy suitable for those who do not anticipate the necessity to realize
capital but who want to benefit as much as possible from their capital immediately
and who, therefore, desire as large an income as possible without taking unreasonable
risks.
6. R. BABSON, INVESTMENT FUNDAMENTALS 261 (3d ed. 1935). Babson classified inves-
tors as very conservative investors, conservative investors, average investors, businessmen, and
speculators. Id He outlined the suitability of investments for each class of investor as follows:
BABSON WORKING PLAN FOR YOUR MONEY






































































































In no instance is margin trading advised. Buy bonds and stocks outright and put them in
your own box. Id at 267.
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ment decisions for them.7 There was no discussion, however, concerning any
legal duty that customers be advised of what is suitable.
B. Early Suitabilhty Rules
The first suitability rule was promulgated in 1939 as article III, section
2 of the National Association of Securities Dealer's Rules of Fair Practice. 8
This rule was probably only intended to state a rule of ethics. 9 If the first
suitability rules were rules of ethics which were not intended to give rise to
legal liability, they became rules to which legal liability attached when the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) used suitability rules to hold
brokers liable in disciplinary proceedings. 10 The process of suitability rules
evolving into rules of legal liability continued as brokers were found liable in
fraud for advising customers to make unsuitable investments.1 " Since 1939,
the suitability concept has become recognized by lawyers as one of the major
philosophical themes of the securities laws. ,
2
Despite this development in the field of securities, there has not been a
comparable recognition of the suitability concept for commodity futures.
This is not because suitability is irrelevant to commodity futures. In 1933,
Telford Taylor, an official of the Roosevelt administration, called for protec-
tion of inexperienced customers involved in speculative investments. Not
only did he see a need for customer protection, but he also saw the need for
broker regulation. 13 In 1937, Harold Irwin, an economist with the Com-
modity Exchange Commission and one of the leading students of commodity
futures trading, expressed similar thoughts.1
4
Despite the relevancy of suitability rules for commodity futures, how-
ever, the philosophy of the Commodity Exchange Act' 5 was not conducive
7. P. FENLON, INVESTMENT DECISIONS: A CASE BOOK (1972).
8. In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suita-
ble for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as
to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
[19761 NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2152, at 2051.
9. See O'Boyle, Suitability, in CONFERENCE ON SEcuRrrITES REGULATION 94 (R. Mund-
heim ed. 1964). Philip A. Loomis, Jr., General Counsel of the SEC, stated: "[t]he concept of
suitability originated with the NASD as an ethical principle." Id at 103.
10. See, e.g., Gerald M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133 (1960); RH. Johnson & Co., 33 S.E.C. 180
(1952).
11. See, e.g., Twomey v. Mitchum Jones & Templeton, 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr.
222 (1968).
12. See Lipton, The Customer Suitability Doctrine, in PLI FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 273 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr., & J. Schepper eds. 1973) (pre-
pared statement of M. Lipton).
13. See Taylor, Trading in Commodity Futures. A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE L.J. 63,
103-04 (1933). Taylor commented:
[s]teps must be taken for the protection of the gullible and the inexperienced. The
past eighty years have amply demonstrated that the general public is easily enticed
into the field of speculation. Men need some organized restraint upon their tendency
to gamble as much as upon their inclination to drink. And brokers stand in need of
regulation of their dealings with the public as much as do the merchants of securities.
Both are fields in which the parties cannot safely be left on to the law of offer and
acceptance and their own consciences.
14. See Irwin, Legal Status of Tradng in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REV. 155, 169 (1937).
15. 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
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to the development of suitability rules. The basic purpose of the Commodity
Exchange Act was not to protect public traders, but to protect commodity
futures markets from manipulation. 16 The protection of the public which
traded commodity futures was incidental to this purpose. In contrast, the
basic purpose of federal securities legislation was and is to protect the public
investor. 17
III. THE HISTORY OF SUITABILITY IN COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING
A. Suitabihty to Avoid Illegality
The practice of complying with what amounted to a suitability duty
dissipated the impetus for suitability rules in the area of commodity futures.
Even though a suitability duty was not stated in a rule, suitability was an
innominate presence. One way the suitability concept manifested itself was
in the control the courts had through the rule requiring an intent to deliver.
The general rule is that transactions are illegal if the parties do not intend to
deliver, but rather to settle on price differences.18 The custom in commodity
futures contracts is to settle on price differences,' 9 and as a consequence, a
pall of illegality has hung over commodity futures transactions. 20 This
anomaly persisted until the state laws which conflicted with the federal regu-
lations were finally preempted in 1974.21
Brokerage firms had to be selective with whom they did business. They
dared not do business with a person for whom commodity futures were un-
suitable for fear that a customer would challenge the legality of the transac-
tion.22 In Ohlendorfv. Bennett, 23 for example, an action was brought by the
16. The purpose of the Act was stated:
Transactions in commodity involving the sale thereof for future delivery as commonly
conducted on boards of trade and known as "futures" are affected with a national
public interest . . . the transactions and prices of commodity on such boards of trade
are susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control and sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations in the prices thereof frequently occur as a result of such speculation, ma-
nipulation, or control which are detrimental to the producer or the consumer and the
person handling commodity and products and by-products there in interstate com-
merce, and such fluctuations in prices are an obstruction to and a burden upon inter-
state commerce in commodity and the products and by-products thereof and under
regulation imperative for the protections of such commerce and the national public
interest therein.
Id
17. S. REP. No. 41, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1933).
18. See 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS 662 (1962); Taylor, supra note 13, at 63.
19. See REPORT OF THE GRAIN FUTURES ADMINISTRATION 46 (1924); Note, Legislation
Affecting Commodity and Stock Exchanges, 45 HARv. L. REV. 912, 913-14, nn. 8-9 (1932).
20. See T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING FOR COMMERCIAL AND PER-
SONAL PROFIT 57 (197 1); Smith, Preventing the Mompzulation of Commodiy Futures Markets.- To De-
iver or Not To Delver?, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1575 (1981).
21. See Smith, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and The Return of The Bucketeers." A
Lesson In Regulatoty Failure, 57 N.D.L. REV. 7, 15 (1981).
22. See, e.g., Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188 (1933); Irvin v. Williar, 110 U.S.
499 (1884); Roundtree v. Smith, 108 U.S. 269 (1883); Lyons Milling Co. v. Coffee & Carkener,
46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931); Riordon v. McCabe, 341 Ill. 506, 173 N.E. 660 (1930); Irwin, Legal
Status of Trading in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REv. 155, 165-69 (1937).
23. 241 11. App. 537 (1926).
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receiver of a bank to recover money which a cashier wrongfully withdrew
and paid to brokers for his losses in grain futures trading. The cashier was a
young man with limited business experience, supporting a family, and had
never made more than $125 a month. The value of the cashier's property
did not exceed $10,000.24 The cashier testified he could not have delivered
or taken delivery. The evidence showed the trading was illegal gambling.
25
Although the name of the game was illegality, the result was to vitiate
transactions which today would be labeled unsuitable. Consequently, even
though there was no suitability rule for commodity futures, brokers had to
comply with what amounted to a suitability duty to avoid the defense of
illegality. If they did not comply and an account went into a deficit, the
practice was to write these deficits off as uncollectable.
2 6
B. The Effict of Increased Trading
In the mid-1960's, there was a great increase in the public participation
in commodity futures markets. 27 This increasing involvement brought a
concomitant need to protect the public. In 1970, Alex Caldwell, Adminis-
trator of the Commodity Exchange Authority, expressed his views about
what the agency was doing toward developing antifraud rules which would
require, among other things, that the commodity broker make a suitability
inquiry. 28 In a letter written to this writer in September of 1970, Mr. Cald-
well stated:
You will be interested in knowing that some time ago we requested
the Department's General Counsel to determine the extent of the
Secretary's rule making authority in this entire area. We have
asked that proposed legislation be drafted if it is necessary to ex-
tend to commodity customers the same type of safeguards now
available to security customers. This study currently is underway.
Insofar as exchange suitability rules are concerned, over 18
months ago we requested all contract markets to adopt regulations
designed to give added protection to customers whose accounts are
handled on a controlled or discretionary basis. Among such regu-
lations was one which would have required brokerage firms to
learn the essential facts relating to each customer, including his
financial resources and trading objectives. Another would have re-
quired each controlled or discretionary account to be given diligent
supervision to see that the trading in the account is consistent with
the customer's trading objectives and his financial resources. While
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange recently adopted new regula-
tions somewhat along the lines we proposed, no other contract mar-
ket has taken action. It is for this reason that we requested the
Department's General Counsel to conduct its current review of this
24. Id. at 550.
25. Id at 551.
26. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 63.
27. See Bagley, A New Body of Law In An Era of Indusity Growth, 27 EMORY L.J. 849 (1978).
28. Letter from Alex Caldwell Administrator, Commodity Exchange Authority, to M. Van
Smith (Sept. 17, 1970) (discussing agency development of antifraud rules) (available at the





The provision of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to which Mr. Cald-
well referred was Rule 942, subsection E,30 which required supervision of the
discretionary accounts by the clearing members, "to see that trading in such
an account is not overly excessive in an amount or frequency in relation to
the equity in the account."
31
Regulation 1992 of the Chicago Board of Trade32 set forth regulations
for discretionary accounts and provided that "[ejach account with respect to
which employee has discretionary authority must be given continuous super-
visions by the employer, . . . to see that trading in such account is not exces-
sive in size or frequency in relation to financial resources in the account."
'33
The only exchange which had a suitability rule for nondiscretionary
accounts was the New York Mercantile Exchange. Rule 48.01 of the New
York Mercantile Exchange34 required every brokerage firm to use due dili-
gence in learning the facts relative to every customer and the nature of that
customer's account. Brokerage firms were also required to keep informed of
the character and volume of trading in every account opened. 35 Although
the rule did not explicitly state that the brokerage firm had a duty to deter-
mine whether commodity futures trading was suitable for a prospective cus-
tomer, this duty was implicit in requiring brokerage firms to inquire into the
facts relative to every customer, and into the nature of the customer's
account.
In 1973, Mr. Caldwell testified before a congressional committee con-
ducting hearings on legislation to amend the Commodity Exchange Act.
36
He spoke of the need to establish suitability rules. "We would like to have a
standard rule under which the members of all exchanges would be required
to delve into the needs of a particular customer to trade in the market, his
financial ability to do so-and other matters."
'37
C. Protection of the Pubh'c
The protection of the public involved in futures trading became one of
the main purposes of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974.38 In accordance with this purpose, the CFTC established the Advisory
Committee on Commodity Futures Trading Professionals to study and rec-
ommend standards for the regulation of professionals.
39
The committee recommended that brokers be required to have a rea-
29. Id.
30. Chicago Mercantile Exchange Rule 942(E) (1970).
31. Id.
32. Chicago Bd. of Trade Reg. 1992 (1970).
33. Id.
34. New York Mercantile Exchange Guide § 48.01.
35. Id.
36. 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
37. Hearings before the Subcaomm. on Special Small Busine6s Problems of the Permanent Select House
Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1973) (Statement of Alex Caldwell).
38. H.R. 13,113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1974); see Leist v. Simplot, [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. 21,051, at 24,180 (2d Cir. July 8, 1980).
39. 40 Fed. Reg. 32,866 (1975).
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sonable ground for believing that each recommendation they make is suita-
ble in light of customers' financial condition, objectives, and other factors.
40
In discussing suitability, the committee noted that a suitability duty is of
particular importance in commodities trading because of the wide variety of
trading programs that are available to customers.4 I As part of a suitability
duty, the committee recommended that brokers should "obtain from each
customer complete information as to his income, net worth, number of de-
pendents, etc."'42 The duty to know customers "must be a continuing one.
A customer's financial situation and capacity for risk taking may change
from what it was when he opened the account." 43 In the view of the com-
mittee, brokers, "should know their customers not only for the purpose of
making suitable recommendations but also to avoid situations in which a
defaulting customer might jeopardize the entire firm and other custom-
ers." 44 In order not to jeopardize their firm, brokers should determine if and
to what extent their customers are trading with other firms.
The CFTC proposed suitability regulations in September 197745 which
followed the recommendations of the Advisory Committee.46 The proposed
rule prohibited commodity professionals from recommending trades, or trad-
ing pursuant to discretionary authority, unless the trading professional has
1) obtained from a customer the essential facts about a customer's financial
condition and trading objectives, and 2) has reason to believe that the posi-
tion would be suitable for the customer based on information known to the
professional. 47 The CFTC explained that, "[t]he suitability of a position
would depend on whether the risk of loss involved was (a) one that the cus-
tomer could safely assume in light of his financial condition and
(b) consistent with the customer's trading objectives."' 48 In its comment on
the proposed suitability rule, the CFTC stated that the suitability determi-
nation consisted of two different judgments:
(1) Whether commodity trading in general is suitable for the
customer in view of his trading objective and financial condition
and, (2) if so, whether the particular position that is the subject of
the recommendation in discretionary trade is suitable. The latter
requirement reflects the fact that the risk of loss can vary widely
depending on the size of the trade, the volatility and market liquid-
ity of the commodity involved, and the amount of margin
required.
49
40. Report of the Commodit Futures Trading Comm'n Advisory Comm. on Commodit Futures Trading
Professionals, COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) Report No. 29, Part II at ii (Aug. 20, 1976).
41. Id at 11.
42. Id.
43. Id at 10.
44. Id at 11.
45. Proposed Rulemaking of the CFTC, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742 (1977), reprtntedin [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH), 20,474 (Sept. 6, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Proposed Rulemaking].
46. Id.
47. Id at 44,743; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. at 21,928.
48. Id
49. Id. at 44,744; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. at 21,929. The CFTC
gave the following example:
Thus, in recommending to a customer the purchase of 10 future contracts of a particu-
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The CFTC adopted the proposed customer protection rules in July
1978.50 When the CFTC adopted these customer protection rules, however,
it declined to adopt a suitability rule.
5 1
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR REJECTION OF THE RULE
The CFTC stated two reasons for not adopting a suitability rule. The
first reason was the inability of the CFTC "to formulate meaningful stan-
dards of universal application." 52 The second reason was that a rule would
merely codify principles implicit in the antifraud provisions of the Act, and
the benefits to be gained by codification were outweighed by the risk of un-
intentionally narrowing the scope of the provisions.53 These reasons were a
pretense.
A. The Universal Standard
Suitability is based on the notion that risks should be judged according
to the finances, needs, and objectives of customers as individuals. Customers
cannot be treated as individuals if suitability is to be determined by a "uni-
versal" standard. When the CFTC proposed the suitability rule, it requested
comment on the "appropriateness of specific suitability standards, such as a
requirement that commodity customers have a minimum net worth (e.g.,
$50,000), annual gross income (e.g., $25,000), account equity (e.g., $10,000)
or some combination of those factors."'5 4 What the CFTC specifically had in
mind was never discussed, but it probably contemplated net worth and in-
come criteria similar to those that have been adopted by states for tax shelter
investments.
55
The appeal of these criteria to brokers is that they require no judgment
to apply. If the criteria of suitability are a net worth of $50,000 and income
of $25,000 per year, the decision about suitability has been made; all a bro-
ker need do is assure himself that a customer indeed has a net worth of
$50,000 and income of $25,000.
Although objective criteria require no thought to administer, they are,
by definition, somewhat arbitrary. 56 The efficacy of objective criteria de-
lar commodity the professional would be required to have a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that the risk of loss from an adverse price movement could be absorbed by the
customer without undue hardship. If the professional thought the risk of buying 10
contracts was too great, the proper recommendation might be to purchase fewer
contracts.
50. Customer Protection Rules, supra note 2, at 31,886; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
CoMM. FUT. L. REP. at 22,623.
51. Id. at 31,889; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. at 22,625.
52. Id
53. Id
54. 42 Fed. Reg. 44,744, reprinted in [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,474, at 21,930 (Sept. 6, 1977).
55. See Murdock, Tax Sheltered Securities: Is There a Broker-Dealer in the Woodwork?, 25 HAS-
TINGS LJ. 518 (1974).
56. In a curious twist, one writer argues that arbitrary standards are necessary to avoid
brokers being intimidated into not advising customers in their best interest for fear a trade may
later be found to be unsuitable. See Hudson, Customer Protection in the Commodity Futures Market, 58
B.U.L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1978).
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pends on how relevant they are to the investment. In the case of tax shelter
investments, a requirement that an investor be in a fifty percent tax bracket
is relevant. A substantial part of the return of any tax shelter is the tax
benefits to be derived, benefits which obviously cannot be realized by per-
sons who do not have a high enough income tax bracket to make use of tax
write-offs. These tax write-offs compensate for the generally higher than
normal risk of tax shelter ventures. Consequently, even though a criterion
based on a tax bracket is an objective criterion, it makes sense because tax
benefits are essential to the suitability of tax shelter investments.
This is not necessarily true for other speculative ventures. Persons of
modest income may be able to afford to speculate if they do not have family
obligations or financial obligations.5 7 Persons of modest finances often can
evaluate the risk of speculative ventures as well as those who are well-off.
Furthermore, there is the problem of deciding what is speculative, a decision
which the public resents being made for them by government.
Because of the leverage possible in speculating on margin, commodity
futures trading offers the opportunity to make significant amounts of money
with relatively little capital. This opportunity may be an illusion, but it is
cherished nonetheless. A suitability rule which would bar persons from trad-
ing who do not meet a prescribed net worth or income requirement would
arouse too much customer resentment to win compliance. And then there
would be no assurance that commodity futures trading would be suitable for
the person who met financial requirements. 58
In its commentary that accompanied the proposed customer protection
rules, the CFTC expressed skepticism about an objective standard of suita-
bility.59 The CFTC has done nothing to formulate a universal standard
since it declined to adopt a suitability rule. One must doubt how seriously
the CFTC believes in a universal standard.
B. Suilability as Implicit in Antifraud Provtsins
The second reason asserted by the CFTC for not adopting a suitability
rule was that a suitability rule would merely codify principles implicit in the
antifraud provision of the Act and there would be too much risk of narrow-
ing the duty by incorporating it in a rule.6° The CFTC, however, never
explained how a suitability duty would have been narrowed by being stated
in the general rule proposed by the CFTC. The narrowing rationale was
actually relied on as a reason for not adopting the churning and due dili-
gence rules the CFTC had proposed as part of its customer protection
57. See, e.g., Tucker v. Economic Systems, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT.
L. REP. 20,480 (CCH) (CFTC Aug. 25, 1977) (suitability determined in view of client's re-
sources, responsibilities, and objectives).
58. Bernard Kummerli, a compulsive speculator, lost $20 million and brought down the
United California Bank of Basel, Switzerland, by speculating in cocoa futures. See Smith, Are
You Suitable For Trading?, COMMODITIES 32 (Oct. 1977).
59. Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 45, at 44,744; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. at 21,929.
60. Customer Protection Rules, supra note 2, at 31,889; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. at 22,625.
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rules.6 1 This rationale was applied as an afterthought to justify the CFTC's
rejection of a suitability rule.
6 2
Under the theory that a suitability duty was implicit in the antifraud
provisions of the law, administrative law judges of the CFTC have said that
firms who sell unsuitable commodity futures to customers can be held liable
for fraud.6 3 The CFTC, however, has hinted that it may reject the notion
that suitability is implicit in the antifraud provisions of the Act. In two cases
in which the CFTC reviewed reparation awards in which administrative law
judges had reasoned that suitability was implicit in the antifraud provisions
of the Commodity Exchange Act, the CFTC stated, in footnotes to its deci-
sions, that it refused to adopt the administrative law judges' reasoning, 64
although the CFTC affirmed the awards. The significance of this dicta is
difficult to predict. The CFTC did not state why it did not agree with the
statements of the administrative law judges or what its own views on suita-
bility were.
Commentators anxious to be rid of suitability, however, have had no
trouble in attaching significance to the footnoted statements. Referring to
the Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. 65 footnote, it was recently stated that,
"the CFTC has unequivocally determined that there is no customer suitabil-
ity standard implicit to any of the provisions of the Commodity Exchange
Act."
6 6
Yet, to exorcise suitability from the antifraud provisions of the Com-
modity Exchange Act, it will take more than merely stating that suitability is
not present. The antifraud provisions of the Act were adopted in 1936 to
incorporate the duties of agency in the broker-customer relationship. 67 The
antifraud provisions, therefore, incorporate the duties arising out of agency.
Suitability is a material fact which a broker, as an agent, has a duty to
disclose. 68
61. Id.
62. "The Commission is not adopting the proposed suitability rule (proposed Sec. 166.2),
but may adopt such a rule at a later time if meaningful standards can be developed." Id
63. See, e.g., Jensen v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,062 (CFTC July 28, 1980) (futures commission merchant who trades
with a client whom he had reason to believe cannot assume the risks raises a presumption of
fraud); Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuTr. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,738 (CFTC Jan. 11, 1979) (failure to disclose material facts is a breach of fiduciary
duty); Hauser v. Rosenthal & Co. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,731 (CFTC Jan. 4, 1979) (futures commission merchants must meet the high ethical stan-
dards applied to the securities industry); Dwyer v. Murlas Brothers Commodities, Inc., [1977-
1980 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,520 (CFTC Nov. 21, 1977) (breach of
fiduciary duty in commodity futures exchange constituted fraud).
64. Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,379, at 25,830 n.4 (CFTC Apr. 13, 1982); Jensen v. Shearson Hayden Stone,
Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) $ 21,324 at 25,582, n.l (CFTC
Oct. 9, 1981).
65. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 25,830, n.4.
66. See Miller & Zarfes, No Customer Suitability Rule But AP's Recklessness Bnngs Recovety,
COMMODITIES LAW LETTER 4 (May 1982).
67. See J. BAER & 0. SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 261
(1949) (setting forth digest of Act written in 1936 by N.M. Mehl, Administrator of the Com-
modity Exchange Authority, the agency which regulated futures markets until 1975).
68. See infia notes 69-71; Smith, Breaking the Chains That Bind- Arbitration Agreements Versus
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C. A Conflict of Interest
The CFTC's somewhat jumbled rationale for refusing to adopt a suita-
bility rule invites interpolation as to other possible factors affecting the Com-
mission's decision. One explanation is the way the United States brokerage
business has become high volume retailing, as seen by the "Madison Ave-
nue" advertising of some brokerage firms.69 Brokers are salesmen who are
paid for what they sell, not on how much their customers make. Because of
their high fixed overhead, brokers must sell in volume. Commissions on
commodity futures transactions are charged only when a trade is closed out.
The commission per contract is low, varying from .2% to .6% of the value of
a contract. 70 For these reasons brokers are under relentless pressure to in-
duce their customers to trade in and out of markets with heavy positions.
To sell in volume, a broker cannot be overly concerned with suitability.
If it comes down to a choice between selling and deciding that commodity
futures trading is unsuitable, brokers opt to sell. Brokers see the problem not
as a matter of choice, but as a matter of business survival.
If suitability rules are incompatible with volume merchandizing, should
futures brokers have to comply with suitability rules? The ever-present con-
flict of interest inherent in high volume retailing was considered by attorney
Thomas O'Boyle, at a Securities Conference at Duke University in 1964.
O'Boyle commented that stressing an image of professionalism the regula-
tory authorities may do a disservice to the public if that status of profession-
alism does not in fact exist.
7 1
If brokers sold tangible products, one might be able to take O'Boyle's
suggestion seriously. But brokers sell intangible merchandise. Customers
cannot see, feel, or test what a broker sells. Moreover, by the time customers
have the experience to evaluate commodity futures trading, they may have
already lost their investment.
Regardless of whether it is wise or unwise to do so, customers rely on
their brokers' advice, and most brokers expect to advise their customers. As
long as this is a legitimate expectation, advice must be honest. To accom-
plish the goal of giving honest advice, the advisor must subordinate his inter-
est to that of the person being advised. 72 This is true of any professional
Forum Rights Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
749, 759 n.44 (1979).
69. In contrast to American brokers, the London Stock Exchange forbids advertising by
member firms, advertising being considered inimical to the mutual relationship of trust between
broker and customer. See Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards. The Importance
ofAdministrative Adjidication in Their Development, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 691, n.88 (1964).
70. See B. GOULD, DOW-JONES-IRWIN GUIDE TO COMMODITIES TRADING 64 (1973).
71. See O'Boyle, supra note 9, at 100.
72. See H. BINES, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT I 4.01[2](a], 4-12 (1978). Wil-
liam 0. Douglas observed this in 1936 in a speech to a school maintained by the New York
Stock Exchange for employees of brokerage firms:
He who holds himself as rendering this investment counsel and this service to custom-
ers should be held to high fiduciary standards of conduct. If he who gives this advice
and encourages and stimulates his customer's purchases and sales has a self-interest in
the transaction over and above his salary or regular compensation, his customer is apt
to receive not unbiased and disinterested advice but advice discolored by the self-
interest which such purchases and sales will serve. The presence of this self-interest
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advice, whether it be by a lawyer, doctor, or commodity futures broker.
To avoid the duty required by suitability rules, brokers would have to
abstain from giving advice.73 There are a few brokers who do not advise,
acting solely as order takers; however, this is atypical. Most brokers want to
sell, and to sell, they think they must advise.
Because customers rely on brokers for advice, the written disclosure
statement which the CFTC adopted as a palliative for not adopting a suita-
bility rule was a sham.74 Written disclosure statements are no match for ag-
gressive selling.75 In a speech on December 7, 1979, before the American
Bar Association National Institute on Commodities Regulation, James
Stone, then chairman of the CFTC, warned that a disclosure statement
could be easily undermined by salestalk. He called for integrity throughout
the sales process in order to adequately serve customers' needs.
76
will deprive the customers of the benefit of disinterested and impartial advice, the very
thing which presumably the customer thinks he is getting.
Se. W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 114-15 U. Allen ed. 1940).
73. See Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975).
74. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1982) which provides:
This statement is furnished to you because rule 1.55 of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission requires it.
The risk of loss in trading commodity futures contracts can be substantial. You
should therefore carefully consider whether such trading is suitable for you in light of
your financial condition. In considering whether to trade, you should be aware of the
following:
(1) You may sustain a total loss of the initial margin funds and any additional
funds that you deposit with your broker to establish or maintain a position in the
commodity futures market. If the market moves against your position, you may be
called upon by your broker to deposit a substantial amount of additional margin
funds, on short notice, in order to maintain your position. If you do not provide the
required funds within the prescribed time, your position may be liquidated at a loss,
and you will be liable for any resulting deficit in your account.
(2) Under certain market conditions, you may find it difficult or impossible to
liquidate a position. This can occur, for example, when the market makes a "limit
move.
(3) Placing contingent orders, such as "stop-loss" or "stop-limit" order, will not
necessarily limit your losses to the intended amounts, since market conditions may
make it impossible to execute such orders.
(4) A "spread" position may not be less risky than a simple "long" or "short"
position.
(5) The high degree of leverage that is often obtainable in futures trading be-
cause of the small margin requirements can work against you as well as for you. The
use of leverage can lead to large losses as well as gains.
The brief statement cannot, of course, disclose all the risks and other significant
aspects of the commodity markets. You should therefore carefully study futures trad-
ing before you trade.
75. See, e.g., Akmajian v. International Commodity Options, Ltd., 11977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,584 (CFTC March 29, 1978) (claimant was granted
reparation due to insufficiency of disclosure statement). Walker v. Rosenthal & Co., 11977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. Furr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,627 (CFTC June 19, 1978) (verbal misrepre-
sentations took precedence over written disclosure statements).
76. Speech by James M. Stone, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman to
the National Institute on Commodities Regulation (Dec. 7, 1979) (on file with M. Van Smith).
Understanding is not assured by a simple disclosure rule. The Commission has such
a rule--and I support it as far as it goes. It does not, however, go very far. A disclo-
sure boilerplate is easily undermined by fast talk. Disclosure to a woefully unsophisti-
cated account prospect is often worth nothing at all. I recall from my previous job
with a shudder hearing that Massachusetts health insurance disclosure forms on preg-
nancy coverage were returned with signature by scores of elderly women in nursing
homes. A disclosure form by itself can serve the unscrupulous huckster at least as well
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It is evident from the euphemistic tenor of the CFTC's risk disclosure
statement 77 that it was intended to disclose as little as possible. If brokers
really wanted to disclose the risks of trading, they would acknowledge that
the prices of commodity futures are unpredictable and warn that any state-
ments to the contrary are generally not to be believed.78 Brokers would also
need to disclose the conflict of interest between their interest in commissions
and a customer's interest in profits7 9 and the fact that generally brokers are
the ones most likely to profit.80 The CFTC's risk disclosure statement is of
the genre of prospectus described as "a literary art form calculated to com-
municate as little of the essential information as possible while exuding an
air of total candor."8' The danger with the disclosure approach is that it
encourages the attitude that once brokers have made a token warning, cus-
tomers are fair game for the hard sell.
V. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
Although a suitability duty is essential to countervail the conflict of in-
terest inherent in the dealings between customers and brokers, it is unlikely
that the CFTC will promulgate a suitability rule for commodity futures un-
til Congress threatens to legislate.8 2 Until there is a suitability rule, custom-
ers will have to rely on the common law to vindicate their rights.
A. Common Law Duties
Under common law, brokers have a fiduciary duty to disclose to cus-
tomers material facts of transactions concerning those customers.8 3 If the un-
suitability of commodity futures trading is a material fact, then the
nondisclosure of that fact is a false representation. 4 Furthermore, because
brokers must act as fiduciaries, they can be held liable in constructive fraud
without an intent to deceive.8 5 Thus, under common law, brokers must ad-
as it serves the public. Assurance of adequate customer understanding requires integ-
rity throughout the entire sales process.
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1982).
78. A warning similar to this has been proposed for securities by one writer. See Note,
Broker Investment Recommendations and the EfJiient Capital Market Hypothesis. A Proposed Cautionary
Legend, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1077 (1977).
79. This kind of conflict would have to be disclosed prominently in a securities prospectus.
See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 331 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1971), modified,
351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972); In re Managed Funds, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 313, 319 (1959).
80. See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 20, at 253. "On being asked to whom the speculating
public's money goes, the commission house people are hard pressed for an answer. The most
usual explanation is that a good share falls through the slot in the table. That is, into the
paying of commissions, but this is only part of the story." Id at 250.
81. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,163, at
91,185 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
82. The CFTC only banned the sale of commodity options to the general public when
Congress started hearings to legislate such a ban. See Smith, supra note 21, at 32.
83. See Cecka v. Beckman & Co., 28 Cal. App. 3d 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1972); Bond &
Share Trading Corp. v. Insuransharer Corp., 40 F. Supp. 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
84. See, e.g. , Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc. 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 222 (1968). (failure to inform customer that excessive trading unsuitable held a fraud).
85. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1573 (Deering 1971); Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal. 2d
329, 342, 364 P.2d 247, 256, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 80 (1961); County of Santa Cruz v. McLeod, 189
Cal. App. 2d 222, 234-35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 249, 253-54 (1961).
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vise their customers in accordance with a suitability duty to avoid de-
frauding their customers. Common law can be used to enforce a suitability
duty by applying conventional legal principles.
8 6
One difficulty customers will have in resorting to common law remedies
is that there is no common law duty to inquire of a prospective customer
whether commodity futures trading is suitable for that customer. 8 7 Thus,
unscrupulous brokers can avoid disclosing that commodity futures trading is
unsuitable by remaining ignorant of the finances and needs of prospective
customers. This could be countervailed by a law which recognizes that
when one advises another, it is implicit that the advice is suitable for the
person being advised.
88
B. Duty Arising From Custom
Customers may also be able to hold brokers liable for losses from unsuit-
able commodity futures trading under a breach of duty arising out of cus-
tom. Custom is a practice that is so well accepted in a community that it has
the force of law.8 9 It is the practice of ethical commodity futures brokerage
firms to have procedures to determine whether commodity futures trading is
suitable for their customers. These procedures generally involve some in-
quiry to determine whether customers can afford the risk of commodity fu-
tures trading, whether they understand those risks, and whether they have
previously traded. A few firms will inquire into family obligations to deter-
mine whether the money a customer will use to trade is "risk capital"-
money that would not affect the standard of living if lost. The wire houses
often have a "dollar line," a procedure that allows a customer to trade a
percentage of his capital over and above his home and automobile. Al-
though the procedures used by brokerage firms to determine suitability
would vary, the ethical firms have some way to determine whether commod-
ity futures trading is suitable for their customers. And because of the preva-
lence of this practice, one can contend that it is the custom of commodity
futures firms to undertake a suitability duty.
Assuming it is the custom for ethical commodity futures brokerage firms
to follow procedures consonant with a suitability duty, this custom gives rise
to a legal duty under which a brokerage firm must operate when it accepts
the business of a customer. 90 Furthermore, the agreements that customers
86. See H. BINES, supra note 72, at 4.0112][a], 4-13; Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Tem-
pleton, 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968).
87. Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash. App. 433, 628 P.2d 1336 (1981).
88. See, e.g., Feeney v. SEC, 564 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978);
University Hill Found. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Best
Securities, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931 (1960).
89. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRAars 10 (1961).
90. In Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 489-90 (1893), the Court stated: "Where a principal
sends an order to a broker engaged in an established market or trade, for a deal in that trade, he
confers authority upon the broker to deal according to any well-established usage in such mar-
ket or trade. ... Similarily, in an article co-authored by William 0. Douglas, Bates & Doug-
las, Secondary Distrbution of Secunties-Problems Suggested by Kinney v. Glenny, 41 YALE L.J. 949
(1932), it was stated:
It would seem that the placing of an order to buy or sell by the customer and an
indication to the customer by the broker of his willingness to undertake to execute the
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sign when they open accounts generally provide that transactions will be
governed by the rules, regulations, customs, and usages of the markets where
transactions are executed. These agreements give rise to a suitability duty
by contract. Brokerage firms can undertake contractual duties that are not
imposed by general law. For example, in Iowa Grabn v. Farmers Gramh and Feed
Co. ,91 a brokerage firm was held liable for losses incurred because it failed to
comply with the duty it had undertaken in the customer's agreement to com-
ply with exchange margin rules. The court held the brokerage firm liable for
breach of a contractual duty despite the cases holding that brokerage firms
are not liable, absent a specific contractual provision, for violation of ex-
change margin rules. 92 The reasoning of the cases holding brokers liable for
violating exchange rules that a brokerage firm has agreed to follow in its
customer's contract would also apply to holding brokers liable for violating
customs that a brokerage firm has agreed to follow in its customer's
contract.
93
Brokerage firms can argue that the practice of firms making a suitability
inquiry is not a custom, but merely a house rule for the protection of firms.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Goldman,94 a customer at-
tempted to avoid liability for a deficit in his account on the ground that
commodity futures trading was unsuitable. The court decided that there
was no evidence of a suitability violation.9 5 The court observed, moreover,
that absent fraud, there was no authority which recognized a private cause
of action for an alleged violation of house rules.96 The customer did not
contend that the firm had a suitability duty by custom or that the house rule
in this case manifested a duty which the firm had undertaken by custom.
Probably the customer was unaware of the prevalence of the suitability in-
quiry in commodity futures or the significance of custom. Because the issue
of whether the brokerage firm had a suitability duty as imposed by custom
was never raised, the court could not decide this issue. Nevertheless, the case
suggests the line of defense that brokerage firms can take against the conten-
tion that there is a legal duty imposed by custom to inquire into the suitabil-
ity of commodities trading.
As noted previously, the courts have yet to decide the question of
whether there is a custom of commodity futures brokerage firms undertaking
a suitability duty. Nevertheless, when this issue is finally considered, the
following factors should demonstrate the existence of this custom: 1) the
order give rise to a bilateral contract. The mutual promises are all implied in fact
being based on the common undertaking of the parties, the way in which such busi-
ness is normally conducted, and the custom and usage of particular markets or
exchanges.
Id at 965.
91. 293 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 1980). See also First Mid America, Inc. v. Palmer, 197 Neb. 224,
248 N.W.2d 30 (1976) (broker agreed to follow exchange rules); S. WILLISTON, supra note 75,
§ 651 at 32, 34.
92. See, e.g., John S. Morris & Co. v. Mezvinsky, 24 A.D.2d 950, 265 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1965);
Dupont v. Neiman, 156 Cal. App. 2d 313, 319 P.2d 60 (1957).
93. See S. WILLISTON, supra note 89, at 36.
94. 593 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1979).
95. Id at 133.
96. Id at 134.
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practice of writing off deficits because of the pall of illegality which hung
over commodity futures, 97 2) the exchange rules,98 3) the prevalence of
brokerage firm procedures to determine suitability, 99 and 4) the general as-
sumption that it is wrong for persons for whom commodity futures trading is
unsuitable to trade.1l ° Even the CFTC's risk disclosure statement is some
indication of the existence of this custom. Finally, the most compelling argu-
ment should be that ethically commodity futures brokers, who hold them-
selves out to their customers as professionals, and who benefit from the trust
they instill in their customers, should uphold a duty commensurate with this
trust.
C. Judictally Imposed Suitability
Although the judicial system can fashion a suitability duty from the
common law, it is not well suited to this task. The randomness of cases and
the limitation of cases to their facts make the formation of policy through
case-by-case adjudication a slow process. 10 1 Courts are adversarial rather
than inquisitorial tribunals, depending on litigants to develop the facts on
which decisions are based. The courts do not have the expertise that is avail-
able to administrative agencies, which can bring their expertise and investi-
gative capability to bear on a problem.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Ironically, the brokerage community may have the most to lose under
the CFTC's obstructionist policy. Brokers, as well as customers, will lose the
protection a suitability rule could provide. Brokers are confronted with an
uncertain potential liability for losses of customers for whom commodity fu-
tures trading is unsuitable. This uncertainty is a two-edged sword. While
brokerage firms may escape liability to some customers, they will be exposed
to potential liability for damages-especially punitive damages-from
others. The CFTC could ameliorate this potential liability by promulgating
a rule which would define the contours of brokers' suitability duty. If bro-
kers complied with such a rule, this compliance could be urged as a defense
97. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 63; Irwin, supra note 14, at 155.
98. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange Rule, supra note 30, and accompanying text.
99. See Hearings Before Comm. on Agniulture and Forestg, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 514 (1973) (state-
ment of Paul H. Franklin, Vice President and Director of Commodities Division for Merrill
Lynch).
100. In the congressional hearings in 1973 which preceded the adoption of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Michael Weinberg, Jr., Chairman of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, alluded to the importance of screening customers with respect to the issue
of the suitability of commodity futures trading:
We have advertised-and told our member firms-that only persons with excess risk
capital, above their living and savings needs, should be in any market. We have held
seminars, talked at colleges, produced millions of brochures, and gone on radio and
TV-all over the country--passing the word that the commodity world is one of ex-
citement, but it should be approached only by persons with the temperament, knowledge and sup-
port to properly use it.
Small Business Problems Involved In The Marketing of Grain and Other Commodities: Hear-
ings Before Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 246 (1973) (statement
by Michael Weinberg, Chairman, Chicago Mercantile Exchange) (emphasis added).
101. See Cohen & Rabin, supra note 69, at 692.
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to liability. Furthermore, by knowing what is expected of them, brokers
could adopt procedures to guard themselves from potential liability.
Brokers would benefit from a suitability duty promulgated by the
CFTC rather than one hammered out by litigants in the courts. If a suitabil-
ity duty is a corollary to honest advice, the CFTC's refusal to adopt a suita-
bility duty could be perceived as deference to the brokerage community.
This could persuade the courts that there is a need to overcome the CFTC's
unjust protection of brokers at the customers' expense. The reaction may be
a suitability duty of draconian harshness.
10 2
Consider what has happened to the medical profession. For years, doc-
tors were able to suppress patients being able to recover malpractice claims
by refusing to testify against fellow doctors. 10 3 The courts countered this
conspiracy of silence with the doctrine of res tpsa loquztur, "the happening of
an unusual occurrence which creates an inference of negligence on the part
of the doctor."' 1° Out of necessity, the courts became so receptive to this
doctrine that doctors were put in the position of having to prove their ab-
sence of malpractice. 10 5 How different it would have been if the medical
profession had faced up to its responsibilities instead of making aggrieved
patients and the courts do it for them.
The rejection by the CFTC of a suitability rule and the efforts by this
agency to undermine any suitability duty which brokers have under the
Commodity Exchange Act once again demonstrate that the public would
have been far better off had there never been a CFTC. 106 The CFTC wants
to appear to be carrying out its mandate, while serving the interests of the
brokerage community. Hence the analogy to the pea and shell game-"now
you see it, now you don't."
102. See H. BINEs, supra note 72, at 4.01[2][b], 4-17 n.54. "In its present stage of develop-
ment, the suitability doctrine leaves unresolved many questions which could lead to harsh re-
sults if there were an absolute rule that violation of suitability standards would lead to civil
liability." Id.
103. See Ames, Modern Techniques in the Preparation and Trnal ofa Malpractice Suit, in PROFES-
SIONAL NEGLIGENCE 129-30 (T. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960).
104. See McCoid, The Care RequiredofMedica/Practitioners, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 85
(T. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960).
105. Id at 91.
106. See, e.g. , Smith, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Return ofthe Bucketeers. A
Lesson In Regulatory Failure, 57 N.D.L. REV. 7, 41 (1981). For another example, the CFTC has
recently proposed rules to promote binding arbitration to the exclusion of its own jurisdiction
and thereby foster the interest of brokerage firms in having disputes with their customers arbi-
trated by their fellow brokers. See COMM. FtrT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,608, at 26,332 (Oct. 28,
1982). See Smith, Breaking the Chains That Bind: Arbitration Agreements Versus Forum Rights Under the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974r, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 749, 770 (1979) (pre-
dicting the CFTC proposal of such binding arbitration).
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SPORHASE V NEBRASKA Ex' REL. DOUGLAS: A CALL FOR
GROUND WATER LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,I the Supreme Court fulfilled com-
mentators' prophecies2 by holding that state water anti-export statutes are
contrary to the commerce clause of the federal Constitution.
3 This decision
brings water regulations within the scope of the Court'i previous pronounce-
ments on state statutes regulating interstate commerce in animal, vegetable,
and mineral resources. 4
This comment will outline the development of the commerce power as
it relates to state export/import restrictions, and examine the Court's ration-
ale in Sporhase in the context of commerce clause precedent. The Court's
characterization of water will be analyzed, and probable effects of this hold-
ing on future interstate water allocation plans will be projected. This com-
ment takes the position that some state regulation of ground water export is
possible after Sporhase.
II. FACTS OF SPORHASE V NEBRASKA EX REL. DOUGLAS
Joy Sporhase and Delmer Moss, both Colorado residents, owned contig-
uous tracts of farmland in Colorado and Nebraska. The crops on these two
tracts were irrigated with ground water
5 pumped from a well located on the
Nebraska tract. 6 These facts in and of themselves did not spark a contro-
versy worthy of Supreme Court attention; however, the additional element
of a Nebraska statute 7 conditioning water export provoked inquiry into con-
1. 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
2. Several commentators have suggested water anti-export statutes may present constitu-
tional problems. E.g., F. Trelease, Federal-State Relations in Water Law 60-61 (Nat'l Water
Comm'n Legal Study No. 5, 1971); Comment, "It's Our Water/"-Can Wyoming Constitutionally
Prohibit the Exportation of State Waters?, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 119, 120 (1975). See Heller-
stein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources,
1979 SuP. CT. REV. 51, 91-92.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (state cannot restrict interstate sale of
naturally seined minnows); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (intrastate fruit
packaging requirements invalid); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (natural
gas anti-export statute invalid).
5. The term ground water has many definitions; throughout this comment it will be used
as defined by the Nebraska Legislature. "Ground water shall mean that water which occurs or
moves, seeps, filters, or percolates through ground under the surface of the land." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 46-657(2) (1978). For a more thorough and scientific definition of ground water, see
generally D. TODD, GROUND WATER HYDROLOGY (1963).
6. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 3458 (1982).
7. The relevant Nebraska statute provides in part:
Any person . . . intending to withdraw ground water from any well . . . in the
State of Nebraska and transport it for use in an adjoining state shall apply to the
Department of Water Resources for a permit to do so. If the Director of Water
Resources finds that the withdrawal of ground water requested is reasonable, is not
contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not otherwise detrimental
to the public welfare, he shall grant the permit if the state in which the water is to be
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stitutional issues under the commerce clause.
Sporhase and Moss did not apply for a permit to the Nebraska Depart-
ment of Water Resources, as required by the statute, before exporting
ground water from their Nebraska well for use on their land in Colorado.
This violation prompted Nebraska to seek permanently to enjoin further
water exports by the landowners. Ruling that the export was not in compli-
ance with the statute, the trial court granted the injunction8 and rejected
Sporhase's claims that the statute was contrary to the commerce, due pro-
cess, and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.9 The Nebraska
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because ground water was not an arti-
cle of commerce under Nebraska law, it could not be subject to commerce
clause considerations. The court also rejected Sporhase's due process and
equal protection claims.10
The constitutional challenge was, however, ultimately successful. In a
seven-to-two decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Ne-
braska decision. 1 ' The majority concluded that the state statute could not
be upheld based on the negative power of the commerce clause.
12
III. BACKGROUND
A. Judicial Interpretation of the Commerce Clause
The commerce clause of the federal Constitution provides: "The Con-
gress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."' 13 On its face,
this constitutional provision does not demand exclusive congressional control
of commerce. The debates of the Constitutional Convention likewise do not
reflect an intent that states be powerless to institute regulatory legislation. '
4
used grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport ground water from that state
for use in the State of Nebraska.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
8. Nebraska was readily able to determine that the Sporhase export did not meet the
statutory criteria. Colorado has an absolute embargo on ground water export (Coo. REV.
STAT. § 37-90-136 (1973)); therefore, the Nebraska reciprocity requirement could not be met.
It is also important to note that Sporhase was using water from his Nebraska well because
he had been denied a permit for a Colorado well. Colorado denied the permit application
because of excessive demands on ground water in the area. Brief of the National Agricultural
Lands Center and Kansas City Southern Industries as Amicusr Curiae at 11-12, Sporhase v. Ne-
braska ex ret. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
9. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants at 4, Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102
S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
10. Nebraskaex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981), rey'd, 102
S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
II. 102 S. Ct. at 3467. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Rehnquist filed
a dissenting opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined.
12. Id. at 3463-67. The Court, by virtue of its commerce clause holding, did not reach the
questions of due process and equal protection. Although due process and equal protection con-
siderations are relevant, they are beyond the scope of both the decision and this comment.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. I and 3.
14. Eg., Phillips, The Growth and Development of the Federal Commerce Power, 11 TEMP. L.Q.
517, 521 (1937); see generally Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contem-
porary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 432 (1941).
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The scope of state regulatory power, however, may be clarified by examining
Supreme Court commerce clause decisions.
The Supreme Court first interpreted the commerce clause in Gibbons v.
Ogden.15 This case involved a New York statute prohibiting steamships, not
licensed by the state from navigating in New York waters. The sole question
to be decided was whether a state could regulate commerce in contravention
of a federal statute. In finding the New York law repugnant to the Constitu-
tion, the Court reasoned that supremacy of congressional action demands
that a state law yield when it is in conflict with a valid act of Congress.
16
Gibbons dealt with the positive commerce power-the situation where
Congress has acted by legislating on a subject. The negative implications of
the commerce clause, where congressional power is dormant, present more
difficult questions regarding state regulatory power.
Wi/llson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 17 marked the beginning of Supreme
Court pronouncements on the dormant commerce power. In Willson, the
Delaware Legislature authorized construction of a dam across navigable
water in the absence of congressional action forbidding such construction.
The Delaware Act clearly did not violate the positive force of the commerce
clause; moreover, the Court found no reason to consider it repugnant to the
dormant commerce power.18 In upholding the Act, the Court nevertheless
indicated there might be a limit to a state's commerce power even when
Congress had not acted.' 9
The case most often credited 20 with delineating the negative implica-
tions of the commerce clause is Cooley v. Board of Wardens. 21 A Pennsylvania
pilot regulation, which did not conflict with any federal regulation, was up-
held in Cooley. The Court reasoned that although state regulation of com-
merce was not expressly excluded by the commerce clause, it would not be
allowed where the subject was national in nature and required uniform
treatment.2 2 Finding that regulation of ship pilots was not a subject of na-
tional concern, the Court allowed the Pennsylvania law to stand.
2 3
The first case to use the negative implication of the commerce clause to
invalidate a state regulation was Wabash, St. Louis, & Paczfc Railway Co. v.
Ilhinois.24 The issue in Wabash was whether Illinois could regulate interstate
railroad rates by requiring lower rates for short distance intrastate hauls
than for long distance interstate hauls.2 5 The Court found interstate rate
15. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
16. Id. at 210. For a more comprehensive discussion of this case, see P. BENSON, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-1970, at 9-25 (1970).
17. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
18. Id. at 252. Construction of the dam was calculated to enhance property values and
protect the public health. Id. at 250.
19. Id. at 252.
20. See, e.g., B. GAvrr, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
7 n.13 (1932); Phillips, supra note 14, at 522.
21. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
22. Id. at 319.
23. Id. at 318-21. For a later case further developing the extent of the state power to
regulate commerce, see Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
24. 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
25. Id. at 561.
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regulation to be a subject of national concern that could only be addressed
by Congress. 26 Following Wabash a line of cases invalidated state commerce
regulation in areas where no federal legislation existed.
2 7
Decisions based on the negative power of the commerce clause present a
problem because they do not follow a clearly predictable pattern. 28 In 1946,
Justice Rutledge aptly described the nature and scope of the negative func-
tion of the commerce clause:
It is not the simple, clean-cutting tool supposed. Nor is its swath
always correlative with that cut by the affirmative edge, as seems to
be assumed. For clearly as the commerce clause has worked affirm-
atively on the whole, its implied negative operation on state power
has been uneven, at times highly variable. . . . [T]he business of
negative implication is slippery.
29
The varying results in dormant commerce clause cases may be attrib-
uted to the Court's use of several different standards. Over the years, the
Court has tested indirect versus direct burdens on commerce,30 balanced
state police power needs against the need for free commerce among the
states,31 evaluated the reasonableness of restrictions, 32 and determined
whether nondiscriminatory alternatives were available. 33 The variety of
analyses makes early decisions less useful precedent than more recent com-
merce clause pronouncements.
The modern test for determining the validity of a state statute affecting
interstate commerce was enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 34 The plain-
tiffs in Pike challenged the constitutionality of an Arizona statute requiring
all Arizona cantaloupes to be packaged in the state prior to export.3 5 Writ-
ing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stewart stated that unless the burden on
commerce was clearly excessive, a statute regulating evenhandedly to further
a legitimate local public interest, with only incidental'effects on interstate
commerce, would be upheld. 36 A close inspection of what has become the
26. Id. at 577.
27. See geerall, B. GAvIT,supra note 20, at 250-52 (a collection of pre-1932 cases invalidat-
ing state regulation under the dormant commerce clause).
28. An attempt to categorize and reconcile all the dormant commerce clause cases would
be an immense, if not impossible, task and is beyond the scope of this paper.
29. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 418 (1946).
30. E.g. , Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927) (state licensing statute directly inter-
fered with interstate commerce and was therefore invalid).
31. E~g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rt. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (safety benefit
of train length law did not outweigh federal interest in unburdened interstate commerce).
32. Eg., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)
(regulation of truck weight and size was reasonable based on evidence; therefore, legislature's
wisdom was not to be questioned by Court).
33. Eg., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (discriminatory milk
regulation invalid since reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives were available).
34. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
35. 1d. at 138.
36. Id. at 142. The following explanation by Justice Stewart has become known as the Pike
test:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public inter-
est, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course de-
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general rule for determining the validity of state commerce regulation,
reveals that it is a combination of tests previously used by the Court.
Most of the negative commerce clause decisions since Pike have been
based on this test. Two cases held the state's interest was sufficient to uphold
the regulation. 37 Four cases invalidated state requirements for failing to fur-
ther legitimate local interests. 38 Two other cases struck down statutes using
the Pike test in addition to invoking the strict scrutiny test reserved forprima
facze discriminatory statutes. 39 The only exceptions to analysis under the
Pike test have been three special cases where the state was a market partici-
pant rather than a market regulator.4° In the absence of a congressional
mandate, the state acting as a market participant is not prohibited from
favoring its own citizens.
41
In summary, a state has a residuum of power to regulate matters of local
concern that affect interstate commerce. The scope of state regulation al-
lowed depends on the particular state concern and whether the local benefit
outweighs the federal interest in unrestricted interstate commerce.
B. Natural Resource Export/Import Restrictons Under the Dormant Commerce
Clause
In the specific area of natural resource export/import restrictions, most
state regulation has been held invalid. 42 Both facially discriminatory ex-
port/import restrictions43 and regulations invalid as applied 44 have been
pend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id.
37. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (state's waste manage-
ment interest sufficient to support plastic container ban); Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (state's game preservation interest sufficient to support hunting
license fee differential).
38. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (Iowa's truck length
statute invalid as a burden on interstate commerce considering the state's questionable safety
interest); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (state's interest in less than
55 foot trucks had only speculative relationship to safety); Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (apple grading regulation invalid burden on inter-
state commerce); Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (reciprocity barrier
to milk imports furthered no legitimate interest).
39. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (absolute barrier to minnow export
facially discriminatory) (see itna notes 47-54 and accompanying text); City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (prohibition on imported waste facially discriminatory).
40. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983) (city
could limit employment to city residents for a city funded construction project). Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (state owned cement plant and therefore could sell its product free of
commerce clause considerations); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (state
recycling bounty favoring citizens valid because state entered market as a participant).
41. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976)).
42. An exception is Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908). The
Court in Hudson upheld a water anti-export statute, designed to protect the health of the citi-
zens, as a legitimate exercise of state police power. Id. at 356-57.
43. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); City of Altus v. Carr, 385 U.S. 35 (per
curiam), affg 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553
(1923) (West Virginia not allowed to retain all natural gas for local use); West v. Kansas Natu-
ral Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (Oklahoma cannot prevent export of natural gas).
44. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (waste anti-import statute
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struck down. Writers have suggested that state ownership of resources vali-
dates otherwise questionable regulation of commerce. 4 5 While possibly valid
at one time, the state ownership theory has been discredited repeatedly.
46
In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 47 a recent example of an absolute restriction on
export, Oklahoma attempted to prevent the export of minnows procured
from the natural waters of the state.48  Oklahoma relied on an earlier
Supreme Court case, Geer v. Connecticut,49 which had validated a statute
prohibiting the export of lawfully killed game birds. The theory in Geer was
that the birds were owned by the state and the state, therefore, could make
any regulations concerning the birds free of negative commerce clause impli-
cations.5° The Court in Hughes rejected the outmoded legal fiction of state
ownership, overruled Geer, 5 1 and analyzed the minnow export restrictions
using the Pike criteria. 52 In addition, the Court announced that facially dis-
criminatory legislation would be strictly scrutinized. 53 The Oklahoma regu-
lation was held to be invalid as unjustified discrimination against interstate
commerce.
54
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 55 is an illustration of an export restriction found
invalid as applied. Arizona, by requiring all cantaloupes grown in-state to
be packaged in Arizona, was enhancing the reputation of local cantaloupe
growers and providing jobs for local citizens at the expense of an interstate
packaging corporation. 56 Although the state's interest may have been legiti-
mate, the regulation as applied imposed an unjustifiable burden on inter-
state commerce and therefore was held unconstitutional.
5 7
Theoretically, the negative implications of the commerce clause do not
preclude state regulation. It is conceivable under Pike that a state may re-
strict the export or import of natural resources so long as the statute is tai-
lored narrowly and designed to effect a legitimate local interest. In practice,
however, no case since Hudson58 has upheld a state commerce regulation in
invalid as simple economic protectionism); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (apple grading regulation invalid since purpose was economic
protection); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (intrastate packaging requirements for shrimp invalid because
designed to favor Louisiana manufacturers).
45. E.g., Hellerstein, supra note 2, at 71-92.
46. See generally Note, Interstate Transfer of Water: The Western Challenge to the Commerce Clause,
59 TFx. L. REV. 1249, 1259-67 (1981) (recites general history of the common ownership theory).
47. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
48. Id. at 323. For a thorough discussion of this case, see Hellerstein, supra note 2, at 119.
49. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
50. 161 U.S. at 529-32.
51. 441 U.S. at 322-35.
52. Id. at 336-38. The Court found the restriction facially discriminatory. A legitimate
local interest existed in conservation and protection of wild animals but could have been ful-
filled more effectively by nondiscriminatory alternatives. Id.
53. Id. at 337. "At a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of
any purported legitimate local purpose. Id.
54. Id. at 338.
55. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The Court set forth the modern test of validity under the com-
merce clause in this case. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
56. 397 U.S. at 142-43.
57. Id. at 143-46. See supra note 36.
58. 209 U.S. 349 (1908). See supra note 42.
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natural resources. Although the Court articulated a standard in Pike for
permissible state regulation, it is possible that state natural resource im-
port/export restrictions will not be tolerated.
C. Congressional Permission
State restrictions on commerce may be validated by explicit congres-
sional permission because the Constitution vests the commerce power in
Congress. 59 An early illustration of the effect of explicit congressional per-
mission is Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (II).60 When the case
was first before the Court, Pennsylvania asked for an order requiring that a
bridge authorized by Virginia be raised because it obstructed free passage of
ships on the Ohio River.6 1 The Supreme Court agreed that the bridge ob-
structed commerce and ordered that it be elevated. 62 Congress, however,
passed a statute authorizing the bridge in its original position. 6
3 On a sec-
ond hearing, the Court held the federal statute valid based on Congress ple-
nary power over commerce.
64
A more recent example of express authorization of state regulation af-
fecting interstate commerce exists in the insurance industry. Under the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act,6 5 Congress removed all commerce clause limitations
on state authority to regulate and tax the insurance industry. Cases inter-
preting this statute have ruled that express congressional permission of state
regulation admits of no exceptions.
66
Congressional deference is not to be confused with congressional permis-
sion. The fallacy of the assumption that congressional deference validates
state commerce regulations is apparent in two recent cases. Lewis v. BT In-
vestment Managers67 involved the Bank Holding Company Act,
68 and New
England Power Co. v. New Hlampshi're
69 addressed the Federal Power Act.
70
Both cases held that for local legislation to be immune from a commerce
clause attack, Congress must expressly state its intention that the local legis-
lation be sustained.
71
Although there has been no explicit congressional permission for state
export/import water regulation, local control is a reasonable possibility.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. I and 3.
60. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856).
61. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (1), 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852).
62. Id. at 626-27.
63. Act of Aug. 31, 1852, ch. III, §§ 6-7, 10 Stat. 112.
64. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (II), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 435-36
(1855).
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 10 11-1015 (1976).
66. Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981); Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
67. 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
68. 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976 & Supp. V
1981)).
69. 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
70. 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-821c (1976 & Supp. V
1981)).
71. BTInv. Managers, 447 U.S. at 49; New England Power, 455 U.S. at 331.
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Currently, two coal slurry pipeline bills are pending before Congress. 72 If
enacted, these bills will enable states to restrict commerce in water used for
coal slurry purposes.
IV. SPORHASE V NEBRASKA Ex REL. DOUGLAS
The Nebraska Supreme Court reasoned in Sporhase that a product must
be an article of commerce to be governed by the commerce clause. 73 The
court defined an article of commerce as a commodity capable of being re-
duced to private possession and exchanged for value. 74 Nebraska ground
water, according to the court, had never been considered a freely transfera-
ble market item and therefore could not be subject to the Constitution's
commerce clause restrictions.
75
In a two-step analysis, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Nebraska court's decision. First, the Court rejected the contention that
ground water is not an article of commerce and therefore not subject to the
negative impact of the commerce clause. 76 Next, using the Pike test, the
Court examined the water-export statute for validity under the commerce
clause.
77
The Court ruled that ground water is an article of commerce, but cited
no direct precedent. Instead, the Court seemed to reach its conclusion by
deductive reasoning. Ground water shortages are a national problem; Con-
gress has power to deal with national problems under the commerce power;
therefore, ground water must be an article of commerce. 78 The Court fur-
ther reasoned that the affirmative commerce power of Congress could never
be utilized to correct the problem of ground water overdraft unless such
water was considered an article of commerce.
79
Using the Pike test, the Court examined the constitutionality of the Ne-
braska statute.80 The Nebraska law8 ' required that four conditions be met
prior to granting approval to export ground water. The export had to be:
reasonable, consistent with conservation, not detrimental to public welfare,
72. Coal Pipeline Act of 1983, H.R. 1010, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. Coal Distribution and
Utilization Act of 1983, S. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. The explicit language authorizing state
authority, § 206(b) of the Coal Pipeline Act of 1983, H.R. 1010, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., is:
Pursuant to the commerce clause in article I, section 8, of the United States Con-
stitution, the Congress declares that the establishment and exercise of terms or condi-
tions (including terms or conditions terminating use on permits or authorizations) for
the reservation, appropriation, use, or diversion of water for a coal pipeline for which a
certification has been made under section 208 shall be determined pursuant to State
law notwithstanding any transport, use or disposal of such water in interstate
commerce.
Section 5(b) of the Coal Distribution and Utilization Act of 1983, S. 267, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.
contains nearly identical provisions.
73. 208 Neb. at 705, 305 N.W.2d at 616.
74. Id. at 705, 305 N.W.2d at 616.
75. Id. at 705-09, 305 N.W.2d at 616-19.
76. 102 S. Ct. at 3458-63.
77. Id. at 3463-65. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
78. 102 S. Ct. at 3462-63.
79. Id. at 3463.
80. Id. at 3463-65.
81. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978). See supra note 7.
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and to a state granting reciprocal rights to export ground water. Under Pike,
the Court held the first three requirements were facially valid restrictions on
interstate commerce; the state interest in conserving a vital resource is legiti-
mate under the police power.8 2 Although the public ownership theory does
not prevent the application of commerce clause restrictions, the public own-
ership nature of western water played a part in the Court's examination of
the local interest and in the Court's justification of the first three export
restrictions.
8 3
The fourth statutory element, reciprocity, was found to be an explicit
barrier to interstate commerce8 4 and therefore triggered the strict scrutiny
test of Hughes o. Oklahoma.a5 The Supreme Court found no evidence estab-
lishing a close means-end relationship between the reciprocity requirement
and conservation of ground water.8 6 Nebraska's requirement did not meet
the minimum Pike standard of effecting a legitimate local public purpose
and therefore was held to be an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.
8 7
Nebraska asserted that the history of congressional deference to state
water law protected its statute from commerce clause restrictions.88 Specifi-
cally, Nebraska referred to thirty-seven federal statutes 9 containing lan-
guage deferential to state water laws.9° The Court ruled this language was
not evidence Congress intended to remove commerce clause restrictions on
state water law, but was only indicative of the specific federal legislation's
preemptive power.9 ' Moreover, under New England Power Co. v. New Hamp-
shire,92 congressional permission must be expressly stated to protect local leg-
islation from a commerce clause attack. With ground water anti-export
statutes there has been no explicit congressional permission to burden inter-
state commerce.
93
82. 102 S. Ct. at 3464-65. See generally Brief of the National Agricultural Lands Center and
Kansas City Southern Industries as Amictus Curiae, Sporhase (in-depth discussion of the vital na-
ture of the ground water resource).
83. 102 S. Ct. at 3463. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
84. 102 S. Ct. at 3465.
85. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). Strict scrutiny is applicable when legislation is facially discrimi-
natory. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
86. 102 S. Ct. at 3465.
87. Id.
88. Appellee's Brief at 22-27, Sporhase.
89. See Federal-State Water Rights: Hearings on S 1275 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and
Reclamation of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 302-10 (1964)
(contains abstracts of the relevant sections of the 37 statutes).
90. The Reclamation Act of 1902, § 8, 32 Stat. 388, 390 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 383
(1976)), is one example of the language referred to by the state. "[Niothing in this Act shall be
construed as affecting or intended to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of any State or
Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation."
91. 102 S. Ct. at 3465-66. The Court also may have been influenced by the fact that all 37
statutes involved surface water.
92. 455 U.S. 331 (1982). See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
93. Nebraska devoted a considerable portion of its brief to the argument of congressional
permission for all state regulations of water allocation. Appellee's Brief at 22-27, Sporhase. Amz
cus curiae briefs of New Mexico, California, Colorado, Wyoming, Kansas, South Dakota, Mis-
souri, Nevada, North Dakota, and Utah were in accord. The Court did not find this argument
convincing. 102 S. Ct. at 3465-66. This portion of the decision appears to be correct consider-
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Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by Justice O'Connor, questioned
the basis of the majority decision. 94 The majority tested the statute's valid-
ity by considering whether Congress has authority to regulate interstate
commerce in ground water.9 5 The dissent emphasized that congressional
authority and state authority require distinct analyses because the affirma-
tive implications of the commerce clause extend further than the negative
implications.96 The article of commerce analysis, according to Justice Rehn-
quist, was wholly unnecessary to a decision on the validity of the Nebraska
law.9 7 Arguably, Congress could regulate ground water overdraft even if
ground water was not an article of commerce by showing that overdraft sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce.98
The dissent's approval of the Nebraska statute was based on the tradi-
tional authority of the states in matters of water regulation. 99 Although the
dissent criticized the majority's article of commerce analysis, Justice Rehn-
quist summarized his objections by stating that Nebraska ground water can-
not be an article of commerce for purposes of the negative impact of the
commerce clause. He reasoned that because Nebraska only recognizes a lim-
ited usufructory interest in ground water, there can be no commerce in
water.l°0 Justice Rehnquist categorized the Nebraska regulation in question
as merely another of the many western water use regulations. t0
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court decision in Sporhase is generally consistent with the
majority of commerce clause cases. 102 Under strict commerce clause analy-
sis, the Sporhase result was predictable.
The Court's reasoning, however, was flawed. As suggested by the dis-
sent, the holding that water is an article of commerce was unnecessary
10 3
and unfortunate because the transfer of water was not the issue. Sporhase
attempted to transfer a water nght, and that should have been the focus of
the analysis.
A water right is a limited property interest defined by state law,
10 4
which allows the owner to use a certain amount of water in a particular
ing that deference must be expressly stated to be valid. For an exhaustive treatment of the
complex topic of federal-state water relations, see generally F. Trelease, supra note 2.
94. 102 S. Ct. at 3467-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 3467.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3467-68.
98. Set United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941). "The power of Congress over
interstate commerce . . . extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate com-
merce . . . as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate
end .. " Id.
99. 102 S. Ct. at 3467-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 3469.
101. Id. at 3468-69.
102. See supra note 4, and accompanying text.
103. 102 S. Ct. at 3467-68.
104. States have traditionally been responsible for defining property rights. See California
Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935) (affirmation of state's
right to choose system for defining property rights).
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manner on specified lands. Under Nebraska law, the owner of a water right
owns only the right to use a limited quantity of ground water on the land
from which it is drawn.' 05 There is no property interest that allows him
unilaterally to transfer the right.' 06
The Court's focus on water rather than on a water right oversimplified
the issue. By referring to water as an article of commerce, the Court implied
that specified water molecules could somehow be owned. The concept of
water as a tangible item of commerce, similar to other natural resources, is
inaccurate.
Natural gas is appropriately considered an article of commerce; it is a
commodity that can be wholly owned, transferred, and destroyed. 10 7 The
owner's property interest is not defined in terms of the rights of other owners
of natural gas, and the natural gas can be used without redefining the other
owners' property interests. 108
In contrast, water is not owned.' 0 9 The property interest in water is an
intangible right, described as an incorporeal hereditament, which is attached
to the tangible substance-water.' " The right is owned, but specific identi-
fiable water is not. I Each individual water right is defined in terms of the
rights of all other water users in the state system.' 12 The interrelated nature
of the right prevents an appropriator from unrestricted transfer or change;
such actions would affect the rights of all other water right holders.'' 3 Only
by redefining his water right can an appropriator transfer the right or
change the place or manner of use of the water. Some states, such as Ne-
braska, do not recognize the right of a general appropriator to sever water
from the land. 1 4 The distinction between the tangible substance, water,
105. See generally Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law and Admhnistration, 59 NEB. L. REV. 917
(1980) (overview of Nebraska ground water law); Harnsberger, Nebraska Ground Water Problems,
42 NEB. L. REV. 721 (1963) (general hydrologic and legal overview of Nebraska's ground water
system).
106. Sporhase, 208 Neb. at 707, 305 N.W.2d at 617.
107. See generally I H. WILLIAMS and C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw § 201, at 17-18 (1981).
108. Another distinction between water and natural gas, which helps explain their different
treatment under the law, is that water is a renewable resource and natural gas is not. The
specified water molecules are not destroyed by use, but instead become the object of the next
appropriator's water right. This physical fact makes it imperative that any definition of a prop-
erty right in water consider every other appropriator's rights in that same water.
109. For a discussion of the nature of property rights in water see generally S. CIRIACY-
WANTRUP, W. HUTCHINS, C. MARTZ, S. SATO, A. STONE, I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 53.1, at 344-49 (1967).
110. The tangible/intangible distinction was probably best articulated in Hammond v.
Johnson, 94 Utah 35, 40, 75 P.2d 164, 170 (1937). Justice Wolfe, in his dissent, pointed out that
a water right does not have all the attributes of real property and therefore cannot automati-
cally be subject to legal doctrines that apply to tangible items capable of being possessed. The
majority in Sporhase automatically identified water as a commodity without noting its different
characteristics.
111. 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 137-38,
442-43 (1971).
112. The appropriative right is measured by beneficial use and absence of harm to other
appropriators. 1d. at 491-516, 569-83; S. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, W. HlrrCHINS, C. MARTZ, S.
SATO, A. STORE, supra note 109, § 51.7 at 296-98.
113. S. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, W. HUTCHINS, C. MARTZ, S. SATO, A. STONE, supra note 109,
§ 53.4 at 357. Se generally I W. HUTCHINS, supra note 11, at 623-44.
114. SeSporhase, 208 Neb. at 709, 305 N.W.2d at 617-18.
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and the intangible property interest in water must be made to appreciate the
consequences of Sporhase.
Each state plays an important role in defining, administering, and pro-
tecting its system of water rights. By interstate compacts1 15 and by equita-
ble apportionment decrees' 16 a state is allocated an equitable share of water
which it must further allocate by a system of rights to users in the state. Had
the Court identified the interest being transferred as a water right rather
than water, a more convincing connection between the reciprocity require-
ment and the state's interest in conservation might have been found. The
reciprocity requirement could be a legitimate means of ensuring that a state
receives its equitable share of the limited interstate water allocation. The
burden on interstate commerce would not be excessive because each state
would retain its equitable, allocated share of water; individuals would not be
allowed 'to reapportion and thereby redefine the right to use this valuable,
life giving resource.
Although the dissent appeared to appreciate the meaning of a water
right and the theory of equitable apportionment, Justice Rehnquist did not
link the two ideas to justify the reciprocity requirement. Recognition of the
two theories led Justice Rehnquist to conclude that a state may regulate a
natural resource so as to protect it from the negative impact of the commerce
clause. 117 This assertion is not valid under prior commerce clause deci-
sions.11 3 Justice Rehnquist would have had more success upholding the Ne-
braska statute by arguing within the confines of the accepted Pike
analysis. "19
The premise that water itself was the commodity being transferred, and
that water is an article of commerce, triggered a commerce clause analysis of
the Nebraska statute. The statute, however, would not necessarily have been
invalid under the Pike test if the connection between a reciprocity require-
ment and the true nature of the interest being transferred had been
considered.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sporhase decision leaves questions unanswered and emphasizes the
need for a federal ground water policy. The extent to which state water
policies will be affected is unclear, and whether Congress will define bounds
for permissible state regulation remains to be seen.
115. For an in-depth discussion of interstate water compacts, see generally J. Muys, Inter-
state Water Compacts (Nat'l Water Comm'n Legal Study No. 14, 1971).
116. Equitable apportionment is the basis for allocating interstate benefits among affected
states. See generally Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Although no court has considered
apportionment of an interstate ground water aquifer, it is reasonable to assume that such an
allocation would follow the equitable apportionment doctrine of Kansas v. Colorado.
117. 102 S. Ct. at 3468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118. The accepted Ake analysis does not provide for absolute state authority over natural
resources unless its criteria are met. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. This assertion assumes Pite is the standard
for measuring state export/import restrictions. If in practice courts will not tolerate state re-
strictions on import or export of natural resources, the state interest in a system of water right
allocation and conservation is irrelevant.
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Congressional response, however, is imperative. States must have spe-
cific information regarding their regulatory power so that the long-range
planning necessary to effective water allocation procedures can be imple-
mented. 120  Theoretically, if narrowly drawn and sufficiently supported,
state anti-export statutes could be valid after Sporhase. 12 ' The opinion, how-
ever, does not indicate how narrowly regulations must be drawn nor how
much evidence must be presented to ensure that such regulations will be
upheld.' 2 2 The complex and vital nature of state water resource policies
requires extensive planning; case-by-case legal determinations will not suf-
fice. Congress must either expressly recognize state authority or formulate a
federally administered conservation program.
In the proposed Coal Pipeline Act of 1983123 or the Coal Distribution
and Utilization Act of 1983,124 Congress may affirm exclusive state authority
over the control of water for slurry export purposes. These bills would not
totally resolve the issue of state versus federal control of ground water, and,
rather than permitting state control of water only in the context of coal
slurry uses, it would clearly be preferable for Congress to formulate a com-
prehensive ground water policy.
Whether state control is affirmed or a federal plan established, it is criti-
cal that a policy be formulated. Ground water is vital to social and eco-
nomic development and without predictable conservation guidelines this
slowly renewable resource will be lost.
Jolene .4f. Crane
120. Fourteen states have statutes regulating water export, see Brief of National Agricultural
Lands Center and Kansas City Southern Industries as Amtus Curzae at 16, Sporhase.
121. Overcoming commerce clause objections, however, will not necessarily ensure a stat-
ute's validity. Due process and equal protection issues may also have to be addressed.
122. An appeal from the trial court of a commerce clause case involving a New Mexico anti-
export statute may provide additional guidance for permissible state regulation. City of El Paso
v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (1983) (although New Mexico had a legitimate interest in its
attempts to conserve ground water, the interest was not sufficient to support a total ban on
interstate ground water transportation).
123. H.R. 1010, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
124. S. 267, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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ANTITRUST LAW IN COLORADO: BACK ON TRACK
INTRODUCTION
To many lay persons, the term "antitrust" conjures up thoughts of huge
corporations and elite corporate lawyers. To many lawyers, antitrust re-
mains a distant and esoteric area of the law.I While both of these viewpoints
are justified to a certain extent, they are also restrictively narrow, for anti-
trust law is indeed a broader and more pervasive subject. Most businessmen
will, at some time, encounter an antitrust problem.2 In fact, most of the
people who violate the antitrust laws are small businessmen or local field
executives of larger corporations. 3 The subject case, People v. North Avenue
Furniture and Appliance, Inc. ,4 exemplifies this wider notion of antitrust law.
North Avenue is a price-fixing case involving small businessmen in Grand
Junction, Colorado. The decision appears destined to assume an important
bench-mark status in Colorado's antitrust law for three reasons. First, North
Avenue is the Colorado Supreme Court's initial construction of the state's
modern antitrust statute.5 Second, state antitrust enforcement has increased
dramatically in recent years, both in Colorado and across the nation.6 North
Avenue, as the sole source of state judicial precedent, will naturally be a guid-
ing force for this increased antitrust activity in Colorado. Finally, although
the holding in North Avenue is necessarily narrow, the reasoning employed to
reach that holding appears to be broadly applicable to future cases constru-
ing Colorado's antitrust statute.
This comment begins with a historical overview of Colorado's scant and
unsettled7 antitrust law. This background helps prepare for a discussion of
the North Avenue decision and an analysis of its major issues. The comment
concludes by outlining some of the possible ramifications of this important
case.
I. BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST LAW IN COLORADO
Colorado originally recognized a cause of action under the common law
doctrine of "restraint of trade."8 The legislature enacted this doctrine into
the first antitrust statute in 1913.9 After some brisk application in the early
1. Ducker, Antitrust and the Lay Lawyer, 44 DEN. L.J. 558, 558 (1967).
2. Id.
3. Prce Firing. Crackdown Underway, Bus. WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 34, Col. 1.
4. 645 P.2d 1291 (Colo. 1982).
5. Id. at 1294. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-4-101 to -108 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
6. Burke & Walters, Antitrust Enforcement in Colorado: New Directions, New Concerns, 6 COLO.
LAW. 1, 1 (1977). See generally Rah1, State Antitrust Symposium, 4 J. CORP. L. 475 (1979).
7. Note, Colorado Antitrust Law Untiedand i)rifing, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 215, 215, 231
(1977).
8. See Denver Jobbers Ass'n v. People ex ret. Dickson, 21 Colo. App. 326, 122 P. 404
(1912). For general background information on Colorado antitrust law, see generally North Ave-
nue, 645 P.2d at 1294; Burke & Walters, supra note 6, at 6-7; Ducker, supra note 1, at 560-62;
Note, supra note 7, at 215.
9. 1913 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 161, § 1.
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1920's,t ° the statute was declared unconstitutionally vague by the United
States Supreme Court in 1927.11 This ruling resulted in a thirty-year hiatus
in the state's antitrust law, 12 which lasted until the present statute's enact-
ment in 1957.13
When drafting the state's modern antitrust statute, 1 4 the Colorado legis-
lature used Wisconsin's antitrust statute 15 as a prototype. Wisconsin had
based its statute on applicable sections of the federal antitrust statutes,
16
namely the Sherman Act of 189017 and the Clayton Act of 1914.18
Although case law construing the federal antitrust statutes abounds,' 9
the modern Colorado antitrust statute did not receive a substantive judicial
interpretation until 1975, eighteen years after its enactment. 20 This inter-
pretation came from a federal court in the case of Q-TMarkets, Inc. v. Fleming
Companzes, Inc. 21 Although Q-T Markets did not address the same antitrust
issues as North Avenue, 22 the method of analysis employed by the Q-TMarkets
court became extremely significant in deciding North Avenue and, therefore
merits a brief discussion.
10. Se People v. Apostolos, 73 Colo. 71, 213 P. 331 (1923) (1913 antitrust statute applied
to shoe industry); Johnson v. People, 72 Colo. 218, 210 P. 843 (1922) (statute applied to price
fixing in electrical contracting business); Campbell v. People, 72 Colo. 213, 210 P. 841 (1922)
(statute applied to restraint of plumbing and gas fitting business).
11. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
12. Note, supra note 7, at 215.
13. Colorado Antitrust Act, 1957 Colo. Sess. Laws 369 (originally codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 55-4-1 to -9 (1958)). The antitrust statute is currently codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 6-4-101 to -108 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (Restraint of Trade and Commerce). Colo-
rado has promulgated other statutes designed to prevent anti-competitive practices: COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-101 to -114 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (Consumer Protection Act) and COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 6-2-101 to -117 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (Unfair Practices Act). Two other provi-
sions were repealed in 1975: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-3-101 to -106 (1973) (Fair Trade Act) and
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-5-101 to -114 (1973) (Unfair Cigarette Sales Act).
14. The North Aoenue court cited the affidavit of David J. Clark, the drafter of the antitrust
bill, which states in pertinent part:
I decided that the antitrust statute enacted in Wisconsin. . . provided the best model.
I then drafted the bill which was subsequently enacted as Senate Bill No. 200 using
the Wisconsin statute as a model. . . . In drafting this legislation it was my intent to
follow the substantive provisions of the Wisconsin statute so that any court decision
interpreting the Wisconsin statute could be cited by Colorado courts.
People v. North Ave. Furniture & Appliance, Inc., 645 P.2d at 1294, n.4.
15. WIS. STAT. § 133.01 (1939) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 133.03 (1980)).
16. See Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604, 147 N.W. 1058
(1914),cert. denited, 249 U.S. 610 (1919) (Wisconsin Supreme Court held that its antitrust statute
was to mean the same thing as the federal statute).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
19. Note, supra note 7, at 225-26.
20. Id. at 215. North Avenue is the only decision by the Colorado Supreme Court construing
the state's antitrust statute, and only three cases even mentioning the Colorado antitrust statute
have ever reached the Colorado Court of Appeals. None of the three cases was decided on a
substantive application of the antitrust statute. See National Cigarette Serv. Co. v. Farr, 42
Colo. App. 356, 594 P.2d 603 (1979); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Sullivan, 534 P.2d 1226 (Colo. App.
1975) (not selected for official publication); People cx rel. Kinsey v. Sumner, 34 Colo. App. 61,
525 P.2d 512 (1974). See also Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, North Ave. Furniture & Appli-
ance, Inc., 645 P.2d 1291 (Colo. 1982).
21. 394 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1975).
22. Q-T Markets dealt with the application of the restraint of trade provision of the Colo-
rado Antitrust Act to tying agreements and exclusive dealing contracts.
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A. The Q-T Markets Case
The plaintiff in Q-T Markets asserted both federal and state antitrust
claims against the defendant. 23 The federal claims alleged an illegal tying
arrangement, 24 in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 25 and an exclu-
sive dealing contract, 26 in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act. 27 More
importantly for present purposes, the plaintiff also alleged a violation of Col-
orado's Antitrust Act.28 The federal court entertained the state claim under
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,29 whereby the federal court construes
state law in accordance with available state interpretations. 30 Because no
Colorado case law construing the antitrust statute existed, the federal court
interpreted the state statute as a matter of first impression.
3'
In its interpretation of section 6-4-101,32 the federal court seized upon
slight differences 33 in language between the Colorado statute and the Sher-
man Act. The court concluded that "[b]ecause of those differences it would
be unwarranted to assume that the Colorado legislature intended to adopt
the case law interpreting the Federal statutes." 34 The court therefore strictly
construed the Colorado statute in accordance with the literal meaning of
the language used by the legislature. 35 The court's holding has had an
ironic result: while Colorado's Little Sherman Act was drafted so as to track
the federal Sherman Act,36 the effect of Q-TMarkets was to disregard the
entire body of federal case law construing the Sherman Act. The Q-TMar-
kets decision made Colorado a minority of one3 7 by construing its antitrust
law independently of federal law. Courts and commentators have, without
exception, questioned or criticized this holding, arguing instead that federal
precedent should furnish a guide to interpreting Colorado's antitrust stat-
23. 394 F. Supp. at 1105.
24. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) where an illegal
tying arrangement was defined as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he
will not purchase that product from any other supplier."
25. 394 F. Supp. at 1107.
26. See 3 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 11.03 (1982),
defining an exclusive dealing contract as one where "the buyer is precluded from purchasing a
particular commodity from anyone but the seller; in other words, the sales are conditioned on
the agreement that no competing lines will be carried."
27. 394 F. Supp. at 1109.
28. Id. at 1105.
29. See Chatanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). See also Ro-
mero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
30. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
31. 394 F. Supp. at 1106.
32. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-101 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
33. The court found the significant difference between the two statutes to be that section 1
of the Sherman Act makes illegal "every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 and Supp. V 1981) (emphasis
added). The Colorado statute omits the words "or otherwise." 394 F. Supp. at 1106.
34. 394 F. Supp. at 1106.
35. Id.
36. 645 P.2d at 1294.
37. But cf. Note, State Anti-Merger Policy: Divesting the Federal Government of Exclusive Regula-
tion, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 531, 564 n.189 (1981) (speculating that Louisiana may also construe
its antitrust statute independently of federal precedent).
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ute.38 Q-T Markets, however, remained the only reported construction of the
statute until 1982 when People v. North Avenue Furniture and Apphance, Inc., pro-
vided an opportunity to challenge the Q-T Markets decision.
II. PEOPLE V. NORTH A VENUE FURNITURE
A. Facts
Adam Smith once said that "[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance to raise prices."
'39
While that statement may be somewhat conclusory, it nonetheless applies to
the circumstances of People v. North Avenue Furniture.
In Grand Junction, Colorado, the locus of the instant controversy, the
larger retail carpet stores subcontract their installation work to independent
carpet installers. As part of the total purchase price, retailers quote carpet
installation rates to their customers from a published price list. 40 In early
1980, the defendants, who were all either sellers or installers of carpeting,
met to discuss the possibility of increasing the established price for carpet
installation. The defendants reached an initial agreement on a fixed price
increase for installation services.4 1 The increase was then proposed for ap-
proval to twenty-five other independent carpet installers in the area, who
later became unindicted co-conspirators. 4 2 This group also approved the in-
crease, and the installers and retailers agreed to abide by the newly estab-
lished prices effective March 1, 1980.
The Attorney General's office received an anonymous complaint re-
garding the price-fixing arrangement and initiated a grand jury investiga-
tion. 43 This resulted in the return of an indictment charging price-fixing
violations under the Colorado Antitrust Act in May of 1980.
4 4
The district court dismissed the indictments in November of 1980 after
finding the defendant's activity was protected by the statutory labor exemp-
tion to the antitrust statute.4 5 Disagreeing with the lower court's construc-
tion of the labor exemption, the Attorney General filed a notice of appeal to
38. North Avenue, 645 P.2d at 1293, n.3 ("We therefore reject the contrary assumption im-
plicit in Q-TMarkets.'); Kelly v. Blue Cross, 1979-1 Trade Cases (CCH), 62,646 at 77,651
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1979) ("The Court is not persuaded by Defendant's [citation of the Q-TMarkets
case]."); Burke & Walters, supra note 6, at 7 ("Whether or not the Colorado courts will follow
this . . . [Q-T Markets] analysis remains to be seen. Some hint of rejection can be found
.... .); Note, supra note 7, at 229-30 ("The Q-TMarkets opinion abrogates the pervasive intent
of state legislatures to look to federal law and landmark cases in construing their own laws.").
39. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (1st Modern Library ed. 1937), quoted by
Ducker, supra note 1, at 577.
40. 645 P.2d at 1292.
41. Id.
42. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, People v. North Ave. Furniture, 645 P.2d 1291 (Colo.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Opening Brief].
43. 645 P.2d at 1293.
44. Id.
45. Id. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-4-103(2) (1973), which states that "[t]he labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."
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the Colorado Supreme Court.
4 6
B. The Issues and Decisions
In North Avenue the Colorado Supreme Court confronted the state anti-
trust statute on first impression. 47 The principal issue of the case concerned
the construction of the statutory labor exemption.48 Before considering
whether the case qualified for the exemption, however, the court had to de-
cide whether Colorado's antitrust statute even applied to North Avenue.
49
1. The "Trade or Commerce" Issue
The illegal restraint of trade provision of the Colorado Antitrust Act
provides in part that "[e]very contract or combination in the nature of a
trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is declared illegal . . . 50
The preliminary issue, then, was whether carpet installation, generally con-
sidered a service, was also "trade or commerce" within the scope of the anti-
trust statute.5 1 If carpet installation was not a trade under the purview of
section 6-4-101, then the antitrust statute would not apply, and construction
of the labor exemption issue would have been unnecessary.
2. The Decision
The court held that carpet installation was "trade or commerce" within
the meaning of the Colorado Antitrust Act. 52 The court noted that the dis-
tinction between carpet installation as an exchange of services for money, as
opposed to an exchange of commodities for money, was without antitrust
significance.
53
In reaching their conclusion, the Colorado court chose to follow the
multitude of federal cases that broadly apply the Sherman Act. 54 The court
46. The notice of appeal to the supreme court from the district court was filed pursuant to
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-102 (1973 & Supp. 1982) and COLO. App. R. 4(b).
47. 645 P.2d at 1294.
48. Id. at 1297.
49. Id. at 1296.
50. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-101 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). This section pro-
vides in full that:
Every contract or combination in the nature of a trust or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce is declared illegal. Every combination, conspiracy, trust, pool,
agreement, or contract intended to restrain or prevent competition in the supply or
price of any article or commodity constituting a subject of trade or commerce in this
state, or every combination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement or contract which con-
trols in any manner the price of any such article or commodity, fixes the price thereof,
or limits or fixes the amount or quantity thereof to be manufactured, produced, or sold
in this state, or monopolizes or attempts to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce in this state, is declared an illegal restraint of trade.
Id. The penalties for violating the Colorado antitrust statute are found in COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 6-4-107 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
51. 645 P.2d at 1296.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. For other examples of labor and service industries within the scope of the Sherman Act,
see, e.g. , National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (engineering
services); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (stock brokerage services);
Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616
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was persuaded by legislative history which showed that in enacting section 1
of the Sherman Act, 55 "Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could." 56
Recognizing that Colorado's section 6-4-101 was modeled on section 1 of the
Sherman Act,57 the court looked to several United States Supreme Court
constructions of the Sherman Act for guidance in construing the Colorado
Act.58
The court first looked to the Supreme Court decision in Atlantic Cleaners
& Dyers v. United States," where "trade" under the Sherman Act was inter-
preted as the equivalent of "occupation, employment, or business whether
manual or mercantile." 6  Thus, laundering clothes, although a service,
nonetheless constituted a "trade" under the Sherman Act.6 1 The court also
discussed Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n,6 2 where the Supreme Court held
that real estate title examination conducted by attorneys was "trade or com-
merce." 6 3 The Court tersely stated that land title examination is a service
and that exchanging such a service for money is "commerce" in the most
ordinary use of that term.64
On the strength of federal interpretations of "trade or commerce" under
the Sherman Act, the Colorado Supreme Court held carpet installation to be
within the corresponding provision of the Colorado act.6 5 This holding ap-
pears to indicate that Colorado will follow the federal lead by reading wide
coverage into Colorado's Little Sherman Act.
3. The Labor Exemption Issue
Having found that carpet installation services were "trade or com-
merce" within the scope of the antitrust act, the court turned to the pivotal
issue of the case: construction of the labor exemption.
The labor exemption states that "[tihe labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce."'66 The defendants argued that because
their agreement to increase carpet installation charges "dealt solely with the
(1975) (construction services); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (coal
mining); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (furnishing news).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
56. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
57. 645 P.2d at 1294 n.4. See supra note 14.
58. Id. at 1295.
59. 286 U.S. 427 (1931).
60. Id. at 436.
61. The court's citation to Atantic Cleaners & Dyers is problematic, however, because that
case relates only to section 3 of the Sherman Act. Section 3 deals exet uiety with people engaged
in trade or commerce in the District of Columbia, and therefore, by definition, ought to be
inapplicable to other jurisdictions (15 U.S.C. § 3 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
62. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
63. Id. at 787.
64. Id. Perhaps the best test used to determine Sherman Act (and Little Sherman Act)
applicability is the one articulated by Sullivan: "If there is a dollar to be made, it's trade or
commerce." L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 709 (1977).
65. 645 P.2d at 1296. After finding applicability of the antitrust statute to the carpet in-
stallation business, the court swiftly moved to a construction of the labor exemption. The court,
however, never stated whether the defendants' activity actually constituted a price fixing viola-
tion; instead, it tacitly assumed the requisite illegality and proceeded to construe the exemption.
In the court's defense, it should be noted that neither party discussed price fixing in their briefs.
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-103 (1973).
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price of human labor," their actions were immune from antitrust prosecu-
tion under the Colorado labor exemption.6 7 The Attorney General argued
that Colorado should narrowly interpret its labor exemption and thereby
limit its application to bona fide labor union activities relating to the terms
and conditions of employment.68
4. The Decision
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the defendant's broad interpre-
tation and held that in order for the labor exemption to apply, the defend-
ants' agreement would have to arise from an employer-employee
relationship concerning wages, hours of work and other conditions of
employment.
69
In arriving at this conclusion, the court had to juggle several entangled
concepts that were not susceptible of a pigeonhole analysis. It is therefore
understandable why the court experienced difficulty in articulating their ra-
tionale. The holding itself and the reasoning used, however, appear to be
entirely proper, with the net effect being that North Avenue interprets Colo-
rado's labor exemption in harmony with both the history and the case law
constructions of the federal labor exemption. The following sections explore
the court's treatment of the labor exemption issue.
C. Analysis
1. History of the Federal Labor Exemption
A necessary dimension of the court's analysis was its discussion of the
Clayton Act labor exemption. 70 The purpose of antitrust law has been to
promote free competition and prevent restraints of trade.7 ' The goal of fed-
eral labor law, however, has been to enhance workers' rights by encouraging
voluntary economic agreements between employers and employees. 72 The
aims of labor law thus clash with those of antitrust law where employer-
employee agreements have the effect of inhibiting competition and re-
straining trade.
73
The tension between antitrust law and labor law climaxed in 1908
when the Supreme Court decided the so-called Danbury Hatters case, 7 4 where
a union-organized boycott of the plaintiffs nonunion-made hats was found
67. 645 P.2d at 1293.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1299.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
71. 645 P.2d at 1295. See 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (Comments of Senator Sherman).
See also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217
U.S. 413 (1910).
72. 645 P.2d at 1295. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
See also Casey & Cozzillo, Labor-Antrust: The Problems of Connell and a Remedy that Follows Natu-
rally, 1980 DUKE L.J. 235, 235.
73. 645 P.2d at 1295. See Casey & Cozzillo, supra note 72, at 235-36; Winter, Collective
Bargaining and Competition. The Application of Antitnest Standards to Union Actieits, 73 YALE L.J. 14,
16-17 (1963).
74. Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
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to violate the Sherman Act.7 5 This decision prompted the labor unions to
seek specific statutory immunity for legitimate union activities violative of
the Sherman Act. Congress responded by passing section 6 of the Clayton
Act 76-the labor exemption. In providing this exemption, Congress sought
to accommodate the important national policies of both antitrust enforce-
ment and legitimate labor union activities.
77
2. Federal Construction of the Labor Exemption
A long line of federal cases has perpetuated the historical purpose of the
Clayton Act exemption, and these cases firmly support the North Avenue
court's interpretation of the Colorado provision. Unlike the broad applica-
bility of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts narrowly construe all anti-
trust statutory exemptions in order to effectuate the legislative intent of
promoting competition. 78 The section 6 labor exemption of the Clayton Act
is no exception to this general rule, and its scope has been severely limited by
the judiciary.
In Columbia River Packers Association, Inc. v. Hinton ,79 the Supreme Court
held that the labor exemption did not apply to agreements between in-
dependent businessmen, but rather, only to employer-employee relation-
ships.8° Similarly, in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd of Elec.
Workers, 8 1 the Supreme Court held the labor exemption was available only
to legitimate unilateral union activity. 82 Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers
Union v. United States83 continued the well-defined trend by stating that the
labor exemption's purpose is to ensure that legitimate union activities are
not stifled by the antitrust laws.
84
In light of this federal precedent, the Colorado Supreme Court formu-
lated the following test for application of the labor exemption: where an
agreement "arises from lawful associational activities of employees concern-
75. Id. at 301.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
77. People v. North Ave. Furniture, 645 P.2d at 1295.
78. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979).
79. 315 U.S. 143 (1943).
80. Id. at 145-47. The Supreme Court's conclusion is particularly applicable to North
Avenue:
The controversy here is altogether between fish sellers and fish buyers. The sellers
are not employees of the petitioners or of any other employer nor do they seek to be.
On the contrary, their desire is to continue to operate as independent businessmen,
free from such controls as an employer might exercise. That some of the fishermen
have a small number of employees of their own, who are also members of the Union,
does not alter the situation. For the dispute here, relating solely to the sale of fish, does
not place in controversy the wages or hours or other terms and conditions of employ-
ment of these employees.
Id. at 147.
81. 325 U.S 797 (1945).
82. Id. at 808-11.
83. 371 U.S. 94 (1962).
84. Id. at 103. In H.A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actor's Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704
(1981), the Supreme Court found that the federal labor exemption applied only to bonafide
labor activity and not to independent contractors or entrepreneurs. See also Home Box Office,
Inc. v. Directors Guild of Am., Inc., 531 F. Supp. 578, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Cesnik v. Chrysler
Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 865 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
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ing the terms or conditions of their employment," the exemption is avail-
able.85 Applying this test to the facts of North Avenue, the court found that
the defendant carpet retailers and installers bore no employment relation-
ship with each other. The primary purpose of their agreement was to fix the
prices for carpet installation and thereby restrain competition in the Grand
Junction market. 86 The court therefore ruled that the labor exemption was
not available to the North Avenue defendants. 87 The court concluded by stat-
ing that businessmen cannot organize into a union and, on that basis, hope
to escape from antitrust prosecution. 88
3. Disposing of Q-T Markets
If federal law controlled the North Avenue case, the analysis would end
here. Even the defendants agreed that underfederal law, their pricing agree-
ment did not result from a union activity, much less stem from a bona fide
employer-employee relationship.8 9 Federal law, however, did not control
the instant case,90 and the issue thus became, to what extent should the fed-
eral constructions apply to the Colorado statute?
Relying on the rationale of Q- T Markets,g' defendants contended that
minor differences between the labor exemptions in the Colorado antitrust
statute and the Clayton Act indicated a legislative intent to depart from
federal precedent. 92 This argument was not frivolous as it was founded on
the logic of the only prior case which construed Colorado's modern antitrust
85. 645 P.2d at 1299.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at n.9.
89. Id. at 1297.
90. d. at 1295-96.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 23-38.
92. Since their interpretations are critical to the outcome of the case, the two statutes are
juxtaposed below. The italicized portions show the Colorado statute places the human labor
sentence in a second section, at the end of the statute. The federal provision on the other hand,
has only one section, with the human labor sentence appearing at the beginning.
In defense of the alleged price fixing, the defendants invoked Colorado's labor exemption,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-103 (1973):
(1) Nothing in this article shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of
labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations instituted for the purpose of mutual
help, or engaged in making collective sales or marketing for its members or sharehold-
ers of farm, orchard, or dairy products produced by its members or shareholders, and
not having capital stock or conducted for profit or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to
be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under this article.
(2) The labor of a hunan being is not a commodiy or article of commerce.
(emphasis added).
The People offered, by way of comparison, the Clayton Act labor exemption, which served
as the model for section 6-4-103:
The labor of a hunan being is not a commodity or artitle of commerce. Nothing contained
in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor,
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help,
and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to
be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.





The court, however, viewed any reliance on Q- TMarkets as tenuous and
declined the invitation to deviate from the clear federal case law of Columbia
River Packers and its progeny. 94 The court rejected the assumption implicit
in Q-T Markets that the Colorado antitrust statute was intended to mean
something distinct from federal antitrust statutes.9 5  Instead, the court
reached the conclusion that the federal constructions were entitled to consid-
erable weight.
96
4. Justification for Applying Federal Precedent to the State Statute
Having dispensed with the Q-T Markets cases, the North Avenue court
then had to justify why it could apply federal precedent, by analogy, to the
state statute. The court accomplished this by resorting to the doctrine of in
pan materia.
Under this doctrine of statutory construction, the court interprets the
meaning of a statute by looking to constructions of statutes with similar lan-
guage and purpose.9 7 In this case, the court noted that both federal and
state antitrust laws were devoted to the dual purpose of protecting the public
against restraints of trade while preserving the rights of workers to bargain
collectively with employers over the terms and conditions of employment. 9
The court stated that the role of state antitrust laws was to address condi-
tions beyond the reach of federal laws. 99 The court concluded that given the
substantial similarity in text and purpose of federal and state antitrust laws,
the federal decisions construing the Sherman and Clayton Acts, although
not necessarily controlling, were entitled to careful scrutiny in determining
the scope of the state antitrust statute."°
In justifying its adoption of federal precedent as a guide to interpreting
the Colorado Act, the court appears to rely solely on the doctrine of in pan
matert'a. Interestingly, the court ignored the Attorney General's argu-
ment, 1 ' which reached the same conclusion by means of the "borrowing
doctrine." Under this doctrine, the construction of statutes borrowed from
other jurisdictions is controlled by the lending jurisdiction's interpretation of
93. It is interesting to note that the defendant did not contest the application of federal
precedent in interpreting COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-101 (1973), which differs slightly from section
I of the Sherman Act.
94. 645 P.2d at 1299.
95. Id. at 1293 n.3.
96. Id. at 1296.
97. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 51.01 (4th ed. 1973). An
illustrative case is State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. 395 (1909):
The Minnesota anti-trust law is framed along the lines of the federal statute, although
it is more diffuse. It may fairly be assumed, however, that the general purpose of all
statutes of this kind is the same, and we may therefore properly look to the decisions
made under federal and state statutes of a similar character for the principle by which
to construe our own statute.
d. at 107 Minn. at 510, 121 N.W. at 399.
98. 645 P.2d at 1295.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1296.
101. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 42, at 9.
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its statute at the time of the borrowing.1 0 2 The advantage of employing this
doctrine is that it has solid support in Colorado case law.
0 3
The court did note that in enacting the Colorado antitrust statute in
1957, the legislature "borrowed" Wisconsin's antitrust statute as a model.'
0 4
The court cited an affidavit from the draftsman of the Colorado statute,
which stated that it was the legislator's intent that any cases interpreting
Wisconsin's statute could be used as precedent to interpret Colorado's stat-
ute.10 5 Significantly, at the time Colorado borrowed Wisconsin's antitrust
statute, Wisconsin interpreted it in harmony with federal precedent.'
0 6
Thus, by looking to Wisconsin case law, the North Avenue court could have
"borrowed" that state's policy of accepting federal constructions of the Sher-
man Act as a guide to interpreting its own statute. The court could have
supported this conclusion by citing its own line of decisions concerning the
borrowing doctrine. 1
07
Thus, the court could have solidly and artfully justified its application
of federal constructions to the Colorado Act. The court, however, declined
to take this approach in favor of the more direct comparison of the Colorado
statute to the federal antitrust laws.
5. The Language Differences in the Federal and State Exemption
The final issue that the court had to address was the defendants' argu-
ment concerning the organizational differences in the federal and state ex-
emption provisions.' 08 The defendant seized upon two differences, namely,
the bifurcation and the reverse order of the human labor sentence.
The court easily disposed of the bifurcation issue. The original enact-
ment of the labor exemption came in a single section entitled "organizations
exempt."' 0 9 In the 1973 version of the statutes, that section was editorially
divided into two parts by the statutory revisor, with the human labor sen-
tence appearing separately." 0 There were no intervening amendments au-
thorized by the legislature. The change was only cosmetic, with no apparent
explanation. Because editorial changes by the statute revisor cannot alter
the substantive meaning, I"' the court stated that it would attach no signifi-
cance to the revisor's bifurcation.'
12
The court never actually addressed the defendants' argument about the
102. Vandermee, 164 Colo. 1!7, 121, 433 P.2d 335, 337 (1967).
103. See, e.g., Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117, 433 P.2d 335 (1967).
104. 645 P.2d at 1294.
105. Id. at 1294 n.4.
106. See,e.g., Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604, 147 N.W. 1058
(1914).
107. See Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117, 433 P.2d 335 (1967).
108. 645 P.2d at 1298.
109. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 55-4-3 (1963).
110. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-103(2) (1973).
111. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 2-5-103(2) (1973 & Supp. 1982). See also CoLO. REV. STAT. § 2-3-
703 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
112. 645 P.2d at 1298. The human labor sentence once again appears as a part of a single
section. An editor's note attributes the change to the North Avenue case. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 6-4-103 (Supp. 1982).
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reverse order of the human labor sentence. After noting the history behind
the sentence, the court only stated that the sentence, in and of itself, does not
affect the rest of the exemption and "has no independent legal signifi-
cance." 1 13 A plain meaning analysis of the federal and state exemptions
would probably have been sufficient justification of the court's quick dismis-
sal of any significance to the reverse order.
III. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF NORTH A VENUE
The numerous federal interpretations have molded the labor exemption
into a mature and well-defined legal concept. The North Avenue holding,
which accords with the federal case law, therefore cannot be claimed as a
milestone in the development of antitrust law. Instead, North Avenue is best
viewed in a broad sense. This generic approach suggests several likely
ramifications of the case and permits a richer appreciation of the importance
of North Avenue to Colorado antitrust law.
A. A Death-Knell to Q-T Markets
The court's rejection of Q-T Markets will probably be viewed as a death-
knell to that anomalous case. The severe criticism received by Q-TMarkets,
together with the North Avenue decision, firmly establishes that Q-T Markets
was wrongly decided. The only technicality remaining in the Q-T Markets
saga is its inevitable overruling by a federal court.
The court's treatment of the Q-T Markets case, however, seems mildly
troubling. Although the Q-T Markets decision was heavily criticized,"I4 it
was the only judicial interpretation of Colorado's antitrust statute. As such,
the case merited a direct, frontal attack if it were to be disregarded. Instead,
the North Avenue court's rejection of Q-T Markets was relegated to mere foot-
note status." 5 The unfortunate, though by no means fatal, result was to
dilute an otherwise forceful ruling indicating that Colorado intends to inter-
pret its statute by carefully considering federal precedent.
B. The Use of Federal Precedent in State Antitrust Law
By ruling that federal precedent furnished a guide to the interpretation
of the antitrust act,' 1 6 the court has breathed new life into Colorado anti-
trust enforcement. This ruling adds stability and predictability to antitrust
law in Colorado because businesses, as well as other public and private liti-
gants, can now confidently rely on the wealth of federal antitrust precedent
to guide their activities and shape their strategies.
113. 645 P.2d at 1299.
114. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
115. 645 P.2d at 1293 n.3.
116. The court stops short of holding federal precedent "controlling" on the Colorado inter-
pretation, thus preserving the court's room to maneuver in future cases. This loophole was
probably intended to avoid exactly the kind of dilemma that led to the Q-TMarkets aberration.
It has been speculated that the reason behind the Q-TMarkets ruling with respect to the Colo-
rado statute was the federal district court's disagreement with the course federal antitrust law
was taking. See Note, supra note 7, at 225.
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C. Some Final Thoughts on North Avenue
The analysis of North Avenue and the implications suggested above seem
to assume that there is a significant amount of antitrust activity in Colorado.
It has also been noted, however, that only two cases, Q-T Markets and North
Avenue, have construed Colorado's antitrust statute since its enactment over
twenty-five years ago. The pragmatic question, then, becomes: does the
North Avenue case really matter? The answer, unreservedly, is yes.
The student or practitioner of Colorado antitrust law should not be
deceived by the paucity of reported antitrust cases. Because antitrust litiga-
tion is expensive, there is a strong incentive for litigants to settle.'' 7 One
commentator claims that over eighty per cent of all antitrust cases reach
settlement through consent decrees.' 18 The popularity of settlements helps
explain why so few cases reach the Colorado appellate courts and are
reported.
The best evidence of the antitrust statute's present vitality in Colorado
is the amount of antitrust enforcement conducted by the office of the Attor-
ney General. The office did not have an antitrust section until 1975, 19
which may well account for the relative dormancy of antitrust law in Colo-
rado prior to that time. Since the antitrust section has been added, however,
antitrust activity in the state has increased dramatically.' 20 Most of this
antitrust enforcement activity has been initiated by the Attorney General.
North Avenue constitutes judicial approval of the Attorney General's activities
and should be the encouragement needed to stimulate an aggressive enforce-
ment policy in Colorado.
Private antitrust actions may also increase as a result of North Avenue.
The use of federal precedent adds one of the incentives needed for litigants
to choose a state forum, namely, predictability in the law. A serious deter-
rent, however, to choosing a state forum remains due to the mysterious ab-
sence from the Colorado statute of a treble damage penalty.' 2 1 The
Colorado Legislature should view North Avenue as an invitation to enact such
a remedy.
117. Note, supra note 7, at 218.
118. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 758 n.8 (1977). See also Burke &
Walters, supra note 6, at 2.
119. Burke & Walters, supra note 6, at 1.
120. Burke & Walters, supra note 6, at 1. There are several reasons for this increase in state
antitrust enforcement in Colorado and across the nation. An exhaustive discussion of these
reasons, however, is both beyond the scope of this comment and has been well documented in
other writings. See generally Dibble & Jardine, The Utah Antitrust Act of1979. Getting into the State
Antitrust Business, 57 UTAH L. REV. 73 (1980); Rahl, State Antitrust Snposium, 4 J. CORP. L. 475
(1979); Sicker, The Role of States in Antitrust Law Enforcement--Some Views and Observatitns, 39 TEx.
L. REv. 873 (1961); Note, The Present Revival and Future Course ofState Antitrust Enforcement, 38
N.Y.U.L. REV. 575 (1963).
121. The absence of a treble damages penalty was explained in part by the affidavit of
David J. Clark, cited by the North Avenue court. "I did make certain changes regarding penalties
to be applied, such as elimination of the provision for treble damages in civil cases, because I
thought the new statute should be 'on the books' for awhile before private actions for treble
damages could be instituted. 645 P.2d at 1294, n.4. This does not explain, however, why the




Finally, state antitrust enforcement is important to Colorado because
some industries may be wholly intrastate and thus not within the federal
jurisdiction. In what is perhaps the major downfall of the North Avenue opin-
ion, the court made only a fleeting reference' to this issue when it stated that
the purpose of state antitrust law is protection of the public against restraints
of trade "beyond the reach of federal law." 12 2 The court leaves to the reader
the troubling task of deciding what constitutes an activity "beyond the reach
of federal law."
Presumably, the answer is those activities that are entirely intrastate.
The authorities, however, are in conflict on the viability of the inter-
state/intrastate distinction. Some argue that almost all actions will result in
interstate commerce. 123 Other writers maintain that industries do exist
which are completely intrastate, such as dry cleaning, dairy farming, and
restaurants.1 24 In light of the tremendous docket problems facing the fed-
eral courts today, it is not inconceivable that the federal courts will be less
inclined to find the degree of interstate activity required to invoke federal
jurisdiction. This increased burden on state courts would make state anti-
trust laws even more important.
CONCLUSION
North Avenue represents the Colorado Supreme Court's first construction
of the state's modern antitrust statute. The case clearly indicates that inter-
pretations of federal antitrust statutes will be given considerable weight
when construing Colorado's antitrust statute. The concepts delineated
above are compelling reasons for an aggressive state antitrust enforcement
policy, and they show that any reliance on the scarcity of reported antitrust
cases as an indication of the degree of antitrust activity in Colorado is a trap
for the unwary. As a result, North Avenue is not an example of much ado
about nothing, but rather, North Avenue should be viewed as an important
case which will significantly guide antitrust enforcement in Colorado.
North Avenue has put antitrust law in Colorado back on track. However,
North Avenue is but a single step. To continue the advances begun by North
Avenue, the judiciary must further define the parameters of the Colorado
antitrust statute, the Attorney General must maintain its aggressive enforce-
ment philosophy, and the legislature must provide litigants with an appro-
priate remedy.
Mark Li/'lie
122. 645 P.2d at 1295.
123. Ducker, supra note 1, at 560 n.7.
124. Note, supra note 7, at 232-33.
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THE UNWED FATHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
AFTER SP.B.: A RETREAT IN CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION
INTRODUCTION
A child, S.P.B., was born during the summer of 1979. The father,
P.D.G., admitted paternity, but denied any obligation to support the child.
The father and the child's mother, C.F.B., were both college students at the
time of the birth. They never married and were not living together at the
time of trial. The father claimed that when the mother told him she was
pregnant, he indicated his desire that the pregnancy be terminated and of-
fered to pay for an abortion. The father asserted that this discussion took
place within the first trimester of pregnancy. The mother did not consent to
an abortion, gave birth to S.P.B., and subsequently filed a lawsuit against
the father for child support. The mother has had custody of the child since
birth. '
At trial the father argued that due process requires that he have an
opportunity to rebut the irrebuttable presumption of section 19-6-116 of the
Colorado Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),2 which states that a father should
share in the support of his child. The father also contended that he was
denied equal protection as a result of the state's use of a gender-based classi-
fication. The state, on behalf of the minor child S.P.B., argued in favor of
the El Paso County District Court's award of both child support and half the
birth expense.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the father's child support obli-
gation, finding the father's due process and equal protection arguments to be
without merit.3 In so deciding, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the
father's argument that the nexus, or rational relationship, between sexual
intercourse and birth is broken. Instead the court relied on Roe v. Wade4 and
subsequent cases5 which hold that the father's desire that the fetus be
1. In re S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Colo. 1982); Brief for Respondent-Appellant, In re
S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent-Appellant].
2. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
3. This case was transferred by the court of appeals to the Colorado Supreme Court
under COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-4-110(l)(a)(19 73 ) because of the constitutional question
involved.
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding state criminal abortion statutes unconstitutional). In Roe
the Court did not base its reasoning on the permissibility of the gender-based classification, but
rather on the woman's fundamental right to privacy. The Court held that the decision whether
to bear a child or have an abortion lies solely with the mother and her physician.
5. Seegenerally Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976). The Maher Court stated that the constitutional freedom recognized in Roe v.
Wade and its progeny did not prevent Connecticut from making a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion. Consequently, the Court upheld a welfare regulation under which
Medicaid recipients received payments for childbirth expenses but not for medical services re-
lated to abortions.
The Supreme Court in Danforth struck down a Missouri statute requiring prior written
consent of the spouse of a woman seeking an abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
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aborted or carried to term is irrelevant and neither state legislatures nor the
courts, on behalf of the father, may interfere with the mother's decision
whether to give birth.
Before Roe, simple reproductive biology and the illegality and unavaila-
bility of abortion were thought to produce the required nexus between sex-
ual intercourse and birth. 6 In the years since that decision, however, some
legal scholars have argued that the woman's essentially unilateral decision to
bear or to abort serves as an intervening factor and replaces the act of inter-
course as the proximate cause of birth.7 The SPB court gave no credence
to that argument, and reaffirmed the United States Supreme Court's recog-
nition of the legally mandated equality between illegitimate and legitimate
children. 8 At the same time, however, it would appear that the court's hold-
ing may infringe on the constitutional protection afforded the father through
a serious procedural flaw that denies his due process of law.9
This comment traces the evolution of illegitimacy and child support,
the apparent conclusion of a trend by the Colorado Supreme Court to recog-
nize unwed fathers' rights, and the current status of gender-based classifica-
tions in Colorado. In addition, the comment discusses the rationale behind
the S.PB. court's decision and the potential social ramifications of this opin-
ion, which strikes a precarious balance between the competing interests of
the state and the individual.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Illegitimacy and Child Support
1. Development at Common Law
Illegitimacy, a social problem for the last two centuries, often has been
viewed as an index of the moral state of the community.' 0 At common law
the parents of an illegitimate child had no duty to support him, since he was
considered "filius nullius," a child of no one."I Various arguments have
been advanced in support of this proposition. It has been said that the un-
wed father could not be made to support his illegitimate child because of the
uncertainty of the child's paternity.' 2 It also has been argued that the policy
of discrimination between illegitimate and legitimate children encourages
unless the abortion was certified to be necessary to preserve the life of the mother. The Court
said that the state cannot " 'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is absolutely
and totally prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy.' " 428 U.S. at 69
(citation omitted).
6. Brief for Respondent-Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.
7. Swan, Abortion on Maternal Demand: Paternal Support Liability Implcattons, 9 VAL. U.L.
REV. 243 (1975).
8. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). The terms "illegitimate" and "legitimate"
should be avoided, because of the stigma associated with bastardy. See infra note 31 and accom-
panying text.
9. See inf/a note 123 and accompanying text.
10. P. LASLETr, BASTARDY AND ITS COMPARATIVE HISTORY 1 (1980).
11. H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 3 (1981).




marriage, and serves as a deterrent to illicit cohabitation. 13 Most twentieth
century commentators find this argument uncivilized because it seeks to
punish innocent children on the unreasonable hope that their suffering will
promote marriage. 14
By 1576, enforcement of the English Poor Law' 5 provided a quasi-crim-
inal procedure for obtaining support from the natural father of an illegiti-
mate child. The Poor Law was designed to relieve the state of the burden of
supporting such children, who were thought of as sin turned into flesh.'
6
Although many years ago the common law ceased legitimacy-based dis-
crimination in mother-child relationships, 17 as recently as 1953 the New
Jersey Supreme Court strained to find a paternal child support obligation in
the common law.' Failing in this attempt, the court found it necessary to
fashion this obligation from equitable principles, natural law and reference
to the laws of "civilized European countries.' 9
Recently, the trend has been to impose an equal support obligation on
mothers and fathers, either by statute or by judicial decisions. Courts some-
times base this obligation on state equal rights amendments or on the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution.
20
2. United States Supreme Court Decisions
More than a dozen Supreme Court cases since 1968, decided on the
basis of the equal protection clause, have mandated full equality for the ille-
gitimate child. 2 ' As a result, many state statutes discriminating against ille-
gitimate children have been held unconstitutional.
22
Citing the fourteenth amendment, the Court has demanded equal legal
treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children over a broad range of sub-
stantive areas. 23 Even so, in 1976 the Court refused to declare illegitimacy
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. An Act for Setting the Poor on Work, 1576, 18 Eliz. 1, c.3 § 7, cited in H. KRAUSE,
CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 3 (1981).
16. FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND LOVERS 6 (S. Katz & M. Inker eds. 1979).
17. Dalton v. State, 6 Blackf. 357 (Ind. 1842), ctedi n J. O'DONNELL & D. JONES, THE LAW
OF MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE ALTERNATIVES 97 n.29 (1982).
18. Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953).
19. Id.
20. "[Nlor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (illegitimates are not to be denied their
right to support from their natural father); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972) (illegitimates should share equally with other children who recover workmen's compen-
sation benefits for the death of a parent); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73
(1968) (statutes granting causes of action for wrongful death cannot deny a right to recovery to
the parent of an illegitimate child); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (a state may not
create a right of action in children for the wrongful death of a parent which excludes illegiti-
mate children).
22. See generally H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA (1971) (discussing child support
laws which were written when illegitimate paternity had only limited legal consequences).
23. The equal protection and due process afforded an illegitimate child have been the
focus of the United States Supreme Court in a number of cases. See cases cited supra note 21.
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per se sufficiently suspect to compel strict judicial scrutiny. 24 Recent United
States Supreme Court cases dealing with illegitimacy, which have applied
varying levels of scrutiny, illustrate the Court's difficulty in arriving at a
consistent method of analysis.
25
Justice Powell, principal architect of the Burger Court's position on ille-
gitimacy under the equal protection clause, 26 stated that "imposing disabili-
ties on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing."
'27
In Gomez v. Perez 28 the Court found no constitutional justification for
denying support to a child simply because the parents were not married.
This decision illustrates the Court's progression toward broadening the
rights of illegitimate children.
3. Development of Colorado Law
Colorado's UPA29 provides the statutory framework for child support.
The roots of this part of the UPA can be found in a Texas law review article
written by Harry Krause in 1966, which was considered revolutionary at the
time it was written. 30 In effect since July 1977, the Colorado UPA allows the
parent-child relationship to be established or acknowledged, regardless of the
parents' marital status. The act attempts to abolish the stigma attached to
bastardy by avoiding the labels of "illegitimacy" and "legitimacy.
' 3 1
Parental child support for illegitimate children, as provided for by the
Colorado UPA, is not new to Colorado. As early as 1918, in Wamsle; v. Peo-
ple, 32 a father was convicted under Colorado's nonsupport statute of 1911
for failure to support his illegitimate child. Over fifty years later in Munn v.
Munn,33 the court held that the father's support obligation to his illegitimate
child could not differ substantially from that owed to his legitimate child.
Colorado Supreme Court Chief Justice Pringle, in his 1972 dissent in In Re
L.B., wrote: "We have, it seems to me, now passed the time when we distin-
24. The Supreme Court traditionally gave only minimal scrutiny to gender-based classifi-
cations. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (statute upheld which permitted only the wife
or daughter of a male owner of a liquor establishment to bartend). Goesaert was later overruled
by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (finding gender-based classification in drinking age law
to be unconstitutional).
25. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (applying a rational relationship test);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (applying intermediate-level scrutiny).
26. He wrote not only the majority opinion in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972), but also three other majority opinions, two concurring opinions and one plural-
ity opinion.
27. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. at 175-76.
28. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
29. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
30. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Socey." A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitmac , 44
TEX. L. REV. 829 (1966).
31. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 22 (1971) (noting the danger
that a legislature, overconcerned with nomenclature, may think it has solved an unpleasant
problem by outlawing an unpleasant word).
32. 64 Colo. 521, 173 P. 425 (1918).
33. 168 Colo. 76, 450 P.2d 68 (1969).
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guish between so-called 'illegitimate' children and 'legitimate' children.
34
B. Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers
1. The United States Supreme Court and Gender-Based
Classifications
Because the father owed no legal duty to his illegitimate child at com-
mon law, it naturally followed that he should have no rights concerning the
child. Responding to the need to reduce welfare rolls, the laws eventually
changed and support duties were imposed upon the father. 35 Unlike most
obligations, this duty came with no rights as courts have often failed to rec-
ognize the unwed father's right to visitation and custody.
36
During the last ten years, the judicial trend has been to broaden the
parental rights of unwed fathers and more closely scrutinize some of the disa-
bilities under which unwed fathers traditionally have been placed with re-
spect to their children. 37 Some of this expansion of rights has been based on
procedural due process requirements, as illustrated in Stanley v. Illhnois. 38 In
Stanley, the Court held that the Illinois statute in question created an uncon-
stitutional irrebuttable presumption that all unmarried fathers are unsuita-
ble parents.39 The Court recognized the due process right of a biological
father to maintain a parental relationship with his children, unless he is
found to be unfit.
40
Many of the United States Supreme Court decisions broadening the
rights of unwed fathers, like those broadening the rights of illegitimate chil-
dren, have been based on the fourteenth amendment a.4  These cases are best
understood by reviewing the Court's complicated equal protection approach
to gender-based classifications. 42 Until 1971, the United States Supreme
Court employed a two-tier test to judge the validity of a statute under consti-
tutional attack based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Under the minimal scrutiny required by the traditional "lower
tier," most statutes were upheld since they were only required to show a
"rational relationship" to a legitimate state end.4 3 The "upper tier test,"
requiring a "compelling state interest," was applied to statutes restricting
fundamental rights and creating suspect classes such as race.
44
34. 179 Colo. 11, 19, 498 P.2d 1157, 1161-62 (1972).
35. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 22.
36. Seegenerally W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 8 (3d ed. 1978)
(discussing the lack of attendant rights of unwed fathers).
37. Comment, Equal Protection and the Putative Father: An Analysis of Parham v. Hughes and
Caban v. Mohammed, 34 Sw. L.J. 717 (1980).
38. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
39. Id. at 656-57.
40. Id. at 649.
41. See supra note 21.
42. Discrimination against the unwed father involves three separate judicial classifications:
gender, marital status, and illegitimacy. See Note, R. McG. & C.W. v. J.W. & W.W.." The
Putative Father's Right to Standing to Rebut the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 76 Nw. U.L. REV.
669, 674 (1981).
43. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). For a more recent decision
based on the rational basis test, see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
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The Court's dislike for the two-tier test surfaced in 1971 when it devel-
oped an intermediate level of scrutiny in Reedv. Reed.4 5 Writing for a unani-
mous Court, Chief Justice Burger applied a "heightened scrutiny" test to
invalidate a statute which favored men over women as administrators of de-
cedents' estates. The new test required that a classification have "a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation."'46 In Frontiero v. Richard-
son,4 7 decided two years later, four justices supported the elevation of gender
to the level of a suspect class, but the idea did not receive majority support.
In Craig v. Boren48 the Court clarified its equal protection test for gender
discrimination cases by taking an activist stand and invalidating a statute
that discriminated against males. The Court stated that: "classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives."
'49
In Caban v. Mohammed 5° the Court applied its intermediate scrutiny test
to the rights of unwed fathers and invalidated a New York statute allowing
unmarried mothers, but not unmarried fathers, to prevent the adoption of
their children by withholding consent. The Court held that the statute was
violative of equal protection because it created a gender-based distinction
between unwed parents bearing no substantial relationship to the state's as-
serted interests. 51 The Court refused to accept the state's argument that ma-
ternal and paternal relations are fundamentally different.
The Court's five-four split in Caban vividly illustrates the difficulty of
defining unwed fathers' rights in the equal protection context. This lack of
agreement indicates a judicial reluctance to further broaden rights in this
area. Consequently, it would appear that Caban represents the current cul-
mination in the development of the unwed father's rights.
2. Colorado Supreme Court
In 1981 the Colorado Supreme Court in R. McG v. J W 52 seriously
weakened a longstanding legal presumption that the husband of the mother
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(right to privacy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1962) (race).
45. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
46. d. at 76.
47. 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 n.17 (1973). The plurality enunciated three criteria which char-
acterize a suspect class: 1) the class suffers from an immutable characteristic determined solely
by accident of birth and bearing no relation to the ability to contribute in society; 2) the class
suffers historic vilification; and 3) the class lacks effective political power and redress.
48. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating a statute prohibiting beer sales to males under 21
and females under 18).
49. Id. at 197. The Court in Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) showed its hesitancy
to implement the intermediate scrutiny test laid out in Craig. In Parham the plurality actively
avoided characterizing the statute as gender-based. Instead, they justified their decision on
comparatively trivial differences in circumstance.
50. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). Caban was the first unwed father case to directly face the equal
protection issues.
51. Id. at 393-94.
52. 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980). For an indepth analysis of this case, see Bastardizing the
Legitimate Child- The Colorado Supreme Court Invalidates the Uniform Parentage Act Presumption of Legit-
miac, in R. McG. v. J.W., 59 DEN. L.J. 157 (1981).
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of a child born during marriage is the father of that child. 53 The court held
that R. McG., the alleged biological father, must be given standing to rebut
such a presumption and an opportunity to establish the existence of a par-
ent-child relationship with C.W., his alleged minor child, 54 even though the
child's mother was married to another at the time of conception and had
remained married at the time of trial.
The Colorado court relied on Supreme Court precedents, including
Stanley and Caban, in finding this gender-based distinction unconstitu-
tional. 55 The court held that the UPA statute56 violated equal protection by
granting biological mothers judicial access while denying putative biological
fathers standing. Such a distinction, the court said, was not substantially
related to an important governmental interest.
57
Although the intermediate level of scrutiny does not require a statute to
fit the state's interest exactly, the court noted that the statute must, at least,
substantially mesh with the classification's purpose;58 such was not the case
in R. MG. 59 The court further held that the denial of standing to R. McG.
violated the equal rights amendment of the Colorado Constitution, which
forbids the denial of equal rights on the basis of sex.6"
The justices in R. McG. also found fatal flaws under procedural due
process analysis. They stated that although the drafters of the UPA claimed
that the act created presumptions rebuttable by clear and convincing evi-
dence,6 1 the UPA was actually irrebuttable because it denied an unwed fa-
ther standing to rebut. 62  The court eyed the presumption with
apprehension in light of the recent judicial trend away from irrebuttable
presumptions, noting the similarity between the statutory framework of the
UPA and the presumption held violative in Stanley.6 3 Several commentators
believe this controversial decision will have far-reaching effects especially in
this time of rapidly changing reproductive techniques.
64
53. Historically, this presumption,pater est quem nupttae demonstral, could be conquered only
by strong proof of the husband's absence or impotency. In England the rule was that any
children born to a man's wife were irrebuttably presumed to be his issue, if the husband was
anywhere within the "four seas." Note, supra note 42, at 669. See, 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 398-99 (2d ed. 1903), citedrn Note, supra note 42, at
699.
54. Test results showed a 98.89% probability that R. McG. was the child's father. 615 P.2d
at 668.
55. 615 P.2d at 671.
56. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-105 to -107 (1978).
57. 615 P.2d at 670.
58. Id. at 671.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 670. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
state of Colorado or any of its political subdivisions on account of sex." COLO. CONST. art. II,
§ 29.
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105(2) (1978).
62. 615 P.2d at 671.
63. The Stantey Court said that procedure by presumption was permissible, but "when.
[that] procedure forecloses the determinative issues . . . [and] explicitly disdains present reali-
ties in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important
interests of both parents and child." 405 U.S. at 657.




Judicially mandated, In re SP.B. leaves no doubt that the constitutional
principles articulated ten years ago by the United States Supreme Court in a
series of highly controversial decisions6 5 are still arousing debate in Colo-
rado. Through its affirmation of the district court opinion, the Colorado
Supreme Court gave no credence to either the equal protection or due pro-
cess arguments advanced by the unwed father.
The court held that the father, P.D.G., could not escape his obligation
to provide child support. This decision was perhaps made inevitable in light
of the constitutional mandate set forth a decade ago in Gomez,
66 which re-
quired equal support for illegitimate and legitimate children.
Although controversy over the continuing enforcement of child support
duties against unwed fathers6 7 undoubtedly will continue, in this era in
which the courts have, in essence, said that women have a choice not to be
burdened with unwanted children but that men have no choice;6 8 the
court's finding of a paternal support obligation in SP.B. is not surprising.
Moreover, this decision furthers the state's objective of protecting the best
interests of the child.
A. The Father's Position
Although the father admitted paternity, he advanced several arguments
in denial of a child support obligation. He argued that the UPA, through its
statutory imposition of the duty of child support upon both parents without
granting the father the right to decide whether to terminate the pregnancy,
violates the father's right to equal protection of the laws under both the
United States Constitution
6 9 and the state constitution.
70
The father also claimed that the UPA creates an irrebuttable presump-
tion that a father must share in child support. According to the father, this
presumption is no longer valid because the availability of legal abortions
breaks the required nexus between intercourse and birth. He contended that
he should at least be given an opportunity to demonstrate that this nexus
had been broken.
7 1
The father reasoned that the wide-spread availability of legalized abor-
tions, together with the mother's unilateral decision to have the child against
his wishes, served as an "intervening factor" breaking the nexus between the
ger ofa Poorly Kept Secret, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 777 (1970) (discussing the current judicial dilemma
concerning artificial insemination).
65. See supra notes 4-5.
66. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
67. See Comment, Child Support: Implications ofAbortion on the Relative Parental Duties, 28 U.
FLA. L. REV. 988 (1976).
68. Swan, Paternal Child-Support Tort Parallels for the Abortion on Maternal Demand Era: The
Work ofRegan, Levy, and Duncan, 3 GLENDALE L. REV. 249, 250 (1978-79).
69. See supra note 20.
70. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 25. This clause has been interpreted to include equal protection of
laws. See Vanderhoof v. People, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903 (1963).
71. Brief for Respondent-Appellant, supra note 1, at 1.
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act of intercourse and the birth. 72 Specifically, the father advanced his belief
that the sex-based distinction found in the UPA was unconstitutional under
the Supreme Court's intermediate scrutiny test.
73
In addition, the father argued that Roe, in making alternatives to birth
available, removed the inevitability of an implied contract between the par-
ties in which they agree that the father will meet his support obligation if
conception occurs.74 At most, the father contended, the parties impliedly
contract to share the expense of the immediate consequences of their act-
the expense of the pregnancy or the abortion. The father noted that if a
court were to find that the parties did enter into an implied contract to sup-
port the child, this would result in paternal rights to the fetus, a right the
Supreme Court has emphatically denied.
75
The father also contended that Roe destroys any tort basis for imposing
support liability on the biological father. 76 Under the tort theory, the "neg-
ligence" of the father arises in the performance of an act that potentially
requires parental liability. This liability is not imposed, however, unless the
act is the proximate cause of the injury. The mother's unilateral decision to
bear a child or to abort acts as an intervening force and removes the act of
intercourse as the proximate cause of birth.
77
Additionally, the father proposed that the mother indemnify him for his
child support expenses since she had the last clear chance to avoid birth, and
her inaction was more responsible for the damages (birth) than his action.
The father maintained that every plaintiff in Colorado has a duty to miti-
gate the damages sustained. The mother failed in this duty, and as a result
the father's liability should be limited to the cost of an abortion or childbirth
and should not extend to the aggravated damage of child support.
78
Finally, the father argued that traditional concepts of American law
require that obligations imposed upon an individual be offset by the enjoy-
ment of corresponding rights. According to the father, these rights were
foreclosed and the fair consequence would be placing the burden of financial
responsibility on the mother for her unilateral decision.79 The father likened
his role to that of an artificial insemination donor. Under Colorado law,
these fathers are non-liable, even though they are aware that their donation
will possibly result in child support needs.80
B. The State's Position
The state reasoned that the father's duty to the child is no greater than
the obligation imposed on the mother, and that such a duty is mandated on
72. Id. at 3.
73. See supra note 42.
74. Brief for Respondent-Appellant, supra note 1, at 4-5.
75. Id. at 5-6. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
76. Brief for Respondent-Appellant, supra note 1, at 6-7.
77. Id at 6.
78. Id at 6-8.
79. Id. at 10.
80. Id at 9. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1978).
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equal protection grounds by Gomez. 8 1 The state claimed that the best inter-
ests of the child are served by the statutory provisions of the UPA,8 2 which
presume a shared parental support obligation; moreover, it was asserted that
the child's equal protection rights would be violated unless the father's duty
to support was affirmed. The state strengthened this argument by compar-
ing the total innocence of the child with the father's relative lack of
innocence.
83
The state reiterated the United States Supreme Court's position that
the right to privacy requires freedom from governmental intrusion into areas
as intimate as the decision to bear or abort a child.8 4 Noting that it was the
father's conscious decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the possible
consequence of conception, the state asserted that the father's desire to pre-
clude this natural result could not be forced upon the mother or enforced by
the state as this would constitute impermissible governmental intrusion.
8 5
The state also observed that other jurisdictions have ruled against un-
wed fathers making similar arguments.8 6 With facts precisely on point to
SPB, the Alabama Supreme Court in Hars v. State,8 7 rejected the father's
offer to pay for an abortion as a legitimate escape from his child support
obligation. The Alabama justices rejected the father's argument that be-
cause he was denied any decision as to the birth of the child, he should be
released from any child maintenance obligation. Furthermore, the court
held that the state's paternity statutes did not deny the father equal protec-
tion of the laws.8'
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Dorsey v. Enghsh 89 found no merit to
a father's theory that the nexus between intercourse and birth is broken by
the woman's right to abortion. The court discounted the father's claim that
his role in the birth of the child had become so attenuated that his circum-
stance was dissimilar from the mother, and that the Maryland statute
treated him unequally.9°
C. The Colorado Supreme Court's Holding
The court's holding was significantly influenced by Colorado's interest
in promoting the welfare of its children. 0' The court validated the statutory
presumption requiring parents who have participated in an act resulting in
conception to be jointly responsible for their actions and this presumption
81. Brief for Petitioner-Appellee at 6, In re S.P.B. 651 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Petitioner-Appellee]; Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. at 538.
82. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-102 (1978).
83. Brief for Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 81, at 7.
84. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
85. Brief for Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 81, at 8-9.
86. Id. at 9.
87. 356 So. 2d 623 (Ala. 1978).
88. Id at 624.
89. 283 Md. 522, 390 A.2d 1133 (1978).
90. A case with similar facts in the Texas Civil Appeals Court arrived at the same conclu-
sion. D.W.L. v. M.J.B.C., 601 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
91. 651 P.2d at 1217.
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was found to reflect the "well-considered judgment" of the legislature.
9 2
The court emphasized, however, that the state has little room for error on its
constitutional catwalk toward protecting the best interests of the child, due
to the proscription from interference with the woman's "fundamental right"
to make decisions regarding her pregnancy.
9 3
Although the justices recognized the existence of a sex-based classifica-
tion they, nonetheless, upheld the statute by finding that the father's right to
be free from these classifications is outweighed by the state's substantial,
competing interest. Additionally, the court, applying heightened judicial
scrutiny, found that an important governmental objective is served by the
classification and that it is substantially related to the achievement of that
objective.
94
Recognizing the disfavor with which irrebuttable presumptions have
been viewed in light of the due process clause,95 the court applied the Vlandis
v. Kline two-pronged test.96 The SP.B. court found the father incapable of
meeting the second prong of the test, which requires a challenger to demon-
strate that the state has reasonable alternative means of making its determi-
nation without applying an irrebuttable presumption. Therefore, the court
never reached the first prong of the test,97 which provides that a statutory
presumption can be invalidated only when it is not necessarily or universally
true.
The father's request for a case-by-case determination 98 of the existence
of the nexus was swiftly rejected on the basis of three critical interests served
by the presumption. The court found that the presumption of a shared pa-
rental support obligation protects the interests of the child, the interests of




Almost one-third of the births in this country are the result of non-legal-
ized relationships.'° The rights of these children have evolved over centu-
ries to a current judicial policy,10 1 which requires that such children receive
care, maintenance, and education equivalent to children born of a legalized
92. Id
93. Id at 1216. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (decision whether to bear
a child is fundamental); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
94. 651 P.2d at 1215.
95. The Supreme Court emasculated irrebuttable presumptions in a series of decisions
stretching from the early 1940's to the late 1960's. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
631 (1969) (presumption that new residents exploited welfare system condemned); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (presumption denying voting by military struck down); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (injustice of automatic sterilization). See also L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1092-93 (1978).
96. 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
97. 651 P.2d at 1217.
98. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
99. 651 P.2d at 1217.
100. FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND LOVERS 95 (S. Katz & M. Inker eds. 1979).




In an effort to prevent the state from suffering economically for the so-
called "sins of the fathers," several states have enacted parental support stat-
utes.' 0 3 Although such statutes are fair in some respects, they are contrary to
basic American judicial traditions in their imposition of obligations without
the granting of concurring rights.'0 4 This analysis will discuss the unwed
father's support obligation, the underlying social policies, and the court's
procedure in implementing this obligation.
A. The Question of the Nexus
Although paternal support statutes have been in effect for many years,
few scholars questioned their constitutionality until Roe. Under Roe, the de-
cision whether to abort rests solely with the mother and her physician,
10 5
allowing the mother to make a unilateral decision completely unaffected by
the desires or direction of the father. The mother's unilateral decision-mak-
ing capability raises questions concerning the proximate cause of birth. Is
conception still the cause, as was the accepted view when abortions were
illegal and unavailable, or does the woman's decision regarding the preg-
nancy intervene as the cause of birth and place responsibility for the support
of the child solely upon her?
If the mother's decision is considered the proximate cause of birth, then
the father's rights under the equal protection clause are violated when he is
forced to support the child, because the mother's action breaks the required
nexus between intercourse and birth. One scholar, examining this nexus,
strongly argued that it is broken under the rationale in Roe and that all
paternal support statutes are invalid, because their underlying premise has
been removed.' 0 6 This argument is supported by reference to such cases as
Doe v. Doe 107 and Jones v. Smith. 108
Indeed, it seems illogical that the same act that cannot commit the fe-
male partner to motherhood can commit the male partner to fatherhood and
twenty-one years of child support. Because the Supreme Court has declared
that a woman's right to privacy guarantees that she should not be burdened
with unwanted children, 1° 9 proponents of the broken nexus theory believe it
102. See generall, H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA (1981).
103. Nine states including Colorado have adopted legislation conforming to the Uniform
Parentage Act. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-
101 to -129 (1978 & Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1976 Supp. 1982); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51 to -. 74 (West Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -135 (1981);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 126.011- to -.391 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-01 to -26 (1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010 to .905 (Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120
(1977).
104. The unwed natural father is only now gaining rights with respect to his child. See supra
text accompanying notes 37-41.
105. 410 U.S. at 163.
106. See supra note 7.
107. 365 Mass. 556, 314 N.E.2d 128 (1974) (a husband has no constitutional or statutory
right to determine whether or not his child should be aborted).
108. 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974) (a potential putative
father does not have the right to restrain the natural mother from terminating her pregnancy).
109. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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is inequitable for the father to be so burdened."10
Directly countering this argument is the view currently expressed by the
majority of commentators, who suggest that the nexus is not broken under
the Roe rationale.' I" Under this theory, the mother's decision to bear the
child, even in light of the abortion option, is insufficient to shift the burden
of support solely to her. The foundation for this theory is based on the argu-
ment that the father, as a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence, can
foresee conception and the subsequent birth of the child as a possible conse-
quence of intercourse. Two commentators, Levy and Duncan, 1 2 disagree
that the proximate cause of birth should be imputed to the mother alone,
because such a theory is based on the untenable implication that the
mother's unilateral decision not to abort could have caused the birth inde-
pendently of the original act of intercourse.
Moreover, if the mother has a duty to avoid the natural consequences of
intercourse, an implied contract to abort would result. This type of contract,
as well as any other contract for sexual relations, is in violation of public
policy, 113 and damages for its breach will not be imposed. 114 Consequently,
the father's act of intercourse places him in the position of one jointly respon-
sible for the pregnancy. A chain of causation is created between his actions
and the birth; the mother's unilateral action or inaction serves as a weak
link, though insufficiently weak to break the causal chain.
With the causal connection even feebly intact, any challenge to the va-
lidity of paternal support statutes using the broken nexus approach will fail.
Several theories remain, however, to challenge the support obligation im-
posed on the unwed father.
B. An Oblgation Wihout Rights?
One theory, an equal protection argument distinct from the broken
nexus rationale, was advanced in SPB. and dismissed by the Colorado
court. The father argued that his right to equal protection was violated by
the statutory imposition of a child support obligation on both parents,
1 5
without giving him a role in the decision of whether to terminate the preg-
nancy.11 6 Under the so called "abortion cases,''117 however, equal protec-
tion arguments are subservient to the fundamental privacy rights recognized
as an implicit liberty guarantee in the fourteenth amendment.i8 The court
110. See, e.g., supra note 7.
111. Levy & Duncan, The Impact of Roe v. Wade on Paternal Support Statutes. A Constitutional
Analysis, 10 FAM. L.Q. 179, 193 (1976).
112. Id.
113. Early Colorado law suggests that a contract for sexual relations is void. See Baker v.
Couch, 74 Colo. 380, 221 P. 1089 (1923).
114. Cf J. SONENBLICK, LEGALITY OF LOVE 154 (1981) (no damages will be imposed for
breach of an agreement not to bear children).
115. 651 P.2d at 1215.
116. Id. at 1214.
117. See supra notes 4 and 5.
118. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a law which
prohibited distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to adults except by licensed pharma-
cists and to persons under sixteen who do not have the approval of a licensed physician); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (decision to bear children is a privacy right belonging to a
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in SP.B., therefore, properly dismissed this argument.
The statutory imposition of the duty of child support upon both parents
will inevitably pass the intermediate standard of review employed by the
Supreme Court in cases of gender classifications. " 9 The classification pres-
ent in the parental support statutes serves the important governmental
objectives of ensuring the woman's right to privacy and the best interest of
the child, and is substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
The statute also passes the standard of review mandated at the state
level, since the Colorado Equal Rights Amendment 120 exempts from scru-
tiny a narrow class of cases in which the classification of the sexes is based on
physiological differences. 12 1 Undoubtedly, this exemption includes the ca-
pability of women to carry and bear children. 122 Even the most skeptical
critics of the imposition of child support obligations on the unwed father
have been forced to agree that the sexes are not similarly situated with re-
spect to childbirth. Consequently, the inevitable conclusion surfaces: abso-
lute equal treatment is not mandated by the constitution. The only
requirement is that the classification meet the intermediate scrutiny
standard.
C. The Irrebuttable Presumption
The court, zealous in pursuing its goal to protect the best interests of the
child, also found the father's procedural due process argument to be without
merit.' 2 3 The SP. court held that the father's suggestion of a case-by-case
determination of the existence of a child support obligation, rather than util-
ization of the irrebuttable presumption, failed to meet the second prong of
the Vlandis test,1 2 4 because such an ad hoc determination is an unreasonable
alternative for the state.'
2 5
The court reasoned that a case-by-case determination would constitute
"unconscionable governmental interference with privacy rights which the
Supreme Court has deemed inviolate."' 2 6 This privacy argument is inade-
quate for several reasons.
single person as well as a married person); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invali-
dating a law which made it a crime to use contraceptives).
119. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
120. CoLO. CONST. art. II, § 29.
121. G. DouTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAw 302 (1979).
122. People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973). As a consequence of such exemp-
tion, a Colorado rape statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-401 (1963), punishing only male offend-
ers was found constitutional in People v. Sahnas, 191 Colo. 171, 551 P.2d 703 (1976). The Sahnas
court stated that the Equal Rights Amendment "does not prohibit differential treatment among
the sexes when, as here, that treatment is reasonably and genuinely based on physical character-
istics unique to just one sex .... In such a case, the sexes are not similarly situated and thus,
equal treatment is not required." Id at 174, 551 P.2d at 706. Note, however, that COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-401 (1973) now punishes both male and female offenders.
123. 651 P.2d at 1214.
124. Under Vlandis an irrebuttable statutory presumption can be invalidated only when a
two-pronged test is met: when the presumption is not necessarily or universally true, and when
the state has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. 412 U.S. at
452.




In most previous cases involving the penumbra-based constitutional
right to privacy, a statute was found invalid when individuals challenged
that statute because they believed it violated their privacy. 1'27 In these cases
the challenged statutes were found invalid because they created unwar-
ranted intrusions into intimate and private spheres. Although the father in
SP.B. was willing to waive his right to privacy, the court would not allow
the mother's right to privacy, inseparable from the father's under these cir-
cumstances, to be violated. The result is an interesting and questionable
twist in judicial interpretation of who can assert a privacy interest and when
it can be asserted.
The court cloaked itself with a privacy rationale and did not articulate
the true reasons behind the denial of the case-by-case method: public policy
considerations and administrative convenience. 12 8 Apparently uncomforta-
ble with basing their decision explicitly upon these reasons, the court re-
sorted to a "parade of horribles" argument which climaxed when the court
said it should not be burdened with a judicial inquiry into "any of a multi-
tude of legal theories which ingenious litigants and their lawyers might ad-
vance."' 1 9 The court stated that such an inquiry would represent an
unconscionable governmental interference with privacy rights. 130 Although
it may legitimately be argued that such a procedure would be a difficult
task, case-by-case determination is a traditional role of the courts and ad-
ministrative convenience alone is not a valid reason to uphold an irrebut-
table presumption. 131
The irony behind the court's use of privacy to prevent rebuttal of the
presumption becomes clear when one realizes that one year earlier, in R.
McG v.J W,132 the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly rejected a very pow-
erful privacy argument advanced by a woman and her husband. Indeed, R.
McG. paves the way for a serious intrusion into the private, intimate sphere
of marriage.
The court in R. McG. allowed an alleged biological father to rebut a
long standing legal presumption. 133 The unwed father in SPB., however,
was not allowed to rebut the presumption of the father's duty to share in
child support. Such a difference is difficult to reconcile. Undoubtedly, the
court noted that R. McG. dealt with the denial of the parent-child relation-
ship, while in SP.B. only a monetary property interest was at issue.
134
Putting all other theories aside, the unwed father should prevail in his
127. Se, supra note 118.
128. Dorsey v. English, 283 Md. 522, 526, 390 A.2d 1133, 1138 (1978). The court in Dorsey
listed the simplification of procedures as one reason for upholding a similar statute.
129. 651 P.2d at 1217.
130. Id
131. The Stanley Court said that although "efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state
ends [are] a proper state interest . . .the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. . . . Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized
determination." 405 U.S. at 656-57.
132. 615 P.2d 666. The mother and her husband argued that their constitutional right to
privacy was violated by the court's grant of standing to the putative father, R. McG. 1d at 672.
133. See supra note 53.
134. See Swan, supra note 7, at 257.
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effort to submit evidence to rebut the presumption simply because such a
presumption is contrary to due process, which requires an opportunity to be
heard in protection of a property interest. 135 In order to determine whether
or not the unwed father should be provided an opportunity to rebut the
presumption of the shared parental obligation of child support, due process
demands that the competing private and state interests be weighed. 136 In
SP.B. the unwed father's property interest, the cost of twenty-one years of
child support plus half the expense of birth, should be weighed against the
state's legitimate interests, which are the best interests of the child and the
state's economic interest in preventing the child from becoming its ward.'
37
As noted by Justice Marshall: "Where the private interests affected are
very important, and the governmental interest can be promoted without
much difficulty by a well-designed hearing procedure," the Constitution "re-
quires the government to act on an individualized basis, with general pro-
positions serving only as rebuttable presumptions or other burden-shifting
devices."' 138 Because the father has a constitutionally cognizable property
interest, such a weighing process leads to the logical conclusion that he be
given an opportunity to be heard.
Although it may be argued that unwed fathers will seldom be successful
in rebutting the presumption of their child support duties and that Colorado
need not undergo the administrative inconvenience of such inquiry, the due
process clause was designed to protect such fragile individual rights from the
often overbearing governmental concern for efficiency. 139 In light of these
due process considerations, unwed fathers should be allowed to submit evi-
dence to rebut the presumption of responsibility for child support.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision in S.P.B. reaffirms the slow and
sometimes painful evolution of the legal status of illegitimate children from
second-class citizens to equal participants in society. The decision recognizes
the unwed mother's constitutional right to privacy, and right to unilaterally
choose to abort or bear a child while not foregoing the possibility of child
support from the father. The court in SP.B. affirms the interest of the state
minimizing its welfare roles while ensuring adequate support of its children.
The decision, however, fails to recognize the unwed father's constitutional
right to procedural due process by upholding an irrebuttable presumption of
mutual, parental child support obligations.
135. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (due process con-
sists of those procedural safeguards designed to accord to the individual the right to be heard
before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind).
136. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
137. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (discussing constitutional adequacy
of state's procedures). In S.P.B., the risk of erroneous deprivation of the father's interest was
high while the value of a hearing, as an additional procedural safeguard, was not unduly
burdensome.
138. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
139. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 656.
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While the court's dismissal of the father's equal protection claim is justi-
fied, dismissal of his due process argument is flawed. Through this denial of
due process, the court strikes a needlessly dangerous balance between com-
peting state and private interests. This problem could have been avoided
effectively by permitting the father to rebut the presumption of his child
support obligation and by requiring the court to reach the merits of his case.
Procedure by presumption is seldom justified, 140 and it is not justified here.
Although case-by-case determination may present complications for the
court, such complications are surmountable.1
4t
SPB. not only represents the end of the trend in Colorado toward
broadening the rights of an unwed father, it represents a judicial step back-
ward in the area of an unwed father's rights to procedural due process.
Kathyn L. Sjuzn
140. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1092 (1978).
141. The Supreme Court has found that interests similar to the one at stake in S.P.B. were
important enough to trigger the admission of rebuttal evidence. Cleveland School Bd. v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (fitness of pregnant teachers); United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (food stamps); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (reduced
college tuition); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father's competency to raise his
children); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of a driver's license).
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